Performance report: homicide

Report: 06
Date: 13 June 2002
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report provides information and commentary on homicide trends and MPS performance including the cost of homicide investigations. The report also looks in detail at the means of death and the relationship between the victim and the accused.

A. Recommendation

Members are asked to note the report.

B. Supporting information

Introduction

1. The Metropolitan Police Authority's Policing and Performance Plan 2001/02 stated:

Homicide

Key actions to meet objective(s) and deliver target(s):

• on behalf of boroughs, Serious Crime Group (SCG) Major Enquiry Teams will continue to investigate homicide, attempts to kill and other critical incidents that require their expertise;
• implement HOLMES 2 (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) in all 16 major incident room sites in London;
• develop a rational case assessment model to help assess optimum resource levels for Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) and teams and provide a potential case for more resources;
• continued targeting of violent criminals through Operation Trident and other proactive tasking to reduce the rate of homicide and thereby the cost to Londoners;
• explore further the scope to prevent homicide, includes a project to check for the presence of serial offenders in London;
• continued implementation of the forensic science strategy to build up resources and expertise in support of other serious crime investigations on boroughs (in addition to homicide);
• complete the training programme for SIOs and Investigating Officers, and continuance of the professional development programme; and
• implement recommendations arising from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary reinspection of 'Winning Consent Part II'.

Definition

2. Homicide is defined nationally and includes:

• Murder
• Manslaughter and
• Infanticide

MPS Performance

3. The 2001/02 MPS performance¹ against target for homicide is:

¹ It should be noted that the data used in preparing this report was taken from CRIS on 18th April 2002 and could be subject to re classification at a later date.

• A clear-up rate of 72.8% against a clear-up target of 90%

N.B. Homicide is measured against a performance target of the percentage of cleared up offences. This differs from most other crime categories that are measured against a judicial disposal target. There are also relatively few homicides each year, therefore any conclusions in relation to trends must be treated with some caution.

4. The target was not achieved because of a number of factors:

Resources

• There has been an increase in the number of homicides this year and this has stretched SCG resources (including the Trident team). Management Board, recognising this fact, increased the number of SIOs, this has not however impacted on this year's performance.
• In common with other operational units, SCG has had to commit resources to Operation Exchange and family liaison following the events of 11 September 2001.
• Similarly, in common with most MPS units, the end of year restriction on budgets has impacted on the activities of the SCG.

Legislative Changes

• The measures introduced by Section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and implemented on 15 January 2001 to reduce the delays in indictable cases reaching Crown Court have effectively meant that all indictable cases need to be ready for the plea and directions hearing within 42 days of charge. This has resulted in intense effort having to be made to meet these requirements because, in real terms, the police have only 28 days to prepare a case that is trial ready.

Changing nature

• Of all homicide offences, 43 were committed using a firearm, compared to 27 last financial year, a 59.3% increase. The 5-year average for firearm homicides, prior to this year, was 21.
• There has been a large increase in the number of murders where the victim is of African-Caribbean origin. Whereas the number of murders in most ethnic groups has fallen, the number of murders in the African-Caribbean group has risen by 54% (from 50 to 77)
• Of the 77 victims who were in the African-Caribbean group, 22 were victims of firearm homicides.

5. During the financial year 2001/2002, there were 202 homicide offences. The number of homicide clear-ups during this year was 147, leading to a clear-up rate of 72.8% which was below our performance target of 90%.

6. The chart below shows the number of homicides committed each month during 2001/2002. Comparisons with previous years shows that there is very little information to be drawn from trying to identify any seasonal variations.

See Charts and Graphs (in supporting material): Homicide offences 2001/2002

Long Term Trends

7. The following chart shows the number of homicide offences since 1990 plotted together with the respective clear-up rates. (In 1998 the Home Office changed their recording practice from the annual year to the planning year.)

8. It can be seen that over the past six years the number of homicide offences has been steadily rising. It should be noted that higher number of offences have been recorded in previous years - 1986 (210) and 1980 (204) – however, both these years also experienced higher clear-up rates – 81% and 95% respectively.

