Specialist Operations Thematic Performance Report - personal protection

Report: 10
Date: 13 May 2010
By: AC Yates on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

A summary of (a) the broad performance framework, including customer satisfaction, for Specialist Operations, and (b) the delivery of personal protection, including learning from previous high-profile and/or challenging events.

A. Recommendation

That Strategic and Operational Policing Committee note the contents of this report.

B. Supporting information

Key performance issues for SO generally

1. This part of the report addresses the key performance issues for the Specialist Operations Business Group generally.

2. Given the nature of terrorism, it is recognised that it is difficult to monitor performance in the same way as other types of crime. Counter-terrorism policing activities are often sensitive and high profile - success ultimately being measured by an absence of terrorist incidents and/or the safety of the public and protected persons not being compromised. This kind of activity does not lend itself to volumetric or quantitative measurement in the same way as other areas of policing e.g. volume crime. Clearly it would not be appropriate to judge success solely on the fact that a terrorist incident doesn’t occur or that a protected person survives a public engagement. It is for this reason that our performance measures will tend to be more qualitative or reflective of an element of the operational activity that prevents the terrorist incident or ensures safety.

3. Also for the above reasons it is also not possible to identify a single or small number of measures that will truly reflect the breadth of activity that takes place. Work is continuing to identify a broader range or measures and this complements a desire from within the Home Office to include appropriate counter-terrorism and domestic extremism measures within the APACS (Assessment of Policing and Community Safety) framework. Currently it would appear that a hierarchical approach may be more appropriate. Such a hierarchy might include measures around:

• Terrorist actions – fatalities, injuries and other casualties, damage to property etc;
• Measures of our success in terms of harm reduction relevant to terrorism and domestic extremism;
• Qualitative measures – from the views of other key stakeholders i.e. Government, MPA and other chief police officers
• Measures of public confidence from responses to the Public Attitude Survey (PAS);
• Disruptions – attack planning/logistical support;
• Terrorism-related arrests, charges and convictions (Terrorism Act and non- Terrorism Act);
• Detention issues/monitoring and monitoring use of Terrorism Act powers such as stop and search;
• Intelligence/investigation processes – compliance/achievement of standards;
• Effective/efficient resource management – monitoring of resource management costs and ‘high volume’ costs;

4. Alongside developments within the MPS, work is currently being undertaken nationally to develop a performance management framework for the national counter-terrorism network. Any nationally agreed measures would be embedded within the MPS counter-terrorism performance framework. Given the national/international nature of the terrorist threat and the closeness of the relationship between the MPS and national counter-terrorism policing, it is likely that MPS performance will increasing be seen as supporting a national policing response.

5. The public reporting of operational performance in relation to counter-terrorism is complex – not least because some of the relevant data is either classified or sensitive. Therefore it is necessary to strike the right balance between the need for transparency and a duty to ensure that security and operational capability are not compromised. For this reason detailed performance data is provided in a restricted form and presented to MPA Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub-Committee.

Confidence and public attitudes

6. There can be little doubt that concerns about terrorist attacks and perceptions of how effective the police are in preventing such attacks are likely to influence public confidence. The quarterly MPS Public Attitude Survey (PAS) includes a number of questions that provide an indication of the public’s views on these issues.

7. As part of the survey, respondents are asked to what extent they are worried about terrorist attacks within London and within their own local area. The graph at Appendix A provides a summary of responses to these questions over the last five years. The percentage of respondents who are currently ‘worried’ about a terrorist attack in London has fallen consistently during the last 12 months and is now 43%. At this time last year the figure was around 50%. The number of respondents ‘worried’ about a terrorist attack in their own local area has also fallen consistently and now stands at 15%. Again, this is a significant reduction on the position 12 months ago when around 26% of respondents were worried about such an attack. It is difficult to link these reductions to any specific aspects of policing activity and it likely that public concern decreases with the passing of time since previous attacks and/or relevant incidents. The graph at Appendix B includes two ‘timelines’ which assist to highlight the impact on public concern following the terrorist incidents in July 2005 and June 2007.

8. Within the PAS respondents are also asked to rate (on a scale of 1 to 7; 1 being low and 7 high) ‘how important’ they feel it is that the MPS undertakes 16 specified activities - including preventing terrorism. Respondents are additionally asked to rate ‘how well’ they feel the police are doing in relation to each of these activities. The table and associated graphs at Appendix B provide a summary of responses over the last three years. Despite the reduction in their concern around attacks, respondents continue to view counter-terrorist policing as of high importance (consistently within the top three of the 16 activities listed in the Public Attitude Survey). The respondents’ view of how well the police are doing in relation to preventing terrorism is also high (consistently at number 1 for the 16 activities listed in the survey). Both of these remain true for the current reporting period. Where there are increases/decreases in ratings these tend to be reflected uniformly across all the listed activities.

Current Specialist Protection work undertaken

9. The remainder of this report focuses on the work of the Specialist Protection Operational Command Unit (SO1).

10. SO1 provides protection to public officials where deemed necessary by official committees or required by international conventions. Its work is capital city, national and international in scope.

11. To deliver its services it works closely with regulatory partners. Services are delivered according to MPS standards, policies and values.

Learning from the London (G20) Summit

12. The London Summit on Jobs and Growth in April 2009 tested SO1’s ability to provide security to unprecedented numbers of visitors. It achieved this efficiently as well as effectively, by working closely with other police forces and government departments.

13. The protection of certain VIPs who attended the G20 Summit would have been major security events in their own right. SO1 learned that confidence of such delegations required a substantial investment in time and engagement, which it achieved at an operational and organisational level. Looking ahead to 2012 – it learned that engagement with the relevant parties prior to and during visits is as important as the actual operational activity during such visits.

