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Report 8 of the 27 September 2007 meeting of the Co-ordination and Policing Committee and describes the deployment of the X26 Taser since its introduction to the MPS in April 2006, including: cost implications of the replacement programme, potential health implications of X26 Taser usage and how lessons are learned from tactical deployment.

Warning: This is archived material and may be out of date. The Metropolitan Police Authority has been replaced by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC).

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Conversion to the x26 Taser

Report: 8
Date: 27 September 2007
By: Assistant Commissioner Central Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report describes the deployment of the X26 Taser since its introduction to the MPS in April 2006, including: cost implications of the replacement programme, potential health implications of X26 Taser usage and how lessons are learned from tactical deployment. This report also includes the MPS proposal in response to the Home Secretary’s authority to extend the use of Taser to a broader range of dangerous and violent incidents. A record of MPS Taser usage since 2003 is attached at Appendix 1.

A. Recommendations

That

  1. members note the contents of the report; and
  2. note/give support to the MPS proposal in response to the Home Secretary’s agreement to the extended use of Taser.

B. Supporting information

The MPS conversion to the X26 Taser

1. As of 18 April 2006, the X26 Advanced Taser was made available to AFOs across the MPS armed commands as part of an agreed extension of the less-lethal option.

2. The roll-out of the X26 is now complete, and the equipment is distributed across the MPS armed commands as follows:

Command Distribution
SO14 20
CO6 126
CO18 50
1TSG 10
RG 14
CO19 58
SCD7 20

Cost implications

3. Each X26 Taser costs £750. This price includes additional equipment and a five-year warranty.

4. Funding for the initial purchase of the X26 Tasers and cartridges was identified within the Medium Term Financial Plans for 2004/05 and 2005/06. £400,000 was then set aside by SO Business Group for the year 2005/06 to cover the purchase of the desired numbers of X26 Tasers, training and some aspects of testing.

5. 2,000 cartridges were also purchased at a total cost of £30,000.

6. A new purchasing cycle has recently commenced with an initial order of 700 cartridges for CO18 training.

Health implications

7. These were outlined in detail to the report to this Committee on 9 June 2006. However, to assist members, the following summary is included.

8. The Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) has carried out an evaluation of the original M26 and later X26 models of Taser. They concluded that the risk of life threatening or serious injury is low.

9. HOSDB also reported that it is unlikely that the electrical discharge from the M26 or X26 would influence the heart of healthy individuals and that the risk of a life-threatening event arising from the direct interaction of the currents of the X26 Taser with the heart was less than the already low risk with the M26 Taser.

10. In their explorations of the effects of Taser usage, HOSDB also considered the effects in combination with other risk factors including:

  • Illicit drug intoxication,
  • Alcohol abuse,
  • Pre-existing heart disease &
  • Cardio active therapeutic drugs.

11. HOSDB have continued to monitor Taser usage, and no further health risks have been highlighted since last report.

12. HOSDB did state that the effect of the X26 Taser might result in the possibility of a subject falling in a less controlled fashion, and as a consequence, this might render the possibility of a subject sustaining a head injury on contact with a surface.

13. Whilst HOSDB’s conclusion was that such a risk was low, the MPS has closely monitored the nature of the injuries associated with apprehensions involving the use of the X26 Taser.

14. Since the introduction of the X26, only one head injury has been identified as the result of a less controlled fall. In this incident, the subject suffered bruising to the left eye.

15. It should be noted that as a result of the small attendant risks, officers receive specific and appropriate aftercare training and on most authorised operations, the London Ambulance Service are readily available.

Monitoring and learning from deployments

16. The MPS has a statutory duty under the Codes of Practice to monitor the availability of new weapons systems that might improve the safety of operations. Monitoring of the X26 is continuing as part of the ongoing UK Taser trial. Records of the circumstances of every Taser use, the post-incident medical assessments undertaken by the Forensic Medical Examiner (FME), and the clinical consequences noted by the FME or clinical staff are forwarded to the Home Office.

17. Taser discharges are no longer routinely referred to the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS). Only if the discharge results in death or serious injury, or danger to the public, or reveals failings in command, should the matter be referred to the IPCC. This does not preclude forces referring discharges if they consider it appropriate.

18. Extensive monitoring and feedback processes exist to ensure that lessons are learned from the deployment of Taser. These include:

  • Post operation debriefs,
  • All uses of Taser are reported by means of an ACPO sponsored discharge-evaluation form supported by an FME report,
  • An MPS database is managed by the Firearms Policy Unit (FPU) and incorporates age, sex, ethnicity, type of discharge, location, reasons for deployment and injury (if any) sustained,
  • The FPU capture and record details of all debriefs of Authorised (pre-planned) operations which again capture any safety critical issues. These will be disseminated by the FPU,
  • Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) review in accordance with guidelines at paragraph 18,
  • Defects or suspected defects in Taser or cartridges are forwarded via the FPU to HOSDB,
  • MPS Near-Miss forms have been specifically amended to incorporate firearms related issues, and capture Taser safety critical information. This information is fed back to FPU, and H & S Branch (HR5),
  • All unintentional discharges are reported to the FPU and monitored for the emergence of any safety critical trends.

