MPS response to the HMIC Stockwell Inspection

Report: 8
Date: 9 July 2009
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report summarises the findings of the latest Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) inspection into the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) response to Stockwell and outlines how the MPS is going to action the issues raised in that report. In particular the report outlines:

• the new ‘non-departmental’ approach mentioned in paragraph 1.2.7 of the HMIC report
• the governance structure and performance management framework to support this new approach
• a detailed action plan including how responsibility has been allocated, the resources required to deliver it (and how these are being provided), key milestones and deliverables

A. Recommendation

That the Authority should actively monitor and scrutinise progress made by the MPS in achieving the deliverables in the agreed timescales.

B. Supporting information

Summary of HMIC Report findings

1. The third HMIC report concerning the MPS response to the tragic events that led to the death of Jean Charles de Menezes (‘The Report’) was received on 22 May 2009. The Report focuses on Command & Control and the closely related issue of ‘inter-operability’ i.e. how different units and personnel work together operationally in Counter-Terrorism operations.

2. The Report defines ‘inter-operability’ as ‘a seamless working relationship between different units and personnel’ requiring certain features including:

• Shared ethos (of what matters most)
• Common doctrine (a common set of operating principles or guidance)
• A unified command model (clarity of who is in charge of what)
• Compatible and reliable communication systems
• Shared language (that ensures common understanding in pressurised operating environments)
• Common equipment
• Common standards of professional practice

All supported through a process of continuous capability building by:

• Shared training and exercising
• Shared operational experience through working together
• Shared learning and debriefing

3. The Report concludes that the MPS has continued to make progress and that ‘highly significant achievements’ have been seen. It acknowledges the important role that the MPS has played in contributing to national policy (e.g. guidance for officers controlling operations, policy on the police use of firearms, and the development of the national counter-terrorism network) and in delivering completely new products that bring national benefits (e.g. the new NPIA firearms command training, interim photo-imagery solutions, and protocols for armed units crossing police force boundaries).

4. The Report also concludes however that the MPS could have worked more swiftly and achieved more, although recognising that there both internal and external contributing factors which have slowed progress, including:

• Legal proceedings – the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) investigation, Health & Safety prosecution, prosecution of the perpetrators of the failed attacks of 21 July 2005, and the Inquest, which concluded in December 2008
• Perceptions of the need for change – differing individual views on what remains to be done to improve capability arising from structural issues of large organisations like the MPS, where there are overarching, but also distinct departmental operational priorities
• Organisational change processes – the scoping, designing, testing, piloting, costing and resourcing required to complete improvement projects and achieve full operational usage
• Consistency of leadership – three different Assistant Commissioners have held responsibility for MPS delivery against the issues raised by the IPCC and HMIC in the four years since July 2005

5. The Report details completed initiatives, including the introduction of a new covert communication system, the delivery of refreshed firearms command training now licensed by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), improved training and exercising for surveillance units, and the implementation of robust management systems for surveillance operations. The Report also details those initiatives that, although not yet complete, have clearly defined activities and timescales to bring them to fruition. These include the introduction of common command doctrine across all operations, a smaller team, or ‘cadre’, of firearms commanders (to enhance operational competence and integrity thereby providing greater mitigation of operational and organisational risk) and the formation of a new Chief Officer cadre to deal with operations involving suspected suicide bombers.

6. However, The Report also identifies a number of initiatives requiring additional focus to define key activities and milestones to bring them to fruition (detailed at Paras 13 – 19).

7. The Report highlights the need for corporate co-ordination to deliver remaining areas of work to a set timescale.

The new approach, governance structure and performance management framework

8. In response to The Report, the Commissioner has launched a non-departmental approach driven and led by the Deputy Commissioner. All Stockwell related projects are now subsumed into a single work programme (the Extreme Threat Programme). The Deputy Commissioner is the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) and is supported by an Assistant Commissioner as Deputy SRO. The Programme Director is a Commander, who is supported by a full-time dedicated Programme Management Office.

9. The Deputy SRO chairs a monthly Programme Board, attended by Commander level lead users, and by a representative from all relevant support service departments. The role of the Programme Board is to set the strategy for each Project within the work programme and to provide focused leadership and direction to ensure targets are met. Meetings are ‘minuted’, providing an audit trail for decision-making. Competing concerns, that cannot be resolved at Programme Board level, will be taken to the SRO and resolved at Management Board as necessary.

10. Each project with the Extreme Threat Programme has a nominated Project Lead. Each Project Lead has defined a project plan outlining key activities and milestones. The dedicated Programme Management Office monitors progress, has direct oversight of achievement against the project plans, and reports to the Programme Director in advance of Programme Board meetings.

