Counter-terrorism: the London debate - MPS update

Report: 6b
Date: 31 January 2008
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

The Authority received the London Debate report in February 2007. The MPS response was provided in June 2007. This report outlines the implementation to date.

A. Recommendation

That members note the MPS updated responses to the 46 recommendations for the MPS contained in the London Debate Report.

B. Supporting information

1. 'Counter Terrorism: The London Debate' was a report presented to the Authority in its February 2007 meeting. It was based on the MPA consultation with over 1000 Londoners. Both the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman welcomed the report. The MPS responded more fully to the recommendations relating to the MPS at the June 2007 meeting of the Authority. It was agreed at that meeting that the MPS would report to the Authority on a six monthly basis. In addition updates would be given quarterly to Reshard Alauddin, Cindy Butts and Toby Harris. The first such update was given in October 2007.

2. The first, and perhaps most high profile, recommendation was Recommendation One, which related to Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The MPS presented a comprehensive response to this at the Full Authority meeting in May 2007. The MPA is currently deliberating internally what the best mechanism or forum is for its formal monitoring of the MPS performance in respect of s.44 Terrorism Act 2000.

3. Of the other recommendations, most complement work already underway in the MPS. Many also overlap with recommendations in other reports such as the IPCC report on Forest Gate and the MPA Scrutiny of MPS Media and Communications. They may also apply to other parts of policing beyond Counter Terrorism. Some, although referring primarily to the MPS, also apply to other agencies.

4. The MPS has appointed a senior person to lead the development of each of the recommendations and to report back. The co-ordination of responses and developments within the MPS is being undertaken by DAC Cressida Dick.

5. There has been a considerable amount of activity and achievement since June 2007. The report below gives an overall update on each of the recommendations, together with, where appropriate, examples of practice.

6. Two recent very important initiatives have had, and will have, a significant impact on the MPS work with communities in counter terrorism. Firstly Delphinus 2 was launched in October 2007. A summary of Delphinus 2 can be found at Appendix 1. Its implementation is designed to coordinate the MPS Territorial Policing (TP) and police Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) contribution to countering terrorism in London by increasing levels of engagement with partners and communities. It is being led by the Territorial Policing CT lead, Commander Steve Allen, together with a full time Superintendent and a small team. Secondly, the Government has refreshed its counter terrorism strategy, the CONTEST strategy, and this includes a much increased emphasis on PREVENT (See Appendix 2). The MPS has been heavily involved in this work and is now assisting in the development of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) PREVENT strategy and action plan.

7. The current responses to each of the recommendations for the MPS are outlined below. As a number of acronyms and technical terms are used throughout the text, there is a glossary attached.

Recommendation 1. Present an urgent review of the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search to the full Metropolitan Police Authority. Include in this review a clear rationale explaining why a given individual is stopped and searched rather than another. If unable to demonstrate to the Metropolitan Police Authority’s satisfaction through this review that the power is sufficiently effective in countering terrorism to outweigh the damage it does to community relations, stop using it, other than in exceptional circumstances, such as where there is a specific threat to a particular location.

MPS Response:

a) This was subject to a detailed report to the Authority at its meeting in May 2007. In Spring 2007, at the request of the MPA, the MPS carried out a review of the use of Section 44 powers under the Terrorism Act 2000. A recommendation from the review was to raise public awareness about the powers and as a response to that, the MPS produced Section 44 Stop and Search data for the first quarter of the Financial Year 07/08 which was widely published in the press in September 2007. The MPS has worked with the City of London Police, British Transport Police and Ministry Of Defence Police in relation to this review as they also make significant use of this power. Commander Jarman has briefed all BOCU leads who use the power, explaining why and how the power should be used. This has been reinforced with letters, briefings and personal phone calls. The MPS monitor daily S44 activity, enabling disproportionality to be measured, monitored and addressed. Stop and Search/Account under the Terrorism Act 2000 is a vital tactic in our counter terrorism strategy. The powers can disrupt, deter and prevent terrorist activity, create a hostile environment for terrorists and provide a visible reassurance to the public. Commander Jarman has also conducted a number of interviews with the media, including Sunrise Radio, Panjah Radio and Al Arabia TV to discuss S44, receiving positive feedback on the use of this power.

