Specialist Operations management information

Report: 11
Date: 11 October 2007
By: AC Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report gives a summary of Specialist Operations Command performance against its objectives from June 2007 to August 2007

A. Recommendation

That Members note the report.

B. Supporting information

1. This report provides an overview of performance of MPS Specialist Operations (SO) covering the period June to August 2007. It includes a review of significant events during these three months and makes comment on any issues affecting the achievement of targets.

2. SO, attendance at Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) Planning, Performance and Review Committee (PPRC) meetings has now been re-scheduled to coincide with the attendance of CO representatives. This change marks a return the attendance schedule that had been adopted prior to the events of 7 July 2005 – when operational demands led to the postponing of SO attendance at PPRC. This revised schedule also reflects the close operational links between SO and CO – particularly in relation to counter-terrorism and security – and that prior to April 2007 a number of Operational Command Units (OCUs) now within CO were part of SO.

Additional performance reporting arrangements

3. In addition to reporting publicly to PPRC, SO and CO also report on their performance, with regard to terrorism related matters, to the Home Office representative on the MPA, Lord Toby Harris, and Reshard Auladin (MPA Deputy Chair). This meeting provides an opportunity to discuss counter terrorism policing measures in greater detail, including those classified as secret. The next meeting has been arranged for 27 September 2007, with Detective Chief Superintendent Christine Jones (CO6 – Diplomatic Protection Group) and Detective Chief Superintendent Robert Sait (SO1 – Specialist Protection) invited to attend to present a verbal report on issues relevant to their particular area of responsibility - including an overview of the OCU, its background, business objectives and performance, budgetary position and any current or emerging issues.

Summary of Performance Information 2007/8

4. A summary of relevant performance measures is attached at Appendix 1. The following section provides an overview of performance during the reporting period in relation to those SO operational objectives that have been developed to support the overarching corporate objectives.

Corporate objective - Creating a safer London

5. Supporting Objective - Effective implementation of the Counter Terrorism 7 Point Programme (see Table 1 below).

6. Performance in relation to this objective is measured by reference to a) the coverage of Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) (against a target of dedicated coverage on 85% of London Boroughs) and b) how soon after joining new Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT) members receive a briefing on counter-terrorism issues (against a target of 80% within 2 months of joining).

7. The target for coverage of CTIOs has been raised to 85% of London Boroughs (including Heathrow). As at the end of August 2007 coverage stood at 88% achieving the 2007/8 target. Recruitment continues, with the aim of exceeding the target further and increasing resilience. There has been a decline in the level of recruitment for SNTs easing pressure on training resources and allowing the target to be achieved.

Table 1

8. Supporting Objective - Through a sustained relationship with vulnerable groups police provide an appropriate response to real or perceived threats (see Table 2 below).

9. Performance in relation to this objective is measured by reference to a) the time taken for police Explosives Officers to attend the scene of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and b) the effectiveness of the police scene management at suspected/actual bomb scenes.

10. All calls for Explosives Officers to attend IEDs have been attended within the set time. The volume of calls was inflated in July, reflecting increased patrols and public vigilance and concern following the terrorist incidents at the Tiger Tiger Night Club, in Haymarket and at Cockspur Street on 29 June. All suspected and actual terrorist incidents have been graded as appropriate for scene management. Once again, July’s volume is inflated following the terrorist incidents of 29 June.

Table 2

Corporate objective - To increase advanced identification of threats from, and opportunities of countering terrorism

11. Supporting Objective - Valuable Counter-Terrorism intelligence is identified and acted upon (see Table 3 below).

12. Performance in relation to this objective is measured by reference to the promptness of police in answering calls to the national Terrorist Hotline. During this reporting period, the target for this measure has been exceeded with 98% of calls to the ‘Hotline’ being answered within the set time. Following the terrorist incidents of the 29 June 2007 temporary arrangements were made to expand the capability of the Hotline call handling facilities, this has resulted in the loss of 19 days of data covering the end of June and the first half of July. However, during this time over 1700 calls with information relevant to the investigation were received.

Table 3

Corporate objective – to enhance the security of key locations and protected persons

13. Performance in relation to this objective is measured by reference to the effectiveness of security and protection arrangements for the Royal Household (see Table 4 below). During the period of this report, there have been no intrusions into the protected secure (Royal) Residence of a principal (red and purple zones).