See Charts and Graphs (in supporting material): Homicide

Progress towards meeting key actions - 2001/2002

9. Key actions to meet objective(s) and deliver target(s):

• on behalf of boroughs, Serious Crime Group (SCG) Major Enquiry Teams will continue to investigate homicide, attempts to kill and other critical incidents that require their expertise;
  • All homicide investigations undertaken by SO1 homicide commands
• implement HOLMES 2 (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) in all 16 major incident room sites in London;
  • HOLMES 2 roll out completed May 2002 (last unit Joint Trials Unit at the Old Bailey).
  • Last homicide MIR (Murder Incident Room) completed at Becke House 29th March 2001.
• develop a rational case assessment model to help assess optimum resource levels for Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) and teams and provide a potential case for more resources;
  • Case Scoring introduced into the MIMI (Major Investigation Management Information) system – DAC Griffiths growth paper presented & accepted
• continued targeting of violent criminals through Operation Trident and other proactive tasking to reduce the rate of homicide and thereby the cost to Londoners;
  • Operation Trident continues to cope with the increased workload of Trident, an additional 30 officers had to be seconded to the shootings team. These officers have now returned to their normal duties but a growth bid for 30 officers has been agreed for this financial year.
• explore further the scope to prevent homicide, includes a project to check for the presence of serial offenders in London;
• murder suppression teams introduced in October 2001
• continued implementation of the forensic science strategy to build up resources and expertise in support of other serious crime investigations on boroughs (in addition to homicide);
  • 27 crime scene managers now in post. Crime cene managers provide a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week service.
• complete the training programme for SIOs and Investigating Officers, and continuance of the professional development programme;
  • SIO development programme continues – accreditation system being considered
• implement recommendations arising from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary reinspection of 'Winning Consent Part II';

See Appendix 1 and 2

Age Profile

10. The following table illustrates the age of victims in the cases occurring during 2000/2001 and 2001/2002:

See Charts and Graphs (in supporting material): Age of victims 2000/2001 and Age of victims 2001/2002

11. It can be seen that the age group containing the highest number of victims has changed from the 31-35 years age group (38 offences – 20%) to 21 – 25 years age group (35 offences – 17%).

Ethnicity

12. Ethnic breakdown and comparison with last year.

13. The table above illustrates that, in the period FY 2001/2002, the number of African - Caribbean victims was 77, an increase of 27 (a 54% increase) on the total for FY 2000/2001. White European victims, in the same periods, fell from 98 to 88 victims (a 10% fall) and Indian/Pakistani victims increased from 22 to 27 victims (a 22.7% increase).

See Charts and Graphs (in supporting material): Breakdown of Homicides by Ethnicity 2000/2001 and Breakdown of Homicides by Ethnicity 2001/2002

14. The number of homicides flagged as being racially motivated has dropped this year from 3.7% (7 offences) in 2000/01 to 2.0% (4 offences) this year.

Offender/Victim Relationship

15. The number of homicides flagged as having a "domestic" relationship has fallen this year from 27.8% (52 offences) in 2000/01 to 23.3% this year (47 offences).

16. The following chart illustrates the relationships between victim and accused. It has to be remembered that this chart only shows such relationships where the crime was solved, relationships known and recorded on the Crime Recording and Investigation System (CRIS).

See Charts and Graphs (in supporting material): Comparison of the relationship between the victim and accused

17. This data is based on the relationship between victims and accused, recorded on the CRIS crime report, by the investigating unit. The type of relationship is based on that between the victim and the first or "principal" accused.

18. This chart confirms that, where the relationships have been identified, in a large proportion of homicides (64% in 2001/2002) the victim knew the principal accused person.

Means of death

19. The following table illustrates the means of death in the cases occurring during 2000/2001 and 2001/2002:

* Other includes death caused by fire, strangulation, carbon monoxide poisoning, falls to the ground, punching, etc.

20. The table shows that during 2001/2002, the largest number of homicides were classified as being caused by a sharp instrument (37.6% of the total homicides). This percentage has remained steady over the past 3 years. However, the number of homicides involving a firearm has increased this year from 14.4% (27 offences) in 2000/02 to 21.3% (43 offences). This is a rise of nearly 60%.

21. Last year, it was reported that for the period 2000/2001, only 25.9% of homicides involving a firearm had been solved² by the 23 April 2001. It has to be remembered that the investigation into these crimes does not stop and of those crimes, 48.1% have now been solved (as of 18th April 2002). This year, 23.3% of homicides involving a firearm had been solved (by the 18th April 2002). This illustrates the difficulty and time taken in solving homicides of this type.

