Update on organisational learning arising from the Peter Woodhams investigation

Report: 6
Date: 16 September 2010
By: Assistant Commissioner Territorial Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides an overview of measures taken and actions implemented by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) following organisational learning arising from the death of the late Mr Peter Woodhams and inquiries that followed thereafter.

There are five key points to this report that follow the MPA commissioning brief. Information incorporated in this report has been taken from existing MPS, MPA and IPCC documents. The background is presented as a summary of existing reports and documents.

A. Recommendation

That Members note this report.

B. Supporting information

Background

1. On 21 January 2006 Peter Woodhams was stabbed close to his home in Tallis Close, London E16. Police attended, he was taken to hospital, and later released. Information on the suspects was given to police and an initial investigation undertaken.

2. On 21 August 2006, Peter Woodhams was murdered. Two suspects were arrested and charged.

3. Following complaints from the family, the IPCC conducted an investigation into the actions of police following the initial incident, and their subsequent investigation and response. The IPCC investigation also considered any organisational learning for the MPS.

4. Following the IPCC investigation, nine officers were subject to disciplinary proceedings. Two of those officers were required to resign, but subsequently re-instated at an Assistant Commissioner’s review. The family pursued a judicial review process of the AC’s decision, which was refused.

5. The MPS accepted that there were a number of failings in the investigation. These are detailed in previous reports. It also accepts that there were a number of areas for organisational learning. The MPS response to this learning is detailed below.

Overview of MPS organisational learning and measures taken

6. The nine IPCC recommendations can be summarised as follows:

• Primary investigation and supervision
  The IPCC investigation highlighted several failings in the primary investigation into the stabbing of Peter Woodhams carried out by officers attending the scene, and recommended that where a number of supervisory officers are present at a scene responsibility for control of the investigation should be clearly identified.
• Secondary investigation and supervision
  It is the IPCC’s view that the policy in place at the time permitted an inappropriate delegation of responsibility. The IPCC has therefore suggested to the MPS that detective inspectors should retain responsibility for the supervision of the investigation of serious crime and of the officers conducting these investigations.
• Use of the Crime Report Information System
  This IPCC investigation has demonstrated the importance of fully documenting all investigative actions on the crime reporting information system in order to provide a full, transparent and auditable account of the actions conducted by officers during an investigation.
• Witness album display system
  As a result of the investigation the IPCC has also recommended that the MPS in general, and in Newham Borough in particular, review the process by which viewings of photographs are conducted and supervised.
• Identification and management of critical incidents
  The IPCC investigation revealed that while many officers spoken to referred to the Woodhams stabbing as a critical incident, it was not managed by the MPS as such at the time. The IPCC has therefore suggested that the MPS assesses the process by which critical incidents are identified, by which management are made aware of incidents for which they are responsible and for which a response from senior management is required.

Review in relation to the investigation of serious crime in Newham Borough

7. First Review - Newham Borough

Following the death of Peter Woodhams, the MPS Critical Incident Advisory Team (CIAT) was commissioned to conduct an urgent review of all Newham Borough investigations of Grievous Bodily Harm Offences reported between January 1st 2006 and October 10th 2006. The review was to rigorously and independently review the effectiveness of investigation on Newham Borough. The Terms of reference were to:

• assess the police investigation and response to 28 GBH allegations at Newham BOCU identified as incomplete since 01/01/06;
• ensure the enquiries are compliant with MPS serious crime policy;
• identify good practice that was utilised during the investigations identified; and to
• identify areas of concern or organisational learning during this time period.

8. The report made seven recommendations for Newham Borough and a further two for the wider organisation. (Please note that the two MPS recommendations are documented within this report under the header of ‘MPS response to IPCC recommendations’).

