A review of the policing response to disasters

Report: 9a
Date: 4 November 2005
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report was deferred from the full Authority meeting on 27 November 2005The report informs and update members on how the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is learning from its response to previous major incidents and disasters.A programme board to review police response to disasters has been set up and a detailed report updating members on progress will be submitted at a later stage.

A. Recommendations

That Members note the contents of this report.

B. Supporting information

1. The Internal Consultancy Group (ICG) was commissioned in January 2005 to complete a review of the policing response to the South East Asian Tsunami Disaster (Operation Bracknell). This took place in the form of consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, feedback via the extranet, interviews with various staff and consideration of related work. This all took place in the immediate days and weeks following the disaster.

2. The ICG report (Management Summary) attached at Appendix 1 was published in May 2005 making numerous recommendations. The report whilst valuable in many aspects is now in many instances out of date.

3. The events subsequent to January 2005 have extended the learning in the disaster arena and it is therefore considered unproductive to deal with this reports’ recommendations in isolation.

3. Subsequent to the Tsunami our response to major disasters has been further tested by the bombings and the subsequent attempts, in London in July and the attacks involving Britons in Egypt (Operation Rock).

4. In order to ensure all the recommendations from all the events and training exercises are properly reviewed and actioned a programme board “Responding to Major Incidents” has been established under the direction of Assistant Commissioner House. The board membership includes members from Central Operations Headquarters (CO1), Public Order (CO11), Serious and Economic Crime Directorate (SCD6), Anti Terrorist Branch (SO13), Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Emergency Procedures (EP), Human Resources (HR), and Directorate of Information. Detective Chief Superintendent Bracken has been identified to lead the programme board under the following terms of reference:

“To identify all recommendations and best practice suggested from the recent responses to major disasters. In partnership with internal and external stakeholders establish a summary of all such recommendations and prioritise them. To draft appropriate Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), Service Level Agreements (SLA) and Police Notice to effectively communicate and implement those agreed recommendations and changes”

5. The first meeting of the programme board took place on 15 September 2005 where a summary of recommendations was circulated to the members. The board next meets on 26 October 2005.

6. A process map has been established outlining the stages and responses to a disaster (Appendix 2), which will be used to drive work streams on all aspects of responding to a disaster especially:

Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)

7. Looking to ensure our means of recovering victims is professional, dignified and timely, and the gathering of ante-mortem data is completed in fast time leading to the effective identification and repatriation of victims.

Casualty Bureau

8. To provide a timely resource to prevent overloading of the “999” emergency system and capture accurate data to provide a structured graded missing persons system.

Family Assistance Centres

9. To identify suitable locations to act as a focus point in the immediate aftermath of a disaster for those seeking information of a family member or loved one believed involved in such incident. To establish effective means of data capture from Casualty bureau, hospitals, mortuaries etc. to facilitate the same.

Mortuary and Resilience Mortuary facilities

10. With partners establishing location(s) for mortuary sites, identifying specialists to be deployed at the same and training police personnel in mortuary procedures such as post-mortem documentation and property handling procedures.

11. Externally, service- wide reviews are taking place in the form of ACPO (EP) establishing a DVI lead to chair a working party into the need for a national DVI team. Whilst a separate work stream is undertaking a radical review and restructuring of the casualty bureau response.

12. The programme board is the point of contact for the MPS on both.

13. Appendix 2 Process map. Responding to Major Incidents and Disasters.

C. Race and equality impact

1. The issues around both Operation Theseus and Bracknell centred around cultural and religious expectations as to the management of the deceased.

2. In the normal course of events families or next of kin are empowered to make whatever arrangements necessary and compliant with religious and or cultural beliefs. In the case of the Tsunami the need to ensure that all deceased were identified in a manner that was both forensically and legally defendable necessitated sensitive and professional interventions by specialist family liaison officers. Management structures were implemented to support the family liaison officer in those instances where the relationship between police and the family deteriorated due to the legitimate need to insist upon this arrangement.

