The Morris Inquiry work programme for the committee

Report: 8
Date: 14 April 2005
By: Chief Executive

Summary

This report sets out proposals for the future work programme for this Committee, taking account of the recommendations made by the Morris Inquiry in relation to the responsibilities of the MPA for oversight of MPS professional standards matters.

A. Recommendations

That

1. the Committee agree the proposals outlined in the report, including those in Appendix 2, as the basis for its future work programme.
2. the Chief Executive prepare suitable detailed procedures and protocols for delivering the work programme, in consultation with the Commissioner and the Chair of this Committee.

B. Supporting information

1. The Morris Inquiry made several recommendations in relation to the oversight functions of the MPA for MPS professional standards, complaints and misconduct matters. An extract from the Morris Inquiry Report on the role of the Authority is at Appendix 1. The recommendations made by the Inquiry that have been allocated to this Committee to drive forward are set out in Appendix 2. Specifically, the Inquiry commented that the MPA ‘could be more assertive in exercising its powers’, and they recommended that

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority keeps under review the protocol with the MPS on the provision of information to the Authority on complaints and conduct cases, in order to ensure that it meets its responsibility for scrutiny.

We also recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority reviews the resources it is able to devote to supporting its role in overseeing complaints and conduct cases, with a view to increasing activity further, particularly in relation to dip-sampling of files.

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority enters into greater dialogue with other police authorities to establish best practice in discharging the oversight role. This could also include visits and the exchange of information.

We also recommend that the Commissioner takes steps to ensure that the Directorate of Professional Standards appreciates the importance of scrutiny to public confidence.

This report makes proposals for the future work of the Committee in order to address the Morris recommendations and to raise the MPA’s effectiveness in its oversight of MPS performance. It has been prepared in consultation with AC Alan Brown, who has expressed support for the direction proposed and for the principle that the work of the Directorate of Professional Standards will be enhanced by greater transparency and accountability.

2. The specific recommendations made by the Morris Inquiry that rest with this Committee for action are listed in Appendix 2.

3. In written and oral evidence to the Inquiry, the Chair of this committee identified some areas where, with the availability of additional staff resources, the Authority could do more. In particular, mention was made of

• Dip sampling of complaints case files.
• Consideration of complaints data and performance at BOCU level as well as force-wide.
• Consideration of complaints trends by reference to categories of complaint, as well as aggregate volume, to gain understanding of how complaints reflect the community’s experience of policing.
• Discussion with stakeholders as a regular feature of oversight.
• Consideration of data and trends relating to discipline matters, to identify issues of timeliness, outcomes, proportionality of investigation, and any disproportionality in relation to race or gender.

4. One of the recommendations made by Morris concerned the resources to support the Authority’s functions in this area. This has already been addressed. There are now two members of MPA staff working full time on professional standards matters, dealing MPA oversight responsibilities and with casework – complaints against ACPO rank officers, police appeals tribunals, and pension forfeiture cases - reporting to the Deputy Chief Executive. The volume of ACPO cases in hand has fallen over recent months, and there is currently a capacity to develop oversight and monitoring that the MPA has not previously had. The proposals made in this report reflect that enhanced capacity.

Dip Sampling of case files

5. Morris received evidence from the APA and others that many Police Authorities review every single completed complaint case file in their force. Typically, police forces outside London may have several hundred complaint cases a year, compared with 4500 or so in the MPS. The scale of the task of “dip sampling” is formidable and previous arrangements have not proved sustainable.

6. The proposal is that there should be a regular monthly meeting of Members of the committee, as the Complaints Cases Panel. The cases for consideration would be randomly selected by MPA officers from a list of completed files provided by MPS; officers of the MPA Professional Standards Team and officers of DPS will review each file against a ‘template’ checklist to cover such matters as timeliness, treatment of the complainant, treatment of the officer, proportionality, clarity of investigative findings and justification for outcome. A synopsis of each case review will be presented to Members at the Panel and Members will have the opportunity to review case files themselves, and to raise questions of representatives of the DPS.