First Review - Newham Borough recommendations:

• Risk assessments must be completed before closing an investigation. Including occasions where, a withdrawal statement has been obtained from the victim, the suspects are known to the victim, the victim can be perceived as vulnerable, or the lifestyle of the victim is contributory to the allegation;
• Victims of GBH from whom withdrawal statements have been obtained must be considered for re contact after a suitable period and the risk assessment updated;
• Awareness training must be considered for local officers to ensure that they are conversant with Minimum Standards for Primary Investigation SOP;
• Newham BOCU must ensure adequate support for staff investigating serious offences. This should include regular reviews and intrusive supervision to ensure that the quality of the investigation meets minimum standards and that CRIS reports are updated regularly;
• Awareness training must be considered for supervisors in the identification and management of Critical Incidents;
• Use of “7 day letters” must only be considered when dealing with serious or third party allegations, after substantial (and recorded) efforts have been made to contact the victim; and
• Supervisors must ensure that all officers involved in the investigation of crime consider the importance of CCTV and alternative identification methods such as e-fits, witness boards etc.

Second (CIAT) Review - Newham Borough

9. In order to provide an assessment of the response to recommendations identified during the first review conducted in October 2006 a second Review of Grievous Bodily Harm Investigations on Newham Borough was conducted during the period from November 2006 to January 2007. This included an assessment of the quality against the set parameters agreed in the first review. The terms of reference were to:

• ensure the enquiries are compliant with MPS policy;
• identify Good practice that was utilised during the investigations identified;
• identify areas of concern or organisational learning during this time period;
• assess whether the identified supervision and review structure for GBH Investigations, i.e. DS review after 7 days, DI review after 28 days, is being adhered to; and
• assess the BOCUs response to the recommendations made during the original CIAT review during October 2006.

10. This review found that Newham had reacted positively and diligently to the concerns and recommendations raised; the police response was to alter investigation and supervision systems to ensure that violent incidents were fully resourced and effectively investigated and managed. The Borough had implemented supervisory protocols for the completion of investigative reviews that incorporated management of risk for victims, community and organisation. The positive response demonstrated that the Borough was committed to ensuring that lessons were learned with continual support through local training and standard operating procedure compliance.

2009 MPS Public Protection Review of Newham Borough

11. In September 2009 a review of Newham Borough was conducted regarding serious violence, public protection and management of risk, which is an ongoing MPS wide process.

12 The BOCU was undergoing an extensive restructuring process to aid in tackling risk issues and minimising the opportunities for errors. They have increased the CSU staff considerably and further changes are proposed for the future.

113. There is a Communication Team and a new Communication Strategy that will be used to raise awareness of risk and the need to protect vulnerable people and reduce attrition rates for repeat victims of violent crime. The BOCU has got all the key elements in place to manage risk and Public Protection issues and there are areas of good practice evident.

MPS response to IPCC recommendations

14. Following this second review of investigation in October 2006 on Newham Borough an assessment was commissioned of GBH investigation across the MPS in January 2007. This caused the standard of GBH investigation to be assessed and to identify the general MPS standard of investigation into incidents of serious violence.

15. The terms of reference for this review were to:

• assess the police investigation and management of GBH allegations occurring across the whole MPS between 01/11/06 and 31/01/07;
• ensure the enquiries meet the minimum standards for crime investigation and reporting; and to
• identify whether the supervision and review structures for the GBH investigations, i.e. DS review after 7 days, DI review after 28 days, are being adhered to.

16. The Critical Incident Advisory Team as part of an organisational learning review recommended the following for the MPS:

• Risk assessments must be completed before closing an investigation. Including occasions where, a withdrawal statement has been obtained from the victim, the suspects are known to the victim, the victim can be perceived as vulnerable, or the lifestyle of the victim is contributory to the allegation;
• Due to the positive effect of the TP directions on requiring senior supervising officers to review GBH allegations, consideration should be given to expand this review process to other serious offences;
• In response to both the IPCC recommendations and MPS review recommendations the MPS undertook the following measures in order to improve performance and operating standards when dealing with most serious violence and other serious offences;
• A new initiative, under the code name of Operation Curb was created to effectively police and manage youth and gang related violence. The issue of serious youth violence and knife crime still remains at the forefront of policing in the Capital and is now the subject of an updated initiative, Operation Blunt II; and
• One of the main issues for the MPS to take forward - particularly arising from the murder of the late Mr Peter Woodhams - is the effective investigation of, and leadership provided during, the conduct of most serious violence crime investigations.

