Criminal networks - disruptions

Report: 8
Date: 17 May 2007
By: AC Specialist Crime Directorate on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides information on Metropolitan Police activity in tackling criminal networks in London. It also outlines how that activity is measured through the Disruption Assessment Process.

The report gives commentary on those networks disrupted in 2006/07 with example case studies. The process by which the disruption of a criminal network is approved will also be commented on.

A. Recommendation

That members note the report.

B. Supporting information

1. A criminal network has been defined by the Metropolitan Police as ‘a group of individuals involved in ongoing criminality for some form of personal gain and which has links to level 2 criminality OR are having a significant impact on the community’. This definition is currently being reviewed to ensure that it adequately reflects the activities of criminal networks and gangs at level one or Borough based investigations.

2. The following is the MPS definition of a disruption: ‘a disruption has been achieved when a criminal network is unable to operate at its normal level of activity for a significant amount of time. A disruption may be achieved by various means and does not have to be in the context of the operation’.

3. The following is the MPS definition of a gang: ‘a relatively durable, predominately street based group of people who see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernable group for whom crime and violence is integral to the groups identity’.

4. The following is the MPS definition of a peer group: ‘ a relatively small, unorganised and transient group, composed of peers who share the same space and common history. Involvement in crime will be mostly non-serious in nature and not integral to the identity of the group.’

5. There is ongoing work, both within the MPS and the Home Office to define ‘harm’ and ‘harm reduction’. With the changes to the criminal network definition the MPS will use the ACPO definition of ‘significant harm’ which states:

• Significant harm can have one or more of the following characteristics
• Significant profit or loss
• Significant impact upon community safety
• Serious violence
• Corruption
• Exercise of control

6. The MPS evidenced reduction of harm from criminal networks using the Criminal Network Prioritisation Matrix (CNPM), which records the level of involvement (high, medium, low, none or unknown) for a variety of crime types and scores this using the maximum sentence available. Once a network is disrupted, this harm score should be reduced, thereby evidencing the harm reduction a particular disruption has caused [1].

7. In the financial year 2006/07, the MPS Disrupted 172 Criminal Networks, exceeding the target of 150. For 2007/08 the MPS have set a target of 225 disruptions. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the disruptions by the primary crime types they were involved in, but it should be noted that the majority of these networks are also involved in a number of other crimes, that cross all National Intelligence Model (NIM) levels. It is, therefore, likely that criminality in other areas will also have been disrupted.

Table 1

8. From last year’s figures, only 35.5% of the networks disrupted are included on the CNPM. There are a number of reasons for this low figure. At the current time, the CNPM is a Specialist Crime Directorate (SCD) resource, whereas disruptions are claimed across the organisation. Disruptions can also be claimed for fast time operations, such as armed robberies dealt with by the Flying Squad, which cannot be submitted to the Matrix beforehand. However, the intelligence on how these networks are structured and the methodologies they use are important to inform the strategic picture of criminal networks/gangs.

9. Since summer 2006 the MPS have prioritised the top 25 criminal networks within SCD to ensure they are the focus of proactive operations to disrupt them. However, these disruptions are unlikely to be reflected in current disruption figures due to the timescales of setting up and executing operations at this level. It is expected that these disruptions will begin to be appear in the submissions to the claims process this year.

10. The information in table 1 reflects the intelligence we have about criminal networks on the CNPM. Drugs, firearms and economic crime as a primary crime type represent the highest number of disruptions. Analysis of the information contained within the CNPM [2] shows that these crime types (in the form of drug distribution, unlawful firearms possession and money laundering) are also the most common crime types for networks to be involved in.

11. Analysis of the criminal networks identified on the CNPM shows that all 32 London boroughs are affected by the activities of these networks. It is often difficult to accurately map where criminal networks and gangs impact at a local level as many operate pan-London. Table 2 shows the number of disruptions approved for each business group for 2006/07.

Table 2

12. SCD is currently accredited with the majority of approved disruptions. It is hoped that further communication of the criminal network strategy and the disruption process to other parts of the organisation, as well as widening the criminal network definition to clearly define the inclusion of gangs will encourage more disruption claims from other business groups in 2007/08. Further analysis shows that out of the 137 approved disruptions from SCD, some 110 were submitted from SCD7 Serious & Organised Crime, which reflects the more serious criminality these networks are involved in. The disruption panel will continue to develop the understanding around the diversity of the criminal networks that are identified and ultimately disrupted within the MPS.