Recommendation 2. Publish an explanation of Operation Kratos (the generic title for a series of Metropolitan Police Service policies and MPS standard operating procedures detailing tactical responses to the threat posed by suicide terrorism), setting out clearly the learning that has taken place since 22 July 2005.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS has published an explanation of Operation Kratos. In addition Kratos is an integral part of Central Operations Community events, which have received much media coverage and excellent feedback from those attending.

b) The Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) review of our progress against the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) Stockwell recommendations has been published on our internet and sent to the MPA. The HMIC overview states "HMIC are able to reassure the MPS that the progress it has made in implementing the recommendations is significant, sustainable and often innovative".

A copy of the document posted on the Internet can be found at Appendix 3.

Recommendation 3. Accept and apply to current counter-terrorist activity the learning from previous terrorist campaigns.

MPS Response:

a) SO15 has responded by implementing an 'Organisational Learning Unit' within the Command. This unit is in its infancy and staff are being recruited and are expected to be in post within 2-months following vetting clearances being granted. This team of staff will maintain contact with not only the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) SO15, but with the recently formed counter terrorism (CT) Units in Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham to ensure lessons identified from operations are analysed, researched and embedded in the continuous improvement cycle. Further links are being established with external agencies, academia, HMIC, NPIA (National Police Improvement Agency) and the private sector to identify good practice that can inform policing CT incidents.

b) One example of this unit's work are a series of ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee (TAM) financed seminars that include wide representation from across policing both at regional and national level, Category 1 responders (e.g. Police, Ambulance, Fire, Local Authority): Government, Local Authority Chief Executives, voluntary partners, military and business. The sessions include presentations from subject matter experts and tabletop, syndicate led, exercises to identify operational, tactical and strategic issues - including gap analysis.

c) Recent themes have focused on scenarios linked to real events or anticipated, identified emerging threats, such as radicalisation in Her Majesty's Prisons, ceremonial events, London 2012, CBRN and maritime related themes.

d) As a result of recent exercising we have designed new vehicles equipped with communications and satellite technology that will provide SO15 with state of the art capability to respond to terrorist incidents.

e) Learning or lessons identified are widely distributed across organisations and link to the new National CT Exercise debrief group. They have also helped inform the current National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) CT Training Needs Analysis Project commissioned by ACPO TAM.

Recommendation 4. Work with partners to initiate more counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation initiatives.

MPS Response:

a) In the past year there have been over 30 “Pathfinder” PREVENT projects initiated in London Boroughs. The MPS have been heavily involved in a small number of these, attempting to identify good practice.

b) Under the refreshed PREVENT strategy it is anticipated there will be more “preventing violent extremism” (PVE) projects. In order to ensure the MPS is properly engaged in this, Diversity and Citizen Focus (DCF) have seconded an Inspector for two days per week to Government Office for London (GoL). DCF will be producing a guide to BOCUs for future PVE bids and will provide a coordinating function in the management of those bids.

c) The MPS will be working closely with ACPO (TAM) and the National Community Terrorism Team (NCTT) in developing PREVENT projects. All such projects will involve working closely with partners and local communities.

d) A counter radicalisation DVD package has been created by DCF and is due for launch at the House of Lords on the 31st January 2008. Borough police CT leads and local education leads will be attending.

Recommendation 5. Provide the public, the business community and those working in other public services with more guidance as to what activity might reasonably be considered suspicious in a terrorism context.

Recommendation 6. Explain to the public what to do with information of use in countering terrorism.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS continues to support the roll out of Project Griffin (private sector engagement with police activity) but has identified further opportunities that build upon similar initiatives that have run in the MPS for many years. Work continues to develop more structured and accountable links with the wider security industry. This includes the development of an industry driven awareness certificated training programme in partnership with Skills for Security (the business sector skills and standards setting body), the Security Industry Authority (SIA) and representative bodies such as the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) as well as some service providers.

b) Other activities include specific relationship building exercises focused at local Borough OCU level. For example, specially trained SO15 Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) with clear links to Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) aligned to BOCU's working with local staff and CT Intelligence Officers (CTIOs), they provide advice together with local crime prevention officers and local CT leads (Delphinus 1). This success has led to the formation of several Community Security Zones that embrace local business neighbourhoods. The CT Intelligence Officers (there are now 55 deployed), together with units such as the Muslim Contact Unit continue to forge ever stronger links with community groups.

c) Delphinus 2 is now being developed, following Lord West's Review, and will build upon those achievements by embedding a CT culture at a local level and specifically in the Safer Neighbourhood Teams, all of whom have received CT briefings by SO15 staff when they were initially rolled out. Local exercises are being planned for multi agency audiences including Local Authority partners during 2008.