3. Operation Theseus encountered similar issues but was further complicated by the need to cater for the reconciliation of hundreds of pieces of human body tissue to both deceased and survivors.

4. In both these operations the Independent Advisory Group (IAG) were engaged to assist in the management of these difficult issues.

D. Financial implications

Current staffing of this work is unfunded and is being found within the existing Central Operations budget. Implementation of a number of recommendations will have a financial implication. This can be detailed in any future report to the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA).

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Detective Chief Superintendent Nick Bracken

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

ICG report – Operation Bracknell: A review of the policing response to the Tsunami disaster

Management summary

On the 26 December 2004, the biggest earthquake for forty years occurred between the Australian and Eurasian plates, off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia in the Indian Ocean. The resulting effect was a devastating tsunami (tidal wave) that travelled thousands of kilometres across the Indian Ocean, taking the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in countries as far apart as Indonesia, the Maldives, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Somalia. Following the tsunami, the world responded immediately by providing humanitarian aid to the affected areas.

Operation Bracknell is the UK policing response to the disaster caused by the tsunami. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is playing a key role in supporting the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and is coordinating UK police involvement in the Operation.

Assistant Commissioner Sir David Veness (now retired) formulated a Gold command structure during the initial response to the disaster and this role was subsequently handed over Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) John Yates (Gold), Commander Cressida Dick (Silver UK) and Commander John Bunn (Silver International).

In order to capture the learning and identity good practice and suggestions for improvement, DAC Yates asked Deputy Chief Constable Brian Moore to oversee the review process on behalf of the MPS. In January 2005, the MPS Internal Consultancy Group (ICG) was commissioned to plan, co-ordinate and facilitate a programme of operational debriefs for Operation Bracknell, working in conjunction with the Operation Bracknell, working in conjunction with the Operation Bracknell review team led by Detective Superintendent Jonathan Tottman.

ICG has conducted an extensive and comprehensive review of Operation Bracknell, not only involving key stakeholders within the MPS but also debriefing external organisations and agencies that have worked in partnership with the MPS. The overarching aim of the review was to capture good practice, individual and organisational learning and suggestions for improvements in the handling of future critical incidents or mass disasters.

The review was conducted using three approaches:

• Consultation with a wide range of stakeholders (a full table of stakeholders consulted is in the main report)
• Feedback via the Police National Network (PNN) extranet. 75 anonymous responses were received from those involved in the policing response to the disaster, along with responses from Hertfordshire Constabulary, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Cumbria Constabulary, Greater Manchester Police and Sussex Constabulary.
• Consideration of related work. A series of ‘10,000 volt’ debriefs was run by Dr Jonathon Crego (Director Centre for Applied Learning Technology). Output from these debriefs has been incorporated, where appropriate, in these findings. A review of the Central Casualty Bureau following the Tsunami disaster, entitled ‘UK Disaster Management’ was commissioned from Dr John Barrett, a consultant, by the MPS’s Director of Information on behalf of the MPS Management Board. His recommendations have been dealt with separately from this report.

Following detailed analysis of the findings of this review, a number of recommendations have been made. They range in scope and potential impact from those, which can be addressed as part of effective internal management practice to those which are beyond the boundaries and capability of any one organisation to deliver. This summary includes the key recommendations.

The recommendations in this report will be represented to MPS Management Board for an ‘in principle’ agreement to further work, who will ensure that the recommendations are assessed for feasibility and impact and, where appropriate, translated into an action plan for implementation.

Recommendations

Structure

1. Establish a command structure with the capacity and capability to provide consistent decision-making and to ensure command resilience in future mass disasters.
2. Establish a protocol between the MPS and ACPO to ensure effective national engagement as part of the initial response to a mass disaster.
3. Identify and establish a mobilisation process to enable the appropriate and timely engagement of key organisations and agencies in a future mass disaster.
4. Ensure that the regional investigation structure is further assessed and revised and that the outcome is communicated effectively to all Forces.