7. Using the staff time now available to ‘pre-sift’ files and identify issues for Member scrutiny, and working in collaboration with DPS, it should be possible to dip sample up to 10 cases each month.

8. In order to develop skills in dip sampling, it is proposed that a one-day training session should be organised for members and officers, to cover the basic requirements of the complaints and discipline processes, and the areas to consider in assessing the quality of a case file. The ‘template’ checklist and the training will be developed in collaboration with the Director of Professional Standards, HMIC and IPCC and will include some input from other Police Authorities.

Consideration of complaints data and trends at OCU level

9. At present, the Committee considers data on complaints and discipline at force wide level only. Given the Authority’s strategic role, that focus is appropriate. But it is proposed that once each year the Committee should examine the trends and performance by OCUs, to identify any significant variances or outliers.

10. Consideration of complaints trends by reference to categories of complaint, as well as aggregate volume. It is proposed that once each year the Committee should examine complaints by category, and by OCU, to assess what the pattern of complaints show in terms of the community’s experience of policing.

11. Consideration of data and trends relating to discipline matters, to identify issues of timeliness, outcomes, proportionality of investigation, and any disproportionality in relation to race or gender. It is proposed that the monitoring data submitted to each meeting of this committee should be extended to include details relating to discipline matters. This will include regular reporting of the numbers of officers suspended or removed from operational duties.

12. If the Committee agree the proposals set out in paras 5 – 11 above, officers will work up detailed procedures and protocols with MPS colleagues.

13. Discussion with stakeholders has not, up to now, been part of the MPA’s oversight process. However, the evidence submitted to the Morris Inquiry by key stakeholders, demonstrated that stakeholders have valuable experiences and insights to relate, which could be of value to the Committee in gaining an understanding of key issues of community confidence in the complaints and discipline process. It is therefore proposed that a programme be drawn up so that at each meeting of the Committee, one or more of the following organisations would be invited to make a written and/or short oral presentation on the operation of the complaints and discipline process from their perspective:

• the Independent Advisory Group
• the Police Action Lawyers Group
• Police Staff Associations
• Trade Unions representing police (civilian) staff
• Greater London CAB Service
• The London Forum of Community Police Consultative Groups
• CRE London Region

14. In order to share experiences with other Police Authorities it is proposed that officers in conjunction with the Chair should arrange for Committee members to visit two or three Police Authorities in each year.

15. The IPCC will continue to have a standing invitation for one of the Commissioners for London to attend each meeting of the Committee, for all of the business of the Committee. In addition, regular meetings will take place between the Chair of the Authority and Members of this Committee with all of the IPCC Commissioners for London, to discuss matters of mutual interest and to share learning.

16. One of the key recommendations of the Morris Inquiry relates to the introduction of a case management model as a framework for oversight of individual cases. The Commissioner accepts the principle of this recommendation, but more detailed work will be needed with the MPS to develop the particular model advocated by the Inquiry into a workable protocol. It is proposed that the Chief Executive should pursue those discussions with the Assistant Commissioner, Professional Standards with a view to bring an agreed protocol to your meeting in June 2005.

17. It is also proposed that the existing protocol dealing with oversight of sensitive cases (which regulates the provision of information to the Authority on complaints and conduct cases) should be reviewed and updated at the same time, in order to ensure that, together with the Case Management Model there is a consistent and cohesive framework setting out how the MPA and MPS will work together to ensure that the MPA is enabled to meets its responsibility for scrutiny.

18. The Committee should continue to monitor implementation of the MPS Anti-Corruption Strategy and its various strands. This should include a twice-yearly report on the strategic intelligence assessment for PSD.

19. There are several of the recommendations made by the Morris Inquiry that are not covered by the proposals above. Proposals are set out (emboldened) in Appendix 2 for action by this Committee on those recommendations.

20. Some of the Morris recommendations overlap with recommendations made by the recent CRE Inquiry into the Police Service, and some areas are also covered by the Review of Police Discipline carried out by William Taylor for the Home Office. The Morris Report Steering Group will look at the 3 sets of recommendations in order to make proposals to Committees about how they should be taken forward in a cohesive fashion.