² Solved is a term used to indicate whether a homicide has been detected, i.e. a suspect has been charged. It is a different measure from clear-up rates. A clear-up is counted in the month in which it was cleared up which is often not the month in which the offence was committed.

Trident investigations

22. Trident conducted 10 investigations in 2000/2001, solving 2 (20%) during the same period. This compares to the remaining 178 investigations of which 138 (78%) were solved. This year, 2001/2002, Trident investigated 16 homicides and solved 4 (25%) during the same period. This compares to the other 174 investigations where 119 were solved (68%).

SO7 projects team

23. The SO7 Projects Team conducts operations against organised crime, which is either Pan London or at a National or International level, involving contracts to kill, major drug supplying, multi-dimensional crime groups, including ethnically composed gangs and serious large-scale firearms trafficking. Last year this group conducted 18 operations concerning "Contracts to Kill" and 102 operations concerning "Threats to Kill". All these operations were based on intelligence and carried out without any loss of life.

Murder suppression

24. It was identified that, whilst there are a number of crime prevention initiatives to deal with the various aspects of crime such as burglary, auto crime and even the theft of garden furniture, there was nothing to deal with the prevention of murder.

26. The murder suppression unit was created in October 2001 to deal with those who are deemed to have the propensity to kill, will carry it out imminently and are is beyond the operational capability of boroughs to monitor. There is a murder suppression team in each of the three geographical commands. This unit works closely with the multi-agency public protection panels (MAPPPs) to identify possible suspects (known as potentially dangerous offenders).

27. It is early days in the development of this unit who are currently exploring ways to deal with potentially dangerous offenders drawing on the good practice identified by Lancashire Police. There are a number of ways being developed to tackle this problem with the common theme being one of disruption.

Costs

28. Costs have been calculated based on the number of staff in the Major Investigation Teams as a % of Budgeted Workforce Target (for budgeted information) and as a % of actual staff (for actual expenditure). This includes overtime expenditure.

29. The Serious Crime Group (SCG) has not been in existence for 3 years therefore trended costing information is not yet available. During the first year of their existence, no formal budget was set for this group as the units that formed the SCG were amalgamated from other existing units.

30. It has to be remembered that not all the work of the Serious Crime Group is homicide investigation (e.g. proactive operations, murder suppression, non-fatal shootings, child protection, specialist crime, serious and organised crime and the MPS firearms unit). These costs will include costs "cross-charged" from other units.

31. In addition, Operation Trident was only formed in July 2000 so, when setting budgets for 2001-02, there was no full year cost history, nor any appreciation of the complexity of their work. In addition, Trident took on the additional responsibility for investigating non-fatal shootings in April 2001, but without any additional resources, and this has impacted on their financial performance.

32. Officers from the Serious Crime Group were also involved in Operation Exchange and at least one team of officers was involved in subsequent operations linked to events post September 11th. Total overtime incurred on these operations was in the region of £200k.

33. The total costs for the 2001/2002 financial year were:

Costs quoted are actual costs.

34. At the current time there is little in the way of activity based data for these newly formed units. It is therefore not possible to estimate the proportion of the above spend that would have been attributable to homicide investigations.

35. However, the restrictions on overtime have been examined and appear to have had little or no effect on homicide investigation. This may reflect that whilst the course of an investigation may have been slowed by overtime restrictions, the final outcome is the result of officers working smarter.

Contextual Information

36. The investigation of homicide in the Metropolitan Police Area is complicated by having to deal with an ever-increasing diverse makeup of the population, with highly complex relationships. Recent instances that have been dealt with have involved bodies being burnt to conceal the identity of the victim; bodies being found with identifying body parts missing; victims being identified as persons not even known to be in this country.

37. The MPS deals with nearly a quarter of all recorded homicides in the country. Nearly 70% of all UK's black homicide victims are the victims of homicide in the MPS compared to only 17% of white victims. Instances of homicide with black victims tend to have a higher proportion where there is no suspect. One of the reasons for this may be the circumstances of the homicide. Black victims are more likely to be shot than white or Asian victims and homicides involving shooting are generally much more likely not to have suspects identified.

38. This is more apparent when examining the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) gradings. Each homicide is graded according to whether it is:

• A – of grave public concern
• B – the offender is not known
• C – the offender is apparent

In 2000/2001, 32% of homicide investigations were graded B, this year, 2001/2002, 52% are graded B. This represents a 63% rise in the number of homicide investigations where the offender is not known.