Operations

5. MPS Management Board to identify a lead Assistant Commissioner (AC) for Central Casualty Bureau (CCB) within the MPS.
6. ACPO nationally and MPS Management Board to agree to mandate the use of CASWEB in future critical incident responses.
7. A standard operating procedure is designed, written, implemented and updated to ensure a consistent approach within and across casualty bureaux in the UK.
8. Ensure that the Gold Commander engages with the Family liaison National Executive Board (NEB) at the outset of a mass disaster.
9. MPS Management Board to clarify the organisational lead for Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) process within the MPS and ensure that the MPS lead identifies future national DVI resourcing needs with the National ACPO Lead.
10. The appropriate ACPO business area to develop a service level agreement with the Centre for International Forensic Assistance (CIFA) to supply expert advisors for the national DVI cadre.
11. Assess the feasibility of maintaining the accommodation and facilities used at Hendon during Operation Bracknell so that functions such as CCB, NIR, family liaison, exhibits and forensic laboratories can be established in fast time to meet future need.
12. That ACPO and the Home Office consider whether, in light of Operation Bracknell, existing powers in respect of the supervision of those on the sex offender register are adequate to protect the public.

People

13. Ensure the arrangements for deploying staff in support of a mass disaster are clearly agreed and documented and communicated at the earliest opportunity identified stakeholders.
14. Ensure the mentoring arrangements are identified and agreed for key posts in the command structure to enable practical experience to be gained in anticipation of the next mass disaster.
15. Ensure that family liaison (FLOs, FLCs and FLAs) and forensic practioners are provided with awareness training about each other’s roles and responsibilities within their accredited courses.
16. Consider what further work may be necessary to develop joint training initiatives in all aspects of responding to a mass disaster.
17. Resolve and formalise pay and working condition policies for staff employed in mass disaster operations or incidents.

Partnerships

18. Protocols should be established between HM government and key organisations, which clearly describe how they will be engaged during a mass disaster response.
19. ACPO to consider reviewing the period of attachment of staff supporting PNICC during a mass disaster, particularly in the initial phase of the response.
20. Define and agree, with affected stakeholders, the role and responsibilities of the Coroner in a mass disaster.
21. Assess the feasibility of deploying joint police and FCO Rapid Deployment Teams in the event of a foreign mass disaster involving British interests.
22. The Secretary General of Interpol to consider establishing, agreeing and maintaining protocols with international partners in order to support effective and consistent DVI working practices.
23. Scope the feasibility of whether UK forces can use the Interpol 1-24/7 communication system when deployed abroad.
24. Consideration should be given to the appointment of an appropriate Minister at the outset of a mass disaster to act as the media spokes person on behalf of HM Government.
25. Active consideration is given to the establishment of a COBR meeting or other appropriate forum at the outset of a mass disaster.
26. The Home Office and Cabinet Office should provide early and relevant guidance on death certification issues in mass disasters.
27. Ensure that funding boundaries are clarified between the police service and local authorities for facility costs at mortuaries.
28. Develop an agreement between ACPO and the British Dental Association (BDA) to allow police to access dental records to assist identification following a mass disaster.

Communications

29. Identify a spokesperson for the MPS to lead briefings to the media in order to provide a consistent public face in response to a future mass disaster.
30. Develop and maintain an extranet site to support major disaster operations.

Resources

31. Steps taken to identify funding streams, which will enable UK police forces to act effectively in support of nation states affected by mass disaster, as, may be required by HM Government.
32. A reimbursement protocol should be agreed between ACPO and the FCO for full cost recovery of UK policing in the event of a mass disaster.
33. The Metropolitan Police Authority and the Association of Police Authorities, together with the Home Office, consider whether the powers available to Police Authorities are adequate to ensure that individual police forces can provide a timely, adequate and effective resource to support a national police response in the event of a mass disaster.
34. Review the call out contractual arrangements for external suppliers, for service provision during public holidays.
35. Ensure that all Forces update HOLMES2 and CASWEB software in order to enable and maintain national compatibility.
36. Ensure that HOLMES2 is developed to allow an effective and compatible interface between CCB and NIR accounts.

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