C. Race and equality impact

21. Questions of proportionality, respect for difference, fairness and equality of treatment are of fundamental importance in the exercise of the MPA’s oversight responsibilities. The proposals in this report will enhance the Authority’s ability to understand the impact and effect of MPS performance in professional standards on the diverse communities in London, and will give the opportunity for representative bodies to inform and influence the MPA in carrying out its functions in this area.

D. Financial implications

22. There are no direct financial implications from these proposals. The MPA Professional Standards Team is funded within the base budget for 2005/6 and any incidental costs of the work programme set out can be met within the MPA budget.

E. Background papers

Report of the Morris Inquiry and various submissions to the Inquiry

F. Contact details

Report author(s): David Riddle, MPA.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

The report of the Morris Inquiry 2004

The role of the Metropolitan Police Authority in complaints and discipline

6.10 Public confidence requires robust scrutiny of police complaints and conduct matters. This is a key part of the role of police authorities. They must ensure that they have systems and structures in place to apply the necessary rigour to oversee the way the police service handles cases.

6.11 As a starting point, it is helpful to examine the statutory framework governing police authority oversight of complaints. This is set out in the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform Act 2002.

6.12 Section 6(1) of the 1996 Act places a duty on police authorities to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police service in its area. The service is under the direction and control of the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) by virtue of section 10(1).

6.13 Section 77 of the 1996 Act imposed a duty on every police authority, in
maintaining an efficient and effective police service, to keep itself informed as to the workings of the procedures for handling complaints about the conduct of police officers. Section 15 of the 2002 Act maintains this duty and now widens it.

6.14 Section 22(3) of the 1996 Act requires the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) to submit a report to the police authority on such matters as the authority may determine relating to the efficiency and effectiveness of the police service. This is subject to an appeal to the Home Secretary on the grounds that the report would contain information which in the public interest ought not to be disclosed, or is not needed for the discharge of the functions of the police authority.

6.15 There is no express statutory provision, which imposes a duty on the police authority to hold its Chief Constable (the Commissioner) to account, although ‘everybody understands that is the convention’. (Evidence of David Riddle, Deputy Clerk, MPA.)

6.16 The MPA has suggested that an express provision to this effect would be
helpful. We have not received evidence from any other source which would justify disturbing the current relationship.

6.17 The Chief Constable (the Commissioner) is responsible for the recording,
handling and investigating of complaints about the conduct of police officers of the rank up to and including Chief Superintendent.

6.18 The police authority is responsible for overseeing the procedures for handling complaints to ensure that they comply fully with the statutory provisions, and for considering issues raised by complaints as they impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the service.

6.19 Police authorities also have responsibility for the recording, handling and
investigating of complaints against ACPO officers, other than complaints relating to the direction and control of a service.

6.20 Police authorities are not responsible for investigating complaints concerning the conduct of officers below ACPO rank. The APA’s view is that, in carrying out their oversight role, police authorities should not involve themselves in the detail of individual cases, other than to look at process issues and any implications for wider policy.

6.21 In their publication, Complaints against the Police – Monitoring and Oversight Arrangements, A Good Practice Guide for Police Authorities, the APA recommends that police authorities should have in place “a structured process for ongoing scrutiny and oversight of complaints which contains all of the following elements:

• process and procedural audit against Home Office guidance;
• dip sampling of completed complaints files;
• analysis of statistics and trends;
• strategic analysis;
• discussion with stakeholders and partners”

The Guide considers each of these elements in detail and offers guidance to assist police authorities.

6.22 The MPA discharges its responsibilities for complaints through its Professional Standards and Complaints Committee. This Committee:

• periodically reviews the policies and procedures adopted by the MPS for
  complaints handling;
• liaises with HMIC in order to obtain an independent assessment of service
  procedures and performance;
• maintains contact with the IPCC to obtain feedback and guidance;
• receives regular reports from the Commissioner containing complaints
  performance information;
• undertakes dip-sampling of complaint case files; and
• maintains oversight of the implementation of the MPS’ Professional
  Standards Strategy.

