Child protection teams

Report: 11
Date: 11 December 2001
By: Commissioner

Summary

Progress report regarding the changes in the MPS approach to child protection following the death of Victoria Climbie. To include issues arising from both the MPS internal review and likely to emerge from Ministerial Inquiry chairing by Lord Laming.

A. Recommendations

1. Members are asked to note progress in addressing child protection issues since the death of Victoria Climbie; and
2. Members allow a presentation by CPT to the Committee following the publication of Lord Laming's report in mid 2002.

B. Supporting information

1. Prior to the formation of the Serious Crime Group (SCG) Child Protection Teams (CPT) were part of Area Crime OCU's (ACOCU). CO41 Crime Policy Branch was responsible for some policy issues although most policy and standard operating procedures were agreed locally with other agencies using the model described in 'Working together to safeguard children' publication. Thirty-one such multi-agency groups exist in London. Additionally Social Services are described as the 'lead agency' for child protection matters and each Local Authority has its own practices and structures. MPS policy and service delivery was widely different dependent on geography, personalities and level of investigative experience.

2. Each Area Assistant Commissioner and ACOCU Commander gave different priorities to units within their commands hence resourcing and levels of staff varied. The balance of skills and experience ranged considerably. Some teams did not have a single substantive detective officer. It must be remembered that CPT's investigate serious crimes daily including rape, serious assaults and death related incidents. In the aftermath of the publication of the MacPherson report thirteen and a half percent of the child protection police staff were transferred to homicide investigation. The level of detective skills fell further and at the time of the formation of SO5 only thirty percent of the police staff were substantive detectives.

3. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Griffiths and Detective Chief Superintendent Kelleher were tasked to review MPS serious crime investigation above Borough command level. Prior to the death of Victoria Climbie they recommended that the Serious Crime Group be formed from the former SO crime units and Area Crime Operational Command units. It was proposed the eighth division of the SCG was a Child Protection Operational Command Unit.

4. In February 2000 Victoria Climbie aged 8 was murdered by her carers. Her Great Aunt had brought Victoria from the Ivory Coast, Africa to France on a false passport. The French Authorities stopped welfare payments and the Aunt travelled to London presenting herself at Ealing Social Services as homeless and in need of support. The family subsequently lived in Brent then Haringey.

5. Victoria was admitted first to the Central Middlesex Hospital with suspected non-accidental injuries but was diagnosed as suffering from scabies by a Consultant Paediatrician. Victoria was later admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital with scalding and concerns were expressed by medical staff about her general condition. Following release from hospital further allegations were made of sexual abuse against the Aunt's boyfriend. Victoria later withdrew these. It was felt at the time that the allegations were only made to Social Services to secure priority in re-housing. Victoria had been kept tied up in a bath and at post mortem was found to have 128 injury sites on her body. She died of hypothermia. Both carers were sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2001 and that evening a Ministerial Inquiry was announced in Parliament. It is envisaged that organisational and individual criticism will be levelled at the MPS by the Ministerial Inquiry.

6. The murder of Victoria Climbie in February overtook events in respect of the MPS re-organisation following the appointment of Sir John Stevens as Commissioner. It became yet another compelling reason for change. Consultation with Territorial Policing followed thereafter on the proposal to create a dedicated unit.

7. On 3rd July 2000 the SO5 Child Protection Operational Command Unit was formed within the Serious Crime Group. The twenty-seven Child Protection Teams, the Paedophile Unit and four major Investigation teams investigating complex abuse in children's homes and paedophile rings were merged into one command now comprising 339 police officers and 110 civil staff.

8. Hitherto each of these units had operated in isolation within the five former Area Crime Operational Command Units independently developing incompatible systems that has made benchmarking against historical data impossible. No performance indicators previously existed and indeed the Government ethos, as enshrined in the Children Act 1989 and the 'Working Together to Safeguard Children' guidelines, is aimed at the 'best interests of the child'. Prosecution of a parent or carer may not always be in the best interests of the child. The views of partner agencies influence the decision to prosecute.