19. Where issues are identified, they are disseminated by the FPU. Any immediate safety-related issues are circulated by telephone, e-mail and team briefings. An example of this might be the unsuccessful deployment of Taser in a stairwell during 2006. The lower barb reached and attached itself to the subject but the raised angle meant that the upper barb fell short. This information was captured in a detailed report and circulated to all practitioners.

20. Tactical developments for operational usage and their practical dissemination is the responsibility of CO19 firearms training. As lessons are learned, these are fed into initial firearms training courses as well as refresher and re-qualification sessions.

Deployments of Taser

21. The FPU maintains the MPS database of Taser deployments. MPS usage is shown in Appendix 1.

22. Previously, only four incidents (involving the M26 Taser) involved MPS units other than CO19: SO16 - one discharge on 3 Sep 04, and SO18 - three discharges 10 July 04, 2 Oct 05 and 21 Oct 05.

23. Since the introduction of the X26 and its broader deployment across the armed commands, five discharges at 7 incidents are attributed to SCD7, two further discharges/incidents to CO18. The remainder are the responsibility of CO19. All 7 of the SCD7 deployments related to the possession or suspected possession of firearms. One of the CO18 deployments related to a bladed weapon and one related to threats alone.

MPS Proposal for the extension of Taser usage to a broader range of dangerous and violent incidents: Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs)

24. In July 2007, Ministerial approval was given for the use of Taser by authorised firearms officers at operations or incidents where the criteria for the authorisation to issue firearms did not apply. In these cases, officers would be facing violence or threats of violence of such severity that they would need to use force to protect the public, themselves and/or the subject(s).

25. To support implementation, Commander Kaye (CO19) will co-ordinate and oversee a corporate approach for the MPS Firearms Commands, involving both Central Communications Command and Territorial Policing. This will be supported by appropriate internal and external briefings, MPS specific standard operating procedures and a continuous monitoring and review process.

MPS Proposal for the extension of Taser usage to a broader range of dangerous and violent incidents: National Pilot for non-AFOs

26. Further to the extension for AFOs, approval was also given to begin a 12 month trial involving the deployment of Taser by specially trained units who are not firearms officers in similarly violent circumstances requiring conflict management.

27. Ten forces will participate in the trial, which will be overseen at the national level, by Commander Broadhurst on behalf of the ACPO Conflict Management Group.

28. It is intended that the MPS be one of the ten pilot forces, and that officers from CO20 will be trained in Taser usage. Taser will only be carried for the purposes of the Commissioner’s Reserve.

29. The guidelines for usage by these officers are based on current conflict management training and Taser, therefore, becomes an additional less lethal tactical option.

Abbreviations

AFOs
Authorised Firearms Officers
HOSDB
Home Office Scientific Development Branch
FME
Forensic Medical Examiner
FPU
Firearms Policy Unit

C. Race and equality impact

1. The police use of firearms within communities has the potential to be highly disruptive and damaging to community relationships. However, the use of Taser as a less lethal option has greatly assisted with the safe resolution of a substantial number of dangerous incidents without the need to resort to conventional firearms. The FPU continues to monitor aspects of Taser incidents including proportionality.

2. In the circumstances in which Tasers are deployed, it is never likely to be practicable to request the person involved in the incident to self define their ethnicity. However, it is recognised that it is very important to monitor for proportionality in the use of Tasers and therefore it is necessary to fall back on an objective assessment of ethnicity.

3. CO19 have initiated a follow-up through custody records to monitor self-defined ethnicity.

4. All Taser devices are effective against a high proportion of the population, including those who are drunk or who are suffering from the effects of drugs or a mental illness.

5. Authorised Firearms Officers have received extensive training in relation to members of the population (special population groups) who do not behave in an expected manner as a result of some form of impairment be it permanent or temporary (psychiatric illness, use of drugs or alcohol) or will not comprehend police instructions e.g. due to deafness or where English is not the person’s first language.

6. All affirmative references in Appendix 1 were incidents approached by the firearms officers as potentially involving the member of a Special Population Group.

7. Officers have enhanced training in relation to negotiation, and are trained specifically in appropriate after-care.

D. Financial implications

1. The cost implications of Taser to date are discussed in the body of this report.

2. For the purposes of the intended pilot, £132,000 has been identified with CO budgets for the purchase of 70 Tasers and cartridges.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Commander Jo Kaye, MPA.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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