Table 4

Other significant events/issues:

Counter Terrorism Update
14. From an operational perspective, recent months continue to be extremely busy for the Counter Terrorism Command (SO15), particularly following on from the events in London and Glasgow at the end of June and beginning of July.

15. During June and July 2007 26 people have been convicted of terrorist offences in 7 separate trials. These convictions have resulted in sentences of 22 months to life imprisonment. The investigation, arrest and conviction of these men have without doubt prevented considerable loss of life and injury.

June 2007

16. 29 June 2007, shortly before 2 am, police were called to a suspicious vehicle - a green Mercedes - parked in the Haymarket, SW1. The immediate area was cordoned off while explosives officers examined the vehicle. They discovered what appeared to be a potentially viable explosive device, which they made safe - this was an act of extreme courage. An investigation was launched by SO15.

17. Later that day, a second potential device was recovered – a Mercedes which had been parked in Cockspur Street, SW1, and later removed to an underground car park in Park Lane, W1.

18. At around 3.15 pm on Saturday 30 June 2007, a jeep Cherokee was driven into the front door at the check-in of the terminal building at Glasgow International Airport. Emergency services were immediately in attendance and two men from the vehicle were detained at the scene. One was taken to the Royal Alexandra Hospital where he was detained suffering from severe burns. The other man was detained in police custody.

19. It was later confirmed that the incident at Glasgow Airport was linked to the events in London on 29 June.

20. On 2nd July 2007, the investigation of both the London and Glasgow terrorist incidents came under the command of SO15. Detectives from the MPS continue to work closely with colleagues from Strathclyde Police, other police forces across the country and internationally (Australia for example). Three people have been charged in the UK.

21. 11 June 2007 three men who admitted sending money and property to support terrorist activity overseas were jailed. Ismael Kamoka, Abdul Bourouag and Khalid Abusalama were all members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) - a group intent on overthrowing the Libyan government and replacing it with a fundamental Islamic state.

22. The men were arrested in Worcester on 05 December 2005. During searches linked to the men, SO15 officers found a ledger written in Arabic, which detailed money transfers to other countries totalling thousands of pounds. The three men sent money – in excess of £20,000 per annum – to people living abroad to support their organisation’s aim.

23. Officers also discovered various forms of false identification, including fake passports and digitally altered photographs. The passports were used for identification purposes to send money to countries including Morocco, Spain, Lebanon, France, Yemen and Sudan.

24. A printed email found at an address linked with Kamoka gave details of fighting in Afghanistan, support for the Taliban and how $500 could buy a new identity.

25. Audio tapes and recordings of jihad songs and the sound of battle were found, as well as a large document detailing Libyan nationals who took part in jihad in Afghanistan, their motives, travel arrangements, training battles and martyrdom.

26. All three men pleaded guilty to entering into an arrangement for the purposes of terrorism, contrary to Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Kamoka was sentenced to three years and nine months, Bourouag and Abusalama to 22 months imprisonment each.

27. 15 June 2007, Qaisir Shaffi was found guilty of conspiracy to murder after denying the charge and was jailed for 15 years. The other six defendants had all admitted conspiracy to cause explosions with intent to endanger life:

• Abdul Aziz Jalil received 26 years imprisonment;
•  Nadeem Tarmohamed received 20 years imprisonment;
•  Junade Feroze received 22 years imprisonment;
• Mohammed Naveed Bhatti received 20 years imprisonment;
• Zia Ul Haq received 18 years imprisonment
• Omar Abdur Rehman received 15 years imprisonment.
• Dhiren Barot had received life imprisonment, with a minimum of 40 years to serve, in November 2006. This was reduced to 30 years on Appeal earlier this year.

28. Dhiren Barot and his gang were determined terrorists who planned bombings on both sides of the Atlantic. Barot was the ringleader of this terrorist cell. Six of the men pleaded guilty to being willing participants in a plot which could have led to the deaths of many innocent people.

29. They made plans for a series of co-ordinated attacks in the United Kingdom. These included packing three limousines with gas cylinders and explosives before setting them off in underground car parks. This could have caused huge loss of life. Plans to set off a dirty bomb in this country would have caused fear, panic and widespread disruption.

30. The seven men jailed were not instigators of the planned attacks but were the planning team needed by Barot to contribute expertise in areas that he was lacking. He needed people to carry out research, gain access to specialist libraries, supply vehicles, false identities and travel documents, bank accounts, money and safe houses.