11. A document showing the governance framework is attached at Appendix 1.

The action plan

12. The Report comments that it is unclear how, or by when, some other improvement initiatives will be completed. In response the Commissioner has given an undertaking that all of the work relating to the areas of command & control and inter-operability will have clearly defined target dates for completion by end March 2010. To provide verification of the work having been completed, a number of the projects may be subject to an internal inspection prior to the end of March 2010. The initiatives specifically highlighted by The Report as requiring additional focus are:

13. The single Surveillance Command: This was formed on 6 April 2009 to provide consistency of training, procedure and professional practice, exposure and learning, and to create a platform for increased inter-operability with other departments and national units. The initiative is identified in The Report as requiring further development to achieve the key features of a single entity (common ethos, structures, tasking arrangements, processes and culture). Led by a Detective Chief Superintendent, the issues raised in The Report will be addressed through the implementation of a single management structure, common recruitment and training processes, and a review of tasking processes by end September 2009 [1]. A cycle of rotation of surveillance teams between crime and counter-terrorism operations will be complete by end November 2009.

14. The new counter-terrorism control room known as 1600: This facility has been in partial use since April 2009; full operational usage has been delayed due to issues relating to security accreditation. A CTC Detective Chief Superintendent is responsible for resolution of these issues. The room is expected to be in full operational use by end July 2009.

15. The operational delivery of a new secure photo-imagery system for transmitting images of suspects and other data: Two photo-imagery transmission options offering an enhanced level of security to that of the current system have been identified. As highlighted in The Report, funding has been secured, however a Detective Superintendent is leading work to identify the system that best meets need (considering departmental, service-wide and national requirements) at lowest cost. Full operational usage of the chosen option will be achieved by at least end March 2010.

16. Clarity on the roles and responsibilities of control room staff: A large and complex project to develop common doctrine for the use, functionality and staffing of MPS control rooms in covert operations, and to maximise inter-operability between these rooms and those used by Central Communications Command (CCC) is underway. The project is led by a Commander supported by a Project Team made up of staff from CTC, CCC and Specialist Crime Directorate (SCD). This work, which must necessarily take into consideration national-level inter-operability issues in both serious crime and counter-terrorism operations, is anticipated to be complete by end March 2010. Running in parallel with this project is work led by the National Co-ordinator - PREPARE to design and deliver training to all staff working within operations rooms across the national CT network, to achieve compliance with guidance recently published by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM). It is anticipated that the MPS will be the pilot site for the first module of this training during August 2009.

17. The debrief of the events of July 2005: This debrief, commissioned by Commander SO15 (CTC), is not intended to be a re-examination of the events of 21 July 2005, which have already been subject to intense scrutiny through judicial processes, rather to ensure that learning is captured from the wider events of July/August 2005. The debrief report will be complete by end July 2009 and is likely to result in a number of recommendations.

18. A structured approach to organisational learning: A service-wide strategic level Organisational Learning (OL) Project has been ongoing since May 2007, led by a Commander. This Project has developed a corporate OL model for use by all business groups. A decision was recently taken by Management Board that the Deputy Commissioner has overall responsibility for OL in the MPS, and compliance with the corporate model was initially tested across a number of business groups during February 2009 in an internal inspection. A further service-wide internal inspection will be arranged in due course. The Report highlights that CTC provides a broad range of high quality learning opportunities through cross-departmental and multi-agency exercising. A Commander led project is underway to develop processes (in accordance with the corporate OL model) by which learning from CTC and firearms operations, and from CT exercises, can be captured, assessed and utilised to inform and validate improvement measures. This necessarily includes a review of debriefing processes. These processes will be in place by end March 2010.

19. Standard terms (a glossary) for operational use in communications by firearms and surveillance officers, which all understand and which will prevent mistakes or misunderstandings: The MPS has compiled a draft of what is anticipated to become a national glossary to ensure common understanding between all forces in England & Wales. The consultation phase is nearing completion and a mature draft will be completed by end July 2009. Although it will take further time for formal agreement, adoption and publication at a national level, the MPS will move to immediate implementation. By end March 2010 the glossary will be embedded into all relevant MPS firearms, surveillance and command policy or guidance documents and training courses, and its application will have been tested in exercise.

C. Race and equality impact

There are no Race and Equality Impact issues directly relevant to this report. There may be issues relevant to specific projects as they near the stage of doctrine formulation. Issues will be identified and managed by the relevant Project Leads with oversight of the Programme Board as necessary.

D. Financial implications

The Extreme Threat Programme Office is funded until end March 2010. Most projects within the work programme are managed by a part-time Project Team; a small number have staff seconded to a full-time Project Team, however these staff continue to be funded by their respective business groups. Financial implications will arise in relation to specific projects as they move to procurement or implementation stage. These will be identified and managed by the relevant Project Leads with oversight of the Programme Board as necessary and subject to normal approval processes.

E. Background papers

• HMIC Report- ‘Stockwell - MPS Progress January 2008 to April 2009’

F. Contact details

Report author: Inspector Tracey Baker, Central Operations on behalf of Assistant Commissioner John Yates, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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