9. Additionally trying to unlock what has gone on behind closed doors of a home with family alliances, loyalty and pressures to conceal the truth is notoriously difficult. Often evidence usable in criminal courts cannot be found and civil measures or providing risk management countermeasures, such as inclusion on the Child Protection Register, become the only viable outcome. For that reason judicial disposal has proved to be an unreliable indicator of police performance. Work is being progressed to establish meaningful operational performance indicators.

10. The 2001/2002 Policing plan contains the following objectives

• Increasing the judicial disposal rate for child sex abuse (by carers) by 10% (32.5% to 35%).
• Establishing child abuse crime prevention initiatives in partnership with other agencies in 60% of London Boroughs.

11. Whilst the abuse prevention initiative objective has now engaged on each local authority area the judicial disposal rate has proved too challenging. It has been discovered that the previous year's overall JD rate was 23.5% and that owing to an error in transposition the figure of 32.5 was accidentally adopted. The judicial disposal rate for offences investigated by Child Protection Teams (April to October 2001) is 26% it is predicted that the 35% target will not be reached.

12. The MPS has taken the following key action to address the organisational shortcomings that existed at the date of Victoria's death.

13. The following groups oversee the development and remedial action within this specialist area:

• Assistant Commissioner Veness oversees a multi-agency strategic group on which Richard Sumray represents the MPA,
• Deputy Assistant Commissioner Griffiths oversees a meeting of users and provisioning branches,
• Deputy Assistant Commissioner Howlett oversees a GOLD strategy group to manage the interface with the Inquiry.
• Detective Chief Superintendent Kelleher co-ordinates all the tasks to ensure continuity between the three groups.

14. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Howlett was appointed ACPO lead and Detective Chief Superintendent Derrick Kelleher appointed OCU Commander. Both senior officers not only have responsibility for policy but also operational delivery. Neither are compromised by prior involvement in child protection management. A dedicated management team has been formed comprising two Detective Superintendents, eight Detective Chief Inspectors and two Higher Executive Officers. The three Superintending rank officers are all career detectives with previous child protection and serious crime investigative experience. The entire team is experienced and committed to raising standards.

15. Local multi-agency protocols/operating procedures vary from 10 to 400 pages and consequently the MPS is delivering different standards of service throughout London. Post MacPherson inquiry, and in the light of Human Rights legislation, this situation has become unacceptable to the MPS. A manual setting MPS professional standards has been written and draft 4 distributed to partner agencies and the Ministerial Inquiry for consultation. All SO5 staff are currently working to the manual in an attempt to raise standards and harmonise across the command.

16. Two key linked forums have been established. One Detective Superintendent heads policy formulation and training strategy is headed by the other. Within the training strategy portfolio lies responsibility for diversity and communication. With a command spread across 31 sites communication is seen as a major difficulty.

17. Child protection was historically seen as a poor relation. The following resourcing issues have been addressed so far:

• Fleet of 7 vehicles increased to 32,
• Number of sites with OTIS increased from 50% to almost 100% with only Ealing Team not on the system as it awaits a move to another site,
• Metradios being issued during November,
• Accommodation strategy has been agreed with Property Services Department,
• Dedicated budget since April 2001,
• Merlin project will deliver a vulnerable persons and automated reporting system for children coming to notice and missing persons during late 2002 and an interim solution 'Protect' will provide a case management system in April replacing 30 standalone databases which are not supported by outsourcing contracts,
• Iceflow and video cameras have been provided
• SO5 is equipped with HOLMES 2.