13. The following cases highlight the challenges that MPS units face in tackling and disrupting criminal networks/gangs in London.

Case study 1

14. This case study of a number of linked SCD operations demonstrates some of the intelligence benefits of tackling criminal networks rather than individual offenders or offences, as the investigations resulted in the identification of several other criminal networks

• Disruption one
  An established Turkish criminal network was believed to be engaged in the supply of drugs and firearms. By developing a picture of the network, police were able to infiltrate the group and eventually arrest the head of the network in possession of a firearm. The individual was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, which effectively disrupted the network from operating at its usual level for a considerable length of time.
• Disruption two
  Surveillance of the original network established a link to a second criminal network that was involved in supplying drugs. Police were again able to arrest the lead member of the network, at this time, in possession of drugs and cash, thereby further disrupting the first network, as well as the network targeted.
• Disruption three and four
  Police activity also identified a third West African criminal network with links to the first Turkish criminal network. This network was believed to be involved in the supply of firearms to a number of other criminal networks and gangs in south London. Police investigations led to the arrest of a key player within the network in possession of two loaded handguns. He was later sentenced to six and a half years imprisonment. Six other members of the network were also arrested in possession of loaded handguns, all being sentenced to five years imprisonment.
• Disruptions five and six
  Through analysis of these networks and surveillance, two other criminal networks involved in the supply of firearms were identified. Key members from both of these were arrested and imprisoned.
• The MPS Disruption panel confirmed a total of six disruptions for this series of operations, which has effectively disrupted the supply of firearms to south London and identified and disrupted the infrastructure and supply route by which this was carried out.

Case study 2

15. The Public Sector Fraud Team of the Economic and Specialist Crime OCU (SCD6) identified a criminal network defrauding the National Health Service (NHS). Two doctors and a surgery practice manager were found to be falsifying records to show that patients had received advice which doctors were then able to claim remuneration for. Over 4,000 fraudulent entries were identified, going back to 1997, at an estimated cost to the NHS in excess of £200k. After a complex investigation that involved obtaining statements from over 100 patients the practice manager was imprisoned for 18 months, and both doctors remain suspended subject to disciplinary proceedings by the General Medical Council. As such, this network is no longer able to commit the offences for which it was identified.

16. These two examples demonstrate the various criminality that networks may be involved in and the different configuration and dependencies of the networks themselves. The examples also provide members with an indication that not every criminal network disrupted by the MPS will have any direct link with causing harm in traditional communities. Case study 2 reveals clearly that the disruption of criminal networks by certain MPS units, SCD6 Economic & Serious Crime for example, will only have an impact on a public or private sector organisation (in this case the NHS). The communities affected here are the taxpayers and users of the service. The disruption of criminal networks that target these organisations remains a focus for the MPS.

17. These two examples also demonstrate the wide-range in the complexity and impact on London’s communities by criminal networks. The disruption panel are currently developing a process that will enable an appropriate weighted score to be given to the criminal network that will help measure the harm and severity caused.

18. As can be seen from the figures in Table 1, the disruption of criminal networks impacts on a number of key performance areas for the MPS. Members will note from Table 1 that the majority of the 172 confirmed disruptions within the last financial year had drugs as a primary commodity. A review of these disruptions shows that the offences of production, trafficking and possession are the most prevalent. In respect of the production offences, the panel saw and approved some 25 plus claims where networks were engaged in the production of cannabis in so called ‘cannabis factories’. SCD7 Middle Markets Drugs Team & SCD7 Proactive Teams have seen the most success in disrupting those concerned with drug production/distribution.

19. Although the MPS are aware of the relationship between disrupting criminal networks/gangs and MPS crime performance figures it is challenging to make a direct link. We are currently exploring ways to discover whether or not there is an efficient and effective means of demonstrating this link.