39. With the increase in the number of African-Caribbean victims of homicides involving firearms in the MPS, this position looks likely to continue. However, with the large influx of white European asylum seekers from regions currently experiencing ethnic unrest associated with religion, any distinctions drawn involving ethnic appearance may become blurred in the coming years.

Conclusion

40. The MPS failed to meet its clear-up target for the year 2001/2002. There are a number of reasons why this is so, largely determined by the changing nature of homicides. There are an increasing number of homicides where the offender is not known. There is also an increasingly complex and diverse make up of the people who work and live in London and who visit London which affects the circumstances surround many of the homicide cases being dealt with by the Metropolitan Police Service.

41. The chronic under-resourcing of the MPS in terms of homicide investigation has been recognised. The Caseload Assessment Model has identified that when comparing the MPS with six other forces, the "typical" SIO has a case load of 4.2 investigations, the average MPS SIO has a case load of 6.1 investigations and an Operation Trident SIO has a case load of 17.5 investigations. This situation is being remedied and a growth bid for an additional 242 officers to be deployed on homicide investigation and murder review has been agreed. 30 of these officers are joining Operation Trident and the remaining 212 officers will be shared across the other geographical units.

42. The provision of these additional officers has also enabled a review of the operating standards and practices of the group to ensure that the best possible use is made of these resources.

C. Financial implications

None.

D. Background papers

None.

E. Contact details

Report authors: Inspector Trevor Adams, MPS.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

Part II – Revisit to MPS following Report ‘Winning Consent’.

7. HMI recommends that the MPS continues to build upon the improvements made in its approach to murder investigation and review during the past twelve months. It should take due cognisance of the need to:

• fully implement its Forensic Science Strategy (Recommendation 32)
• reduce the caseload of SIOs to a manageable figure (Recommendation 33)
• address, with urgency, MIR multi-tasking and general staffing levels (Recommendation 35)
• introduce clear audit trails for all murder review recommendations.

• fully implement its Forensic Science Strategy (Recommendation 32)

The MPS has formally agreed that the responsibility for the identification branch – SO3 – and for forensic science policy will rest with Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO).

A Forensic Science Strategy Board has been established with members from SO3, Territorial Policing and Specialist Operations. Level III Crime Scene Examination support to both TP and the SCG is subject to role development with implementation in the next six to twelve months.

• reduce the caseloads of the SIOs to a manageable figure (Recommendation 33)

The MPS Managing Caseload Project was rolled out across the SCG in June 2001. This project will enable the true picture of relative workloads by SIOs to be identified and the average workload determined. Further work is being undertaken that will enable a comparison to be drawn between the average workload of an MPS SIO against SIOs in several other forces.

The MPS Consultancy Group was commissioned to establish the impact of the current workloads upon the health and welfare of SIOs and IOs. A paper on Managing SIO Workloads was presented to Management Board on 26 September 2001. Actions included:

• a costed bid to pursue a Regulation 61 allowance for each SIO/IO. This option was not pursued because of the implications of the Police Reform Bill.
• a costed bid for additional SIOs, IOs and Major Inquiry Teams over three years. This was approved with authority to recruit nine additional SIOs as part of the SCG Growth and Development Project.
• a dedicated senior officer will be appointed to lead a Case Closure Project to reduce the caseload per SIO by at least 33% by June 2002. A Detective Superintendent within the Murder Review Group is leading this project.

Cost implications for each of the above actions are included in the attached Action Plans.

• address, with urgency, MIR multi-tasking and general staffing levels (Recommendation 35)

The project to reduce the caseload of SIOs and teams will also significantly impact on the level of multi-tasking of MIR staff. Any dividend from the proposed growth bids would also be used to reduce the workload upon MIR staff.

A project commenced in August 2001 on one murder command, whereby a dedicated MIT team deals with all category homicides. The objective of this project is to reduce HOLMES usage on straightforward cases, thereby reducing the multi-tasking of MIR staff. If successful, the project will be extended throughout the whole SCG. The project will be reviewed in April 2002.

Arrangements are also in hand to recruit an additional HOLMES data inputter/typist for each MIR. This initiative was previously costed at £504,000.

A business case for a growth bid to provide an additional seven MIT teams over the next three years was presented to Management Board on 26 September 2001, where it was agreed that this would be subsumed within the SCG Growth and Development Project.

• introduce clear audit trails for all murder review recommendations.