Public Protection Groups

17. In June 2008 the MPS developed Public Protection Groups (PPG), including Public Protection Desks on all 32 London Boroughs, which are led by a Detective Chief Inspector. The aim of the PPG is to effectively manage:

• Dangerous places (private and public);
• Dangerous people; and
• Vulnerable people (adults and children).

18. There now exists a clear organisational structure with information sharing protocols for the effective management and enforcement of serious violent and sexual offenders, which also involves partnership work with other agencies. The Groups seek to recognise and manage the continuum of physical and sexual violence.

19. In September 2008 TP Violent Crime Directorate (VCD) led a review of the Public Protection Groups. The review sought to provide: ‘a proportionate & effective review that provides a realistic view of the MPS' position in relation to Serious Violence, Public Protection and Risk Management (victims and perpetrators) and the systems & processes which drive it’

20. The ‘Review’ has highlighted that all of the MPS’ boroughs have a measure of leadership, enablers, partnership and systems & processes in place for the effective management of dangerous people and dangerous places.

21. In addition the review team has identified a number of organisational areas for improvement, which are being considered to further enhance the MPS’ response to the development of Public Protection Groups and the management of Most Serious Violence and risk.

Serious Violence Team (SVT)

22. In June 2007 the Serious Violence Team (SVT) was formed as a service delivery unit providing investigative support and intervention to the increasing number of incidents of serious violence and homicides amongst young people. The role of the TP Serious Violence (Service Delivery) Team is to:

• Develop, implement and review MPS policy & SOPs regarding primary/secondary investigation and supervision of Serious Violence (i.e. Sec18/20 assaults - excluding domestic violence and hate crime offences, which are monitored elsewhere);
• Improve Serious Violence service delivery and performance outcomes at BOCU level; and to
• centrally monitor, review and quality assure the investigation of serious assaults in line with the Primary and Secondary Investigation Standard Operating Procedures and the MPS Serious Violence Strategy, which include all offences of Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) and attempted murder. A similar function is undertaken by other TP Violent Crime Directorate and Specialist Crime Directorate units in relation to domestic violence, hate crime and inter-familial assaults and other serious offences.

Service delivery

23. The following control measures and activity have been initiated as part of an ongoing commitment to improve the MPS’ effectiveness, leadership, risk management and performance in relation to serious violence perpetration:

• The development of Primary and Secondary Investigation Standard Operating Procedures, which includes a bespoke section (Part 3) on Serious Assault;
• This SOP was published on 7 May 2008;
• Compliance with Part III of this SOP is monitored and reviewed by the Territorial Policing (TP) Serious Violence Team (SVT);
• TP Violent Crime Directorate Detective Superintendent monitors compliance through a formal National Intelligence Model (NIM) compliant meeting structure where high-risk cases are identified for review and intervention (as necessary). This may involve the provision of tactical advice to the investigating officer;
• Risk assessment, identification and management forms a clear part of serious violence crime investigations by front line officers and secondary investigators. TP SVT will monitor high-risk cases to ensure that this is complied with;
• TP VCD has produced a self / peer group inspection template for boroughs to examine their investigative and victim support packages to ensure they meet with corporate standards i.e. Investigation SOP;
• Review and follow up of out-standing Serious Violence named suspects. There are corporate performance reports relating to this subject area against which Borough Commanders are held accountable for delivery;
• SVT provides strategic and operational tactical advice in the conduct of serious violence investigations, risk management processes and conduct of named suspect ‘man-hunt’ enquiries;
• TP VCD provides training input and markets their services at Crime Control Strategy Meetings (CCSM) Showcase and other events;
• SVT manage a 'Case Tracker System', which is used to record and monitor those investigations that require ongoing reviews, and when required direct intervention by the SVT, especially in the more critical and serious cases;
• There are now three Superintendents performing night duty from three strategic locations covering London. They are accountable for providing strategic support and direction at critical and/or major incidents; and
• The role of the SVT clearly overlaps with other units within the Violent Crime Directorate, such as Operation Blunt II, Operation Verano and the 5 Borough Operation Alliance Team, as well as SCD1 and SCD8 (Operations Trident and Trafalgar) and it is important that these units continue to work in close partnership.