31. The bulk of the evidence that shows the parts played by these men emerged not from surveillance but from enquiries carried out after they were arrested. This involved painstaking examination of the mass of material found during searches. A huge amount of this material was on computers, some of it encrypted or deleted.

32. The evidence in this case was obtained though close co-operation with the Security Service and international partners.

33. June 2007 Younis Tsouli, Waseem Mughal, Tariq al-Daour were jailed after they admitted incitement to commit an act of terrorism, namely murder. They are the first people in the UK to be prosecuted for incitement of terrorist murder using the internet. Tsouli was jailed for 10 years, Mughal for 7.5 years and al-Daour for 6.5 years.

July 2007

34. 9 July 2007 a jury at Woolwich Crown Court found Muktar Said Ibrahim, Ramzi Mohammed, Hussain Osman and Yassin Omar guilty of conspiracy to murder. They were jailed for life on 11 July for the attempted terrorist attacks in London on 21 July 2005; they were told that they must serve at least 40 years before they can apply for parole – a total of 160 years jail sentence.

35. The jury was discharged after failing to reach verdicts on Adel Yahya and Manfo Kwaku Asiedu – a retrial of these two men is to begin on 12 November 2007.

36. 18 July 2007 Yassin Nassari was jailed for three-and-a-half years after being found guilty of possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism contrary to Section 58 Terrorism Act 2000.

37. SO15 officers arrested Nassari in May 2006. Officers searched his luggage after he arrived on a flight from Amsterdam to Luton Airport. A computer hard-drive was seized and found to contain documents about martyrdom, weapons training and how to construct the Qassam artillery rocket - a homemade steel rocket used by terrorists in the Middle East.

38. Analysis revealed that Nassari had communicated with other extremists via Internet chat-rooms. He exchanged views with other users, including Tariq al-Daour –who was jailed along with two other men in June 2007 for incitement to murder using the Internet.

39. Further evidence was found at his home address including graphic and violent videos of terrorist attacks and prohibited material.

40. 18 July 2007 Al Bashir Mohammed Al Faqih was jailed for four years after admitting possessing documents describing how to make explosives and how to set up a terrorist cell. Al Faqih, a Libyan national, is a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

41. Officers found a manual on the manufacture of explosive devices on a CD-Rom during a search of his home following arrest. In addition, Al Faqih had in his possession a significant amount of material including books, CD-ROMs, documents and audiocassettes that could be construed as ‘jihadi’ or radical, the court was told.

42. 26 July 2007 five men were sentenced to a total of more than 13 years' after being found guilty of possessing large amounts of extremist material to help them prepare for training camps overseas and to carry out terrorist acts.

43. Martyrdom and suicide bombings were a recurring theme in the material, designed to encourage people to die in the process of destroying the chosen targets of the authors.

Other matters

44. 14 June 2007 SO15 appealed for assistance and information regarding the whereabouts of Zeeshan Siddiqui, who is believed to have absconded from a control order imposed on him under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. He had absconded from hospital in the Hounslow area on 27 September 2006 and immediate steps were made to trace him, and these inquiries continue, but he could not be named until an anonymity order was lifted. After he was named, information was sought from the public via the Anti-Terrorist Hotline.

45. Anonymity orders are assessed on a case-by-case basis. At the time Siddiqui absconded, it was the considered view that there was a clear operational advantage to the anonymity order remaining and substantial operational disadvantage in removing it. At all times, active lines of enquiry were being pursued to find this individual.

46. 1 August 2007 detectives from the MPS Counter Terrorism Command charged Lukimon Sulaimon under the Terrorism Act 2000 with failing to disclose information, which might help in bringing a terrorist to justice in the UK. The arrest is in connection with the continuing investigation into the events of 21 July 2005. The matter remains sub judice.

C. Race and equality impact

There are no explicit race and equality items addressed. The activities that form this report and the data content are arrived at with a regard to delivering SO policing services to an equal standard for all Londoners. The performance report fully complies with equal opportunities policies and associated MPA/MPS Diversity issues. In addition, SO are in regular contact with key community groups and use this to assist the monitoring of the impact of counter terrorist policing in London.

D. Financial implications

SO collects performance data on a regular basis. However, additional effort is expended on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of performance measures included in this report. Due to the events of July 2005, additional funding has been obtained from the Home Office in relation to Counter Terrorism and Security Protection.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Superintendent Neil Haynes, SO Continuous Improvement Unit, MPS.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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