The MPS Murder Review Programme Board oversees the audit trail of all recommendations. Recommendations of earlier reviews are ‘played through’ the minutes of the monthly meeting; this includes actions that are applicable to Borough level. Once actions are completed they are ‘signed off’. Major components of case resolution return until the minutes indicate action is complete. Recommendations are either dealt with in totality or brought back to a subsequent meeting. An ACPO officer oversees this process and the matter is reported back to the Chair of the Review Board.

Appendix 2

Policing London “Winning consent”

A review of murder investigation and community & race relations issues in the Metropolitan Police Service

Senior Investigating Officers

Caseloads

12.39 The Inspection found it was common for an individual SIO in the MPS to carry a caseload of between 5-12 different murder cases compared to an average caseload of no more than two cases in the comparison forces.

12.40 It is usual practice in the smaller provincial forces for an SIO and their team to be employed on only one murder investigation at any time. It is important to note, however, that an SIO in the MPS is solely employed in the investigation of murder and other serious crimes. In provincial forces a senior detective who has other day-to-day responsibilities such as head of divisional CID usually carries out the role of the SIO.

12.41 SIOs told Her Majesty’s Inspector that they were carrying, what they felt to be high, and sometimes excessively high, caseloads. In order to assess this the Inspection team sent out a questionnaire to SIOs in the MPS and the comparison forces asking them to give their caseload on a nominated day taken at random. Returns were received from 45 SIOs in the nine comparison forces and 22 SIOs in the MPS as shown in Fig 12.1.

12.42 Figure 12.1 indicates that, on average, an SIO in the MPS is investigating six murder cases compared to two in the comparative forces. One SIO in the MPS claimed to be investigating 14 murder offences. The MPS officers are investigating an average of two ‘other cases’ the same as the comparison group. With this caseload, Her Majesty’s Inspector found it difficult to understand how an individual SIO could be expected to manage and prioritise cases. He is concerned that an SIO may be tempted to focus time and resources on new ‘easy to solve’ cases at the expense of longer running cases. This concern was endorsed during interviews with AMIP detective constables.

Murder

Figure 12.1 – Comparison of SI0 Caseloads on 6 September 1999

Recommendation
Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the MPS considers carefully the maximum caseload it requires an SIO to manage, having regard to the varying complexity of cases. This is as much in the interests of the welfare of the officer as it is in the interests of quality of service to the public. 

Report by Her Majesty's Inspector Mr David Blakey – ‘Revisit to MPS Following HMIC Report Winning Consent’

17. The workload of SIOs remains a major cause for concern; in fact, on comparison of available data the situation appears to have deteriorated. Figure 1 highlights the increase:

18. These cases are predominantly murder investigations but some other serious crime investigations are included, e.g. serial rape, follow-up to serious public disorder, attempted murder. The number of SIOs (thirty-one) has not increased. Whilst the figures reinforce the cause for concern, there are a number of considerations in interpreting the raw numbers. Whilst Her Majesty’s Inspector believes that the workload of SIOs is excessive, further work needs to be done by the MPS to establish the true level of that excess. There is reluctance in the MPS to close cases; this Inspection found 640 HOLMES murder accounts classified as ‘live’. As the MPS has averaged 155 new murder cases per year over the ten years up to 1999 and up to 200 in the past year, it is obvious that many of those ‘live’ classifications are in fact moribund and should be so acknowledged. The SIO caseload figure could then shed its dramatic quality and come closer
to reality. In addition, it has not been part of this Inspection to establish with rigour the actual demand and degree of difficulty of each case. This is a matter for the MPS.

19. Her Majesty’s Inspector welcomes the setting up of a project board by the MPS to examine the issues. This group will work towards a rational formula to help prioritise caseloads and indicate the ability of an SIO to assume responsibility for new cases. A methodology for closure of dormant cases will be an important element of the project board’s task. Her Majesty’s Inspector looks forward to the outcome of the project, which is crucial to the quality of murder investigation, and to the health and welfare of SIOs.

20. Workload for SIOs remains high and that continues to cause concern to Her Majesty’s Inspector because of the impact on the service given to the public and on the welfare of the officers. The recommendation in Winning Consent was to ‘consider carefully the maximum caseload’. The project board is addressing this issue and some useful analysis is emerging for measuring the complexity and sensitivity of individual cases as well as just the bare numbers.

21. The recommendation is being pursued but there is much more work to be done.

Murder

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