6.23 We have received evidence from both Lord Harris, former Chair of the MPA, and Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee, on how the MPA discharges its oversight role and what they perceive to be restrictions under the current statutory regime.

6.24 Mr Auladin informed us that the MPA had recently increased staffing support to Members on professional standards issues and that the new resource would be used to develop systems and processes for oversight and monitoring, particularly in relation to dip-sampling cases, OCU level analysis, analysis of data on categories of complaint, improving discussions with stakeholders and more detailed monitoring of timeliness of investigations and their outcomes.

6.25 The MPS Directorate of Professional Standards handles approximately 5,000 cases a year. The MPA told us that, given this figure and the resources at its disposal, the proportion of files the Authority is able to sample is small. Some police authorities are able to analyzed every complaint file for their service; that level of scrutiny is beyond the resources of the MPA and scrutiny at Member level is in the region of 10 cases a month.

6.26 However, Mr Auladin went on to underline the Authority’s view that the current monitoring regime was deficient in that the police authority is unable to influence the way matters are dealt with by the Service in particular in terms of oversight of individual cases. The proposal in the Review of Operation Lancet that the Clerk to the Police Authority should be included in case conferences did not, in his view go far enough and he considered that ‘a more systematic and formal system for proper Member oversight is required.

“The MPA considers that the current framework should be strengthened by, as a minimum, legislation or a Home Office Code of Practice to provide for a police authority

• To receive, as of right, regular reports on current ‘sensitive cases’ including complaints, discipline cases, civil actions against police, grievances and employment tribunals…
• To identify specific cases upon which it requires a full report from the Commissioner, and for these to include live as well as closed cases.
• To give advice or views on the conduct or progress of a specific case to which the Commissioner should be required to have regard; to nominate one or more

Members to give such advice or views on a continuing basis throughout the course of an individual case.

• To set standards in respect of matters such as use of mediation, informal resolution of complaints, and restorative conferencing to which the Commissioner should be required to have regard.”

(Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee.)

6.27 Lord Harris proposed in his submission that the function of the investigation of complaints within a service should be at ‘arms length’ from the service management and directly accountable to the police authority. “Redefining the relationship of the investigating unit to the Authority could boost community confidence in the complaints process, complementing the role of the MPA.”

6.28 The MPA itself acknowledged that this proposal received little support from those giving evidence to the Inquiry. The Commissioner saw it as potentially being “political interference”, although the MPA, like all police authorities, is not intended to be a political body. The MPA clarified that they were not proposing that police authorities should have any direct responsibility for discipline decisions or functions and saw the proposal as building on the ‘existing convention in police forces that the Deputy Chief Constable is the discipline authority and responsible for the operation of the complaints function’.

6.29 Thus, in respect of the MPS, the MPA’s proposal is that the Deputy
Commissioner should have responsibility and accountability for the direction and control of the service relating to the investigation of complaints and conduct matters and should report to, and be accountable, to the Authority for the performance of those responsibilities.

6.30 This would leave the Commissioner free in the role of final adjudicator on
individual cases without a conflict of responsibilities. ‘The separation of functions, and the introduction of the authority as an independent player, would serve to increase public and internal confidence in the system’. (Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair of the MPA’s Professional Standards and Complaints Committee.)

6.31 We invited the Home Office to comment on the MPA’s proposal. The department’s view is that the current statutory framework enables police authorities to carry out their oversight responsibilities and that authorities play a valuable role in asking challenging questions of the service. In their submission to us, the Home Office noted the MPA’s view that there was a case for ‘fundamental structural reform to put the investigation of professional standards matters at arms length from the management of the force … making it directly accountable to the MPA’. They also noted that the MPA did not appear to be seeking day to day control or management but rather to act as a “critical friend”.

6.32 The Home Office is ‘not yet convinced that there is a compelling case for a reform of the statutory duty of police authorities in relation to professional standards’. It also considers that making such a change would risk ‘blurring the clear distinctions between [Chief Constables and Police Authorities] that were established in the Police Act 1996’. On this last point they differ from the MPA. The Authority’s view is that empowering police authorities will clarify responsibilities without compromising the Commissioner’s responsibility for direction and control.

