Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) consultation on proposals for additional powers for the Mayor and Assembly

ps/05/05
1 December 2005
MPA briefing paper

Author: Keith Dickinson, Head of Policing Policy and Partnerships, MPA

This briefing paper has been prepared to inform members and staff. It is not a committee report and no decisions are required.

Summary

The Government regards the creation of the GLA as a real boost for London that has had a positive impact on Londoners’ quality of life. It also believes that a directly elected Mayor provides a strong voice for the capital, sets a strategic framework for London’s future growth and has wide ranging powers to tackle London’s unique challenges and implement solutions. The Assembly does a vital job as a check and balance on the Mayor, challenging and scrutinising his activities. Recognising that the GLA has now led London for five and a half years, they believe that the time is right to consider whether the strategic planning and delivery of services in the capital could be improved by devolving more powers and responsibilities to the Mayor and Assembly. In that context the Government is committed to:

• the GLA remaining a focused, strategic authority that builds on its successes to date to provide strong, effective leadership.
• achieving the right balance of powers between national government, the GLA and the London boroughs, and
• devolving responsibilities to the most appropriate level.

The consultation paper sets out the Government’s options and proposals for granting additional powers and responsibilities to the Greater London Authority (GLA) – the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. It looks at which powers the GLA and, in particular, the Mayor might assume and considers whether doing so would improve strategic planning and delivery in London.

A copy of the document is in the Members Library; it can also be found at www.odpm.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1161897 but in summary:

Chapter 4 looks at the scope for additional powers for the Mayor. It focuses on four main areas – housing, learning and skills, planning and waste management and waste planning.

Chapter 5 seeks views on the Mayor’s relationship with these functional bodies. Specific proposals include providing for the Mayor to be the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority; reconfiguring the membership of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority to enable the Mayor to appoint three members to represent business, under-represented groups and LFEPA staff, and one to champion London resilience; and empowering the Mayor to give LFEPA directions and guidance, provided these are compatible with the Fire and Rescue National Framework.

Chapter 6 seeks views on developing the role of the Assembly in policy development and extending its scrutiny role to London-wide public bodies not directly accountable to the Mayor.

As it is intended that the MPA submission be confined to those issues that impact directly on the work of the Authority, the following section only, is extracted from the consultation document.

5.3 The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) - current arrangements

5.3.1 Prior to the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and the creation of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was held to account by the Home Secretary, who was in turn answerable to Parliament for its performance. The creation of regional structures under the 1999 Act, including the Mayor and the GLA, provided an opportunity to improve democratic accountability and align the arrangements more closely with the rest of the country by creating a police authority for the MPS. However, the special nature of London has meant that the accountability arrangements for the MPS remain unique in a number of ways.

5.3.2 Although the legislatively prescribed functions of the MPA are identical to that of other police authorities (to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force), there are some noticeable differences including:

• The elected representatives that make up over half of the MPA membership are members of the GLA appointed by the Mayor to reflect the political balance of the Assembly. Elected representatives in other police authorities are drawn from county councils and unitary authorities.
• Uniquely, one of the independent members of the MPA is appointed by the Home Secretary, reflecting the national and international functions of the MPS in relation to the protection of prominent people and places, national security and counter terrorism.
• With 23 members, the MPA is larger than other police authorities (most have 17).

5.3.3 Additionally, the Assembly, the Mayor and the Home Secretary have additional roles in holding the MPS to account:

• The Assembly has the power to question the MPA on the discharge of its functions and has, in practice, extended this scrutiny function to the MPS as well.
• The Home Secretary retains a direct role in holding the MPS to account for its national and international functions in relation to the protection of prominent people and places, national security and counter-terrorism.
• Through his high public profile and central role in the budget setting process for the MPS we recognise that the Mayor is able to exert influence over policing priorities for the force.

Issues and challenges for London

5.3.4 We believe that the MPS is not held to account as efficiently and effectively as it could be. The existing structure in which many bodies have a direct or indirect role in holding the MPS to account needs to be streamlined in order to ensure the process is transparent to the people of London. Furthermore, strong leadership is required at the head of the accountability body to ensure that it is effective in holding the MPS to account.

Proposal

5.3.5 We are convinced that the MPA should continue to be the primary accountability body for the MPS. But we intend to reform it to strengthen its ability to discharge its functions.

5.3.6 We propose to provide for the Mayor to be the chair of the MPA. There is already a strong public perception that the Mayor is directly responsible for the performance of the MPS, even though at present he is limited to exerting indirect influence by means of his high public profile and overall budget setting role. Making him the chair will make real this perception and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the MPA. Furthermore, we are of the view that the high visibility and direct link to local people will provide the Mayor with sufficient leverage to increase the effectiveness of the MPA as a scrutiny body.

5.3.7 This change will also streamline the accountability arrangements by removing the need for the Mayor to indirectly influence the process. By giving the Mayor a lead role in the formal accountability structure, we will have removed one of the separate parties holding the MPS to account.

5.3.8 Although we recognise that London represents a special case in many ways, we should minimise the extent to which its arrangements are taken out of alignment with the rest of the country. We therefore intend for the other members of the MPA to be comprised of members of the London Assembly, chosen to reflect the political balance of the assembly, and independent members. As chair of the MPA, the Mayor would have an increased role in the selection of independent members (save for the Home Secretary appointment).

Question

Q 35: We welcome comments on the proposed approach.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 current arrangements

5.3.9 Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places a duty on those organisations that fall within its ambit14 to do all they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in their area. The organisations to which section 17 applies are responsible for delivering a wide range of services locally, and in delivering these services they are ideally placed to impact on the socio-economic and environmental drivers for crime. Section 17 requires them to routinely consider the implications for crime and disorder as they carry out their day to day business in delivery of these services.

Issues and challenges for London

5.3.10 The GLA has a very important role to play in delivering key services across the capital as a whole, such as transport, planning and the environment. It works closely with the London boroughs in the delivery of these services but there is no requirement in law for the GLA to take account of the impact that delivery of their services may have on crime and disorder. We believe that this anomaly should be addressed.

Proposal

5.3.11 We believe that there is now strong evidence for extending the provisions of section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act to the GLA. This would allow the Authority to ensure that it, and its functional bodies – namely the GLA itself, the London Development Agency and Transport for London, (in addition to the MPA and LFEPA who already fall within the ambit of section 17) – mainstream crime and disorder and community safety into all aspects of their work.

Question

Q 36: We welcome comments as to whether section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act should be extended to the GLA.

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