Operational Activity

24. Operation Blunt 2 & Operation Verano is driving enforcement activity across MPS business groups and commands to address the continuing risk of serious youth violence, firearms and knife crime - including youth homicide. It takes account of learning in its focus on targeting ‘dangerous people’ and ‘dangerous places’ and the response to serious incidents of violence.

25. The operation, which commenced on 19 May 2008, compliments other MPS activity, which is taking place to manage risk. On 5 July 2008, the operation was further enhanced through the addition of a central Task Force. The operation has a command structure with the strategic lead at Deputy Assistant Commissioner Level.

26. This is a pan-London operation involving all MPS business groups and Borough Commands.

Strategic Intention

27. Operation Blunt 2 as the following strategic intention to:

• stop the killing of young people on the streets of London;
• reduce serious violence involving young people as victims and offenders;
• reduce the carrying of weapons by young people on the streets of London; and
• maintain the support of communities and young people for police action to reduce youth violence.

Strategic Approach

28. The strategic approach continues to be an intelligence-led focus upon dangerous places and dangerous people who represent greater risk of serious youth violence. The approach is intended to:

• create and maintain an environment that is hostile to the routine acquisition, carriage and use of lethal weapons in public space;
• arrest, prosecute and convict individuals who commit violent crime, whether as individuals or as part of groups (gangs); and
• lead on enforcement, ensuring that tactics recognise and respond to the concerns and expectations of the community, including young people.

Tactical delivery

29. Tactical delivery comprises:

• Increased fixed and flexible search deployments and security measures to restrict knife carriage – educational establishments, entertainment and leisure venues, transport infrastructure and public space events; with use of knife arches to identify persons carrying knives;
• Intelligence led stop and search operations targeting specific individuals, groups and areas;
• Targeted enforcement operations to disrupt and prevent violence perpetrated by violent individuals and groups (gangs); and
• Disruption of knife supply through intelligence-led neighbourhood weapon sweeps and enforcement of existing retail sale supply legislation.

The Blunt 2 Task Force deploys a mobile capability comprising of up to 50 uniformed officers each day between 2.00pm and 12.00am. These officers are directed in accordance with intelligence, including the live monitoring of calls relating to youth violence and weaponry. A central control for the Task Force and post-school patrols is established within the Special Operations Room at Central Command Complex (Lambeth). The Taskforce is deployed through a daily management meeting. This is complimented by deploying an officer of Chief Inspector rank as Silver commander to monitor and deploy support based upon actual and developing incidents of serious violence. This provides local officers dealing with serious assaults and critical incidents additional support to ensure an effective response.

30. In June 2009 this capability was further enhanced by the start of Operation Verano which improved links with the specialist crime departments and includes an intelligence cell. In addition to the Blunt Taskforce two support units of Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers covering a day and evening shift are now subject to daily tasking.

31. Operation Blunt 2 and Verano deploy resources targeting dangerous people and dangerous places using intelligence-led information. The Operation Blunt Task Force, TSG and Borough police teams are targeting enforcement activity towards individuals and groups who are known to be involved in serious violence.

32. A number of tactical options are used to target such people including proactive surveillance operations, the use of stop and search powers, knife arches at events and the weapons sweeps of dangerous places.