14. Through a sustained development of its major event capability over a number of years, SO1 has confidence that it will be able to deliver future major events to similar high standards.

Learning from Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)

15. The strategy to engage the host authorities ensured that the MPS were able to protect key VIPs visiting CHOGM in 2009.

16. The protection operations at the London Summit and the CHOGM were both considered to be very successful, not only in terms of the operational delivery of security, but also in terms of proactively identifying learning for future protection operations generally, and the London 2012 Olympics in particular.

Learning from work carried out in war zones and how it impacts on other aspects of personal protection

17. Protection in war zones and other hazardous environments, is a growing and challenging area of SO1’s work, in which it has learned of the importance of working closely with key stakeholders to deliver safety. Officers receive specific training and are specifically equipped for this role.

Preparation for Commonwealth Games (CWG)

18. SO1 has offered assistance to develop capacity and capability of members of the Indian authorities and planning for the CWG in October 2010. It has offered good practice and learning from major events to support plans.

Preparation for Olympic Games

19. Planning for the 2012 Olympic Games in London is fully underway and on course in terms of project planning and preparation. Her Majesty’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations will add to the number of VIP visitors.

20. SO1 has drawn upon its experiences and learning from the 2004 Athens, 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Vancouver 2009 Games, together with its wider operational learning in shaping its plan.

Financial and resource challenges for personal protection for planned large scale events and ongoing personal protection

21. The funding for personal protection is provided by the Home Office to the MPS through the Dedicated Security Posts (DSP) Specific Grant. The levels of funding and evolving operational requirements are subject to ongoing discussion between the MPS and Home Office.

22. Realistic funding continues to be a challenge in steady state and in meeting unforeseen increases in demand, such as large-scale major events. Budget management and local expenditure controls have been successful, however there is a need for agreement on appropriate funding mechanisms for this activity.

C. Race and equality impact

23. SO1 is the smallest of the six Operational OCUs in Specialist Operations, five of which are armed. Black & Minority Ethnic (B&ME) officer representation in SO1 is 6.7% with an SO average of 7.5%. B&ME Police Staff representation is 17.4% with an average across SO of 21.9%. Female officers make up just 8.3% of the total, with an average of 9.1% across SO. 69.6% of Police Staff in SO1 are female, while the average across SO is 43.7%.

24. B&ME diversity within SO1 is clearly not at MPS targets, but remains at a level that parallels many other specialist OCUs. SO1’s Diversity strategy includes developing the mentoring scheme both internally and for those wishing to join the OCU and the setting up of internal focus groups. Improved workforce diversity is especially desirable, as it has the potential to enhance the skills base, to meet the needs of the diverse backgrounds of our protected principals. SO1 ensures that this work is fully connected to the wider development within the Business Group through active membership of the SO Diversity Board and the SO Diversity Working Group.

25. As can be seen from the above figures, gender diversity of police officers is an issue for this OCU in comparison to OCUs outside SO. Apart from wishing to properly reflect the community we serve, there are many practical operational advantages to a larger proportion of female Protection Officers, including the fact that we have female principals. Female officers have reported that the perception of poor work/life balance, working away from home, and carriage of firearms are the main barriers to their applying. Over the last few years the OCU has undertaken a series of measures to encourage and attract female officers to work in SO1. Female-only recruitment days, opportunities to try out firearms on a range, identifying and encouraging female officers, mentoring for female candidates through the selection process, and facilitating officers who wish to work flexibly and/or not work outside of London. The OCU has a well-received female focus group, which provides a forum for female officers to engage and support each other. However, it remains the case that for many female officers, the perception of a male-dominated and physically very demanding role deters them from considering a career in this OCU. SO1 has been successful in attracting a significant number of female officers to the briefing days in the last recruitment round, and is working with other departments to overcome the challenges posed by the fitness test to female applicants.

26. SO1's primary customer group of protected principals is set by Governmental committees. SO1 tailors its service to meet the unique needs of each individual, ensuring they are closely consulted. The permanently-protected principals have many differing backgrounds and particular needs, including disability and illness along with other diversity of lifestyle. When developing a protection package for individual principals, these needs are considered and addressed as a priority, along with security measures. Protection of principals often extends overseas to many diverse locations worldwide. Again, a full briefing is prepared to include cultural and religious considerations when deploying to these countries.

27. In addition, SO1 has responsibility for the security of visiting heads of government and other persons from all over the world where this is authorised through the relevant external committee. These individuals have many diverse needs and cultural backgrounds, as well as language barriers. The Operations Office manages these, and provides a full briefing package for the protection officers to assist them in providing sensitive and appropriate support.

D. Financial implications

1. Financial issues are addressed in the body of the report. This report raises no new financial issues.

E. Legal implications

1. In so far as project planning and preparation for the Olympics raises legal and governance issues, including in respect of procurement, property acquisitions/disposals, partnerships and HR these are dealt with within the business cases submitted to OSCM and the MPA. This report is submitted as part of the governance process and raises no legal issues for consideration.

F. Environmental implications

1. The Metropolitan Police Service is committed to proactively manage and minimise our environmental impacts and prevent pollution through the implementation of the Environmental Strategy.

2. Mindful of environmental considerations, the intention would be to minimize the transportation of dogs seized, the pre-qualification questionnaire required the kennels to be located within a 40 mile radius from WC2N 5HS which is adjudged to be the centre of London.

G. Background papers

None

H. Contact details

Report author: Deputy Assistant Commissioner Janet Williams

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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