6.33 Peter Herbert, a Member (and former Deputy Chair) of the MPA, considered that the existing powers should be adequate: “… we should be able to get the level of co-operation from the MPS to make scrutiny and accountability work.” Although he implied that the system had not always worked smoothly: “I am aware, certainly, that where the MPS is resistant to that level of intrusion and accountability, either selective information, as I said earlier, is given, or no information is given at all.”

6.34 ACPO too were in favour of maintaining the status quo and disagreed with Lord Harris’ suggestion of a new reporting line for professional standards:

“The present system of misconduct hearings relies on a review and an appeal process. A review by the chief constable and ultimate appeal to a third party panel convened by the authority. An independent appeal process would have to be re-engineered if the authority were to be involved in the direct management and handling of complaints investigations. It is submitted in short that the change would be an imbalance of the relationship between a force and an authority and cumbersome to boot.” (Submission from Christopher Fox, President of ACPO.)

6.35 Indeed, both ACPO and the Home Office believe that effective oversight is possible within the current statutory framework. This is also the view of the APA. The Association believes that, if a police authority is exercising its responsibilities robustly, it is capable of monitoring effectively.

6.36 However, the APA was “attracted to the MPA’s proposal that the investigation of professional standards should be put at arms length from the force with direct reporting to the police authority.” The Association considers that this would be consistent with the police authority’s scrutiny and oversight role and would reinforce the role of the police authority as the link between the policing service provided and the local community. “It would certainly complement the thrust of the new complaints arrangements which were designed to increase public confidence by making the system more independent.” However, the APA stressed that it had not consulted its members about the proposals and would need to do so before expressing a definitive view.

6.37 Having considered the evidence that we have received, we do not believe that there is a compelling case for recommending changes to the legislation governing the role of police authorities in relation to complaints. We are persuaded that the current statutory provisions provide a framework for effective scrutiny.

6.38 We are, of course, mindful of the fact that the MPA is a relatively new police authority charged with oversight of a police service that operated without a police authority for over 170 years. It is, therefore, likely that it might take some time to find the right level of equilibrium in the relationship and also for the MPS to appreciate the benefits of increased scrutiny.

6.39 This latter point is important, since effective oversight depends, to a certain extent, on a constructive attitude on the part of those whose work is overseen. It is possible that some of the MPA’s frustration with the current system is a reflection of the attitude of the MPS to the Authority’s interest in its work.

6.40 We have already commented on the need for a police authority to apply
appropriate rigour to its oversight role. We consider that the MPA could be more assertive in exercising its powers. There are examples of police authorities who are much more robust in holding professional standards departments to account.

6.41 In the next chapter we outline a model of case management which we believe will ensure greater scrutiny of complaints and discipline matters. If this is adopted, we are confident that it will assist the MPA in discharging its oversight role effectively.

6.42 Oversight is not political interference but part of proper accountability. This needs to be accepted by DPS, and the interest of MPA Members in the directorate’s work welcomed and positively encouraged. We have received evidence of police services who have issued an open invitation to members of their police authority’s professional standards committee to inspect any professional standards file.

6.43 We have seen a draft protocol which, when analyzed, will apply to, inter alia, complaints, conduct cases and Employment Tribunal claims. This should assist in clarifying the arrangements for the provision of information on cases which are significant in terms of their financial or other consequences.

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority keeps under review the protocol with the MPS on the provision of information to the Authority on complaints and conduct cases, in order to ensure that it meets its responsibility for scrutiny.

We also recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority reviews the
resources it is able to devote to supporting its role in overseeing complaints and conduct cases, with a view to increasing activity further, particularly in relation to dip-sampling of files.

6.44 However, we are firmly of the view that oversight needs to be a formal
function conducted through formal structures, rather than through the
involvement of individual Members of the Authority in specific cases, and we would encourage a partnership to that end.

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Authority enters into greater dialogue with other police authorities to establish best practice in discharging the oversight role. This could also include visits and the exchange of information.

We also recommend that the Commissioner takes steps to ensure that the Directorate of Professional Standards appreciates the importance of scrutiny to public confidence.

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