Training & Implementation

33. A number of training initiatives has been developed and/or further enhanced since August 2006 including:

• All probationary police officers receive on-going training with 5 consecutive days dedicated to public protection matters. This training also impacts on the effective management of crime and critical incidents;
• In addition risk management processes and critical incident management form part of sergeant and inspector leadership training;
• All inspectors have been provided with a Duty Officer’s Information Guidance pack, which compliments their leadership / critical incident training. A specific section of this binder is dedicated to the effective management of serious assaults;
• Further training is provided to Inspecting ranks and above at Firearms and Critical Incident Management courses, which also place a clear emphasis on the Golden Hour Principles, which are applicable to serious assault incidents;
• In February 2009 mandatory critical incident and crime scene management training commenced under ‘Primary Investigation Training’. This type of training was originally rolled out in January 2007 under operation ‘Almaze’ as a pilot programme. The current programme provides training to front line police officers (constable, sergeant & inspector ranks), including MSC officers and PCSOs, which complements the publication of the ‘Critical Incident Standard Operating Procedures’ and the emphasis on the ‘Golden Hour Principles’ to improve evidential capture at the earliest opportunity. In May 2010 - 89% of police officers, 93% of MSC officers and 94% of PCSOs had received training across the MPS;
• The effective management of incidents / crimes and the Gold Hour Principles permeate through all levels of detective officer training at the Crime Academy. A critical incident exercise is a key part of the DS and DI courses; and
• In response to the IPCC recommendation regarding the process and supervision of viewing of witness albums an MPS Witness Album Display System (WADS) Best Practice Guidance and Visual Identification SOP have been implemented and forms part of the Visual Identification Policy.

Outstanding actions associated with Organisational Learning/MPS Reviews

34. It should be noted that there are no outstanding actions relating to IPCC recommendations and MPS reviews with all known actions fully discharged.

Ongoing review of performance and standards

35. On 7 May 2008 the Primary and Secondary Investigation SOPs were updated to incorporate a standardised guideline for the investigation of serious violent offences. This has been pivotal to the changes and improvement of how the MPS conducts borough investigations.

36. Boroughs are more aware of managing the risk to repeat victims of serious violence by identifying and conducting early risk assessments and implementing appropriate control measures, this area of police work is continually developing to improve the consistency and standard of ongoing reviews.

37. There has been a notable improvement in the quality and frequency of sergeant and inspector reviews with better action planning and more details investigative strategies being set for the OIC. It should be noted that in the most critical cases, DCI input is often given.

38. The management and welfare of victim has been improved with the creation of Borough ‘Victim Support Units’, which provide a contact point and support network for victims and witnesses during the investigation and judicial process.

39. The SVT continues to review borough practices and provide recommendations for change by conducting borough visits and reviews. As a result of this process boroughs are developing local protocols and guidance for the investigation of serious violent offences and conducting peer reviews with neighbouring boroughs, in order to identify areas of best practice.

40. The SVT record and monitor all the interventions they make with boroughs. This data is considered alongside the boroughs performance data in order to identify best practice and those in need of additional support and guidance to ensure they manage their investigations to the standard required by existing standard operating procedures.

41. Part 1 of the Primary Investigation of Crime Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) states that initial supervision of all crimes entered on the Crime Report Information System (CRIS) must be supervised within 4 hours. The supervisor must ensure that all the expected actions contained within the SOP have been considered and recorded correctly allowing any shortfalls in the primary investigation to be identified at an early stage. The responsibility for ensuring that this supervision takes place will remain with the Duty Officer. The SOP also states that the first supervisor in attendance at any scene will be responsible for controlling the scene. The identity of this supervisor will be recorded on the Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) along with any subsequent changes.

42. Part 3 of the Secondary Investigation of Crime SOP states that once it has been decided to carry out a secondary investigation a crime must be reviewed by a supervisor and an investigation plan written before the crime is allocated to an investigator. Further supervisory reviews will be conducted after 7 and 28 days. If the crime is still active after 3 months then a further review will be conducted by a Detective Inspector.

Additional changes to MPS Practice regarding Most Serious Violence (MSV) and Critical Incident Management

43. The review periods for Attempted Murder, Section 18 and Attempted Section 18 GBH involve an initial review between 10 and 18 hours by a Detective Sergeant, which is followed by a Serious Wounding Forensic Intervention (SWFI) by a forensic practitioner. A second review is conducted after 7 days by a Detective Inspector, which is complimented by a Borough Forensic Manager’s review. A third review is then conducted by the designated BOCU DCI after 28 days (if the case remains unsolved). Subsequent Reviews will be conducted by the SIO (DI) in consultation with the designated BOCU DCI at 28-35 day intervals thereafter (until the case is solved or closed).

