Flu pandemic

Report: 9b
Date: 4 November 2005
By: Commissioner

Summary

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A. Recommendations

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B. Supporting information

The Threat – an introduction

This paper has been drafted to provide information around London resilience in the event of a general influenza (flu) pandemic. Pandemics of flu are known to occur intermittently (three times within the last century) and experts believe that a new pandemic can be expected in the coming years. During previous pandemics up to 25% of the population became ill. Being prepared will be key to minimising the impact on people’s lives and business continuity in the capital.

Taking care of our staff

As part of the ongoing London resilience planning process, the GLA group, which includes the MPA, have purchased 100,000 doses of the anti-viral, Tamiflu. The drug will be made available for use by staff in the event of a flu pandemic.

Business continuity

Delivery of essential policing services in the face of depleted resources will take place by invoking local business continuity plans. These plans will include contingencies for the non-availability of some key staff. HR Directorate are also developing an extended mobilisation plan that seeks to address some of the skill shortages experienced during Op Theseus. Part of this work is to expand the number of skills categories within MetHR. A study has been commissioned by the Resilience and Continuity Board to deliver a management framework and supporting processes to ensure that in a major crisis situation the critical residual functions of the MPS (i.e. those functions which are not themselves part of the response to the crisis) may continue to be delivered to an acceptable level.

Role of BOCUs and the role of Public Order Planning

It is possible, during a flu pandemic, that the Department of Health may advise the cancellation of large public events and travelling on some forms of public transport. This may prompt outburst of public disorder. Police may also be called upon to secure pharmaceutical outlets and NHS premises as the public attempt to obtain stocks of anti-viral drugs. ‘Quarantine zones’ may also need to be enforced. If these events are forecast, the MPS can plan for them in the normal way. If they are spontaneous, which is more likely, BOCU officers will police them with support from Central Operations resources and use of the Service Mobilisation Plan as necessary. Any flu pandemic has the possibility of increasing the mortality rate. There will, in this case, be a requirement for officers to report an increased number of ‘sudden deaths’.

Working as part of the London Resilience Team

It is important to reinforce the message that the Department of Health are leading on the planning for pandemic flu, with other agencies, including the police service supporting them in that work. The MPS are doing this through both the London Resilience Forum and the GLA Group Pandemic Response Plan Steering Group.

The GLA group, led by the Mayor, are also working closely with the Department of Health and the London Resilience Forum to develop a pandemic flu response plan for the GLA Group. The purpose of the plan is to ensure the GLA group maintains business continuity in the event of a pandemic flu affecting London. The plan will also detail how the anti-viral drugs will be made available to GLA group staff.

Each member of the GLA group has been involved in the development and approval of the plan, which has now been discussed, with the management teams of each functional body.

As the likelihood of a pandemic increases, a London Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) would be put in place. This is likely to be chaired by Phil Woolas MP, Minister for London Resilience.

Keeping Avian Flu in perspective

As previously stated, this paper has been drafted to provide information around London resilience in the event of a general flu pandemic. It would, however, be remiss not to mention avian flu given that it has been the focus of media attention in recent weeks. A general flu pandemic is not to be confused with avian flu. Avian flu viruses do not normally infect species other than birds and pigs. The first documented infection of humans with the avian flu virus occurred in Hong Kong in 1997. In all of these cases, close contact with live infected poultry was the source of human infection. There has been no proven case of a human infecting another human, worldwide, to date. The business continuity, London resilience and public order planning mentioned above would apply equally in the case of avian flu.

C. Race and equality impact

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D. Financial implications

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E. Background papers

None provided

F. Contact details

Report author: Chief Superintendent Simon Lewis.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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