20. For example, Specialist Operations have disrupted eleven networks involved in criminal activities in 2006/07. In doing so they have prevented a terrorist attack on London. This year they aim to further develop the information from these disruptions by categorising networks into attack planning, funding terrorism, logistical support and encouraging support in order to demonstrate where they have been effective and how.

21. By targeting criminal networks rather than individual offenders and/or offences we are able to discover the infrastructure behind the criminality and use resources in the most efficient way to reduce harm to communities by preventing criminal networks from operating. It also gives us a better understanding of how criminals operate and how best to tackle them in the future.

22. All B/OCUs within the MPS can claim a disruption to a criminal network/gang. A disruption has been achieved when a network/gang is no longer able to operate at its normal level of activity. A disruption can be claimed at anytime during an operation if there is evidence that the network has been prevented from operating at previous levels for a significant amount of time. More than one disruption can also be claimed against one network. For example, the first disruption claimed might relate to the arrest of a member of a network that is responsible for delivering firearms to customers. The removal of this individual means the network is no longer able supply the firearms they possess. This results in the head of the network having to carry out the deliveries himself, and he is arrested in possession of a firearm. This would be a further disruption.

23. A disruption is claimed by completing a Disruption Assessment form and submitted to the Disruption Assessment Panel for approval. The Panel will either approve or reject the disruption, and will give feedback to the submitting unit as to whether further details are required or an outright rejection. In the case of the former, it can be resubmitted at a later date.

24. The disruption panel consists of seven members, with representatives from across the organisation. There are planned fortnightly sittings.

25. In order to approve a disruption, the Panel look for the following evidence:

1. A group of individuals are involved
2. There is evidence of ongoing criminality
3. The criminality is linked to level and/or causing harm to a community
4. What police activity was used
5. What effect this activity had, i.e. how has the criminal network/gang been prevented from operating
6. Some evidence that financial investigation has been undertaken or at least considered

26. The panel is held in an open forum. However, there are occasions when the operation under consideration is of a sensitive nature. On these occasions, one to one meetings are held between the officer in the case and appropriately security-cleared members of the panel.

27. The results from the panel’s decisions are then fed back into the CN Prioritisation Matrix to evidence harm reduction from those networks.

28. The types of intelligence received through the disruption panel varies, but some examples are:

1. Details of drug concealment methods and drug importation routes
2. Methodologies for laundering the proceeds of crime
3. Identification of best practice for targeting different types of networks
4. How networks/gangs may be adapting to current legislation
   This intelligence is fed into the Met Intelligence Bureau (MIB) for use and/or dissemination to the relevant units and agencies.

29. The use of the legislative powers provided to the MPS within the Proceeds of Crime Act will be a developing theme that the disruption panel will seek to explore within the financial year 2007/08. Working with the POCA implementation team, specific questions have been incorporated on to the MPS disruption claim form. These changes have been brought in to highlight the use of POCA powers in disrupting criminal networks through the application to the courts for restraint or cash seizure orders.

Abbreviations

CNPM

Criminal Networks Prioritisation Matrix

NIM

National Intelligence Model

SCD

Specialist Crime Directorate

SO

Specialist Operations

TP

Territorial Policing

CO

Central Operations

NHS

National Health Service

BOCU

Borough Operational Command Unit

MIB

Met Intelligence Bureau

C. Race and equality impact

1. The specific equality and diversity issues relating to this paper are acknowledged. The activities that form this report and the data content are arrived at with a regard to delivering policing services to an equal standard for all Londoners.

2. In addition, consideration regarding race and equality impact is also discussed in the majority of the operations and projects detailed in this report.

3. Specifically, Trident’s Independent Advisory Group will be consulted with regards to police activity targeting criminal networks and gangs in the black community. The MPS are also currently developing engagement with the Vietnamese and Chinese community in partnership with SOCA. Operation Quadrant is focused on dealing with criminality within the South Asian community and will liase with IAGs from those communities in relation to operations and projects.

D. Financial implications

There are no financial implications as all of the data featured in this report is already produced regularly by the MPS.

E. Background papers

MPS ‘Criminal Network Strategy and Methodology Manual’, September 2006

F. Contact details

Report author: Simon Tee, Specialist Crime Directorate, Performance Improvement Unit and Emma Muir, Serious and Organised Crime Command, MPS.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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