44. No investigation will be closed without a closing review by a Detective Sergeant. If closed prior to 7 days from the outset of the investigation this review will be completed by a DI.

45. All investigative reviews and strategies are now completed on a designated review screen on CRIS.

46. Part 3 of the Secondary Investigation of Crime SOP is currently in the process of being amended to incorporate more detailed guidance on completing intelligence assessments and risk management plans in cases of serious violence in order to reduce repeat victimisation and to prevent the further escalation of violence. It is now standard practice for a risk assessment to be completed on closure of every investigation.

47. The proposed changes to the SOP will also provide guidance and minimum standards of investigation when dealing with Crime Related Incidents (CRI) and unsupported or victimless prosecutions.

Critical Incident Advisory Team

48. The role and responsibility of the Critical Incident Advisory Team (CIAT) is to manage the MPS Critical Incident Policy and maintain the Critical Incident Manual.

49. The CIAT is also responsible for the implementation of the new Critical Incident Standard Operating Procedure (CI SOP) for the identification, management and recording of critical incidents. Where a critical incident has been identified. The team will look at the incident concerned and provide recommendations to regain or minimise the confidence lost and identify organisational learning.

50. Where an incident has risk factors associated with it which indicate that confidence may be lost, then the CIAT can provide advice to help assist in preventing a critical incident from occurring.

51. The CIAT is responsible for advising on Critical Incident training issues. The CIAT assists HR3 Leadership Academy and Hydra Operations with the Duty Officer's Critical Incident Training (DOCIT). The CIAT has developed in partnership with HR3, a two day Critical Incident training package for all newly promoted Sergeants and Inspectors.

52. To assist in the initial management of Critical Incidents the CIAT have produced a comprehensive Duty Officer's Binder.

Victim Support

53. Victim Focus Units (VFU) are in place on all 32 London boroughs to provide enhanced care and service to victims of crime from the point of allegation of a crime. Working with the Officer in the Case (OIC) and Crime Management Unit (CMU), victims are kept updated during the whole investigation process with a minimum contact of every 28 days, regardless of the progress of the case as required by the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (VCOP). The Unit ensures appropriate referrals to other agencies are made including Victim Support (VSS), local government bodies and other agencies. At the point of charge the case is handed over to the Witness Care Unit to continue liaison and support throughout the court process.

Violent Crime Performance

54. There have been changes to the categorisation and recording of serious violent crime in recent years, which makes it impossible to present a simple set of figures for comparison over the last five years. However, from analysis of various crime types and the different categories into which they have been aggregated, it is reasonable to infer that for the whole of the MPS, the number of violent crime offences at the more serious end of the spectrum has reduced over the last five years. For example, the combined number of GBH and ABH offences in 2005/06 was 84,159, which had fallen to 72,705 in 2008/09. Similarly, Most serious Violence fell from 11,658 in 2008/09 to 11,088 in 2009/10. Sanction detection [1] rates (SD rates) for violent crime have improved over the last five years. For example, the SD rate for GBH for the MPS in 2005/06 was 28%; in 2007/08, it was 36%. Similarly, the SD rate for Most Serious Violence increased from 30% in 2008/09 to 38% in 2009/10.

55. On Newham borough, SD rates have also improved. For example, the SD rate for GBH improved from 16% in 2005/06 to 33% in 2007/08, and the SD rate for Most Serious Violence improved from 30% to 34% in 2009/10. However there is no evidence of a notable reduction in the number of such offences. For example, the number of GBH offences in 2007/08 (234) was almost the same as in 2005/06 (249), and the number of Most Serious Violence offences increased from 545 in 2008/09 to 624 in 2009/10.