18. Lack of training and skills has been a major issue. The following action has been taken,

• A full time policy officer has been appointed to ensure that SO5 working practises and the lessons learnt from reviews of child deaths continually feed SO5 working practices and training,
• 59 officers have been trained on a three week foundation course based on the National Police Training Detective Foundation course,
• Plans have been put in place to provide the three-week course to all non-detectives as a matter of priority with one further course this year and the remainder from the beginning of 2002. Thereafter training will be provided for substantive detectives according to needs. The programme will be completed by the end of 2002.
• A specialist SO5 Training Unit of a Sergeant and three Constables has been formed,
• SO5 is now a member of the Pan London Child Protection Co-ordinators Training sub group which is looking at standardising multi-agency training,
• Multi-agency Hydra training based on the MPS critical incident management system is being designed,
• A consultant has been brought in to review multi-agency training,
• Generic professional and CRR training is now being delivered,
• A database to manage training and skills balance is currently being populated,
• The detective skills have been increased from 30% to 40% plus 13 uniform officers have been selected for the CID training programme and foundation course,
• Each team now has some detective experience,
• Deputy Assistant Commissioner Howlett and Detective Chief Superintendent Kelleher are working with the National ACPO lead looking at national standards of competence. Two SO5 officers have been nominated to work on a national ACPO committee to support this.

19. Progress in some areas has been slower, notably:

• The provision of accommodation and personnel for a fully staffed headquarters,
• The establishment of an intelligence cell,
• The release of Major Investigation Team officers from two inquiries into children's homes which have been in progress for three years to support child protection,
• SO5 inherited a large number of recuperative duty and long term sick officers and dealing with them effectively has been difficult,
• An occupational health strategy cannot be fully delivered as OH do not have sufficient numbers of staff,
• Failure through advertising to staff a Management Information Unit.

20. Staffing levels will be an issue during the Inquiry and adverse criticisms will be made. As mentioned earlier inconsistency in record keeping has meant that historical data is flawed. Consultancy Group undertook a study and data gathering exercise to establish a formula for staffing Child Protection Teams. This established that the further resources were required however an internal re-distribution of resources was also identified as being necessary. The workload and efficiency study will be repeated in 2002 once new systems have bedded in.

21. The brigading together of the generally small teams will release officers from some teams to reinforce others under pressure. An experiment at Camden CPT introduced a third Sergeant who worked closely with Social Services resulting in the abolition of unnecessary attendances at case conferences, thorough risk assessments on each referral and a managed reduction of work flowing to investigators. The CIPP model of a Sergeant to three investigators has increased supervision levels and will address a further Inquiry concern. This will be extended in due course.

22. Given the difficulties around increases of police officer numbers a 'Best Value' scrutiny of the functions was undertaken resulting in the following bids:

• Thirty-two Executive Officer Grade posts designated Care Officers who would ensure that MPS procedures regarding children on the Child Protection Register are implemented and that information on Protect and Merlin is processed correctly,
• Four Sergeants and Four Administrative Officers to staff a Crime Management Unit administering for the first time a dedicated child protection section of CRIS and allowing central continuous monitoring and regulating of standards and workloads,
• Six Police officers and an additional analyst for the Intelligence Cell and Source Handling Unit.
• One Executive Officer for the Child Abuse Prevention Project
• One Executive Officer, one administrative officer and one constable for the paedophile unit.

23. It was generally felt that further increases in police officer investigator strengths could not be justified until a reliable formula was established and efficient, consistent but safe working practices are adopted and bedded in.

24. The Ministerial Inquiry has been taking live evidence since late September and is expected to continue until 17th December 2001. Part 2 of the Inquiry will look at child protection in general terms and will make recommendations for the future. The final report will be published during the spring or early summer, on a date to be advised.

C. Financial implications

1. The resource implications outlined in paragraph 17 have been met from existing resources.

2. The bid for civil and police posts, outlined in paragraph 22, will have been subject to the determination of the Authority at its meeting on the 10th December. To meet those costs in full, civil staff costs are estimated at £996,000 and police costs at £540,000.

D. Background papers

SO5 Business Plan 2001/2002

E. Contact details

Report authors: Det. Chief Superintendent Derrick Kelleher, MPS.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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