Conclusions

56. As a result of the Peter Woodham inquiry the MPS has implemented a series of changes and protocols in order to provide a more consistent and improved service in relation to the initial police response to critical incidents, investigation and management of serious crime, as well as better victim care.

57. It is reasonable to infer that for the whole of the MPS, the number of violent crime offences at the more serious end of the spectrum has reduced over the last five years, and there has also been considerable improvement in the sanction detection rates for such offences.

58. The assessment of practices and standard operating procedures are continually subject to ongoing scrutiny and review with organisational learning being a central element to this process.

C. Other organisational and community implications

Equality and Diversity Impact

1. The MPS is mindful of any adverse impact or disproportionality that may occur as a result of the delivery of its services. In the delivery of its services the MPS fully embraces the need to engage and consult with communities and their representatives.

Financial Implications

2. There are no apparent financial implications arising from this report.

Legal Implications

3. There are no specific legal implications arising from this report.

Environmental Implications

4. There are no environmental implications resulting from any practices or resourcing issues arising from this report.

Background papers

1. MPA Commissioning Brief - dated 20th May 2010
2. IPCC Executive Summary - Investigation of the Metropolitan Police Service’s response to the stabbing of Peter Woodhams - dated 21st January 2006
3. MPA Update report regarding Peter Woodhams investigation - Report by Chief Executive - dated 5th March 2009
4. IPCC recommendations & MPS strategy and action plan
5. Critical Incident Advisory Team - Newham TP Crime Assessment (1st Review) - dated January 2007
6. Operation Bomont - Review of GBH enquiries (2nd Review) - dated 31st January 2007
7. Newham Borough - Commissioners public protection review & action plan 2009 Public Protection Review on Newham Borough
8. MPS Organisational learning response - dated 30th January 2009
9. MPS, Violent Crime Directorate - Organisational learning report arising from the Peter Woodhams inquiry - dated 30th January 2009

Contact details

Report author: DS Mark Adams, MPS, Violent Crime Directorate

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Abbreviations

AC

Assistant Commissioner

ACPO

Association of Chief Police Officers

BOCU

Borough Operational Command Unit

CAD

Computer Aided Despatch

CCSM

Crime Control Strategy Meeting

CCTV

Closed Circuit Television

CI

Critical Incident

CIAT

Critical Incident Advisory Team

CMU

Crime Management Unit

CPS

Crown Prosecution Service

CRI

Crime Related Incident

CRIS

Crime Reporting Information System

DC

Detective Constable

DCI

Detective Chief Inspector

DI

Detective Inspector

DLS

Directorate of Legal Services

DOCIT

Duty Officer’s Critical Incident Training

DS

Detective Sergeant

FP

Forensic Practitioner

FYTD

Financial Year To Date

GBH

Grievous Bodily Harm

HQ

Headquarters

HR

Human Resources

HR3

Training and Development

IPCC

Independent Police Complaints Commission

KEC

Knife Enabled Crime

MPS

Metropolitan Police Service

MSC

Metropolitan Special Constabulary

MSV

Most Serious Violence

NIM

National Intelligence Model

OCU

Operational Command Unit

OIC

Officer in the Case

PCSO

Police Community Safety Officer

PPG

Public Protection Group

PSCC

Professional Standards and Complaints Committee

SCD1

Homicide and Serious Crime Command

SCD8

Trident - Shootings Prevention and Investigation Command

SD

Sanction Detections

SDR

Sanctioned Detection Rate

SMT

Senior Management Team

SOP

Standard Operating Procedures

SVT

Serious Violence Team

SWFI

Serious Wounding Forensic Intervention

TP

Territorial Policing

TSG

Territorial Support Group

VCD

Violent Crime Directorate

VCOP

Victims Code of Practice

VFU

Victim Focus Unit

VSS

Victim Support Service

VSU

Victim Support Unit

WADS

Witness Albums Display System

Appendix 1 - A summary table of violent crime statistics showing the number of offences and sanction detection rates between 2005 & 2009/10

Knife Crime 

GBH

ABH

Serious Wounding

Violent Crime

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