d) SO15 continue to support business through engagement with the London Resilience Team, CBI and Chambers of Commerce, educational establishments, academia, London Resilience Forum (LRF) business alliances and partnerships.

e) Examples include the recent business briefing (Oct 2007) when over 80 key industry and business partners attended a MPS CT weekend briefing. This covered the majority of the Government's CONTEST sectors, such as food, finance, energy, transport etc, as well as the hospitality and entertainment sectors, - including briefings and exercises related to Op SEAGRAM (the police operation in response to the Haymarket and Glasgow incidents in June 2007). Owners and management of 'Tiger Tiger' provided a business perspective and there were presentations from the London Fire Brigade and other relevant partners.

f) Project ARGUS is a National Counter Terrorism Security Office initiative, exploring ways to aid businesses in preventing, handling and recovering from a terrorist attack. It achieves this by taking businesses through a simulated terrorist attack. The simulation identifies the measures to take for preventing, handling and recovering from a terrorist attack. Briefings continue as a priority with over 85 separate events held since April 2007 targeting over 3000 businesses across various business sectors, the night time economy, pubs, clubs, energy, shopping and retail sectors.

g) Each event is quality assured by delegate feedback. Questionnaires have been returned by 83% of attendees reporting an overall satisfaction rate of 99%.

h) Following Op Seagram and the attacks in Haymarket 359 priority licensed premises have been subject to personal visits. These include high capacity, high profile bars, pubs and nightclubs; 2,800 advisory booklets have been circulated and a total of 582 premises have been visited by either CTSA's or local Licensing staff.

i) Additionally, staff have presented or chaired conference sessions, some open to the Press, and provided key messages around CT activity. These have included events held by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), CBI and Continuity and Risk events.

j) In March 2007 the MPS launched a five week paid publicity campaign - "if you suspect it, report it" - urging the public to report any suspicious behaviour in confidence to the free Anti-Terrorist Hotline. Advertisements appeared in the Evening Standard, London Lite and the Londonpaper. Adverts appeared on several radio stations.

k) The press adverts sought to raise awareness of a range of items, which may be needed by, or be of use to, terrorists and asked the public to consider whether they had seen any activity connected with them, which may have made them suspicious. The radio advertising was devised to complement the press adverts. Advertising also ran in the Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire and West Midlands areas.

l) We are currently planning our next CT paid publicity campaign which again will focus on encouraging people to report suspicious behaviour/items to the Anti-Terrorist Hotline. It will explain how calls are dealt with and is intended to reassure people that their calls will be treated in the strictest of confidence.

m) A comparison of the Hotline Call data from March 2006 with that of March 2007 (when a publicity campaign was launched) saw a year on year increase of 64%. The actual calls received were 414 in 2006 and 681 in 2007. This data reflects actual calls logged on the Hotline. All hotline messages are assessed by experienced CTC staff and actioned where appropriate. Some calls are quickly established to be unrelated to terrorism i.e. when the caller simply wishes to speak with police regarding a local neighbourhood matter. Nonetheless such callers can be advised, directed or referred to an appropriate department. Some become the subject of substantial work and most provide intelligence data for consideration alongside other data in the continual assessment process of CTC. The important issue is that members of the public have access to police to provide information on terrorism, whatever their reason or suspicions, as they may not appreciate just how important their information is within a broader context. Hotline messages routinely become the subject of further development and where appropriate referred to our CTIO’s via the tasking process.

Recommendation 7. Train parking attendants, traffic wardens, parks staff, neighbourhood wardens and city guardians in counter-terrorist awareness.

Recommendation 8. Find better ways for council employees to feed to the police 'soft' intelligence which they come across in the communities in which they work

MPS Response:

) Under Operation Delphinus, the MPS counter terrorism and extremism seven point programme, there is a specific requirement to brief police officers and the extended police family to identify signs of violent extremism.

a) BOCUs were required to commence work with Local Authorities to develop action plans by October 2007 and to have processes in place to deliver briefings to local authority staff by March 2008. Many BOCUs are already delivering these briefings through other work such as Project Griffin. BOCUs have been given explicit instructions through the Delphinus 2 explanatory notes regarding the need to carry out this activity and to maintain records regarding the numbers of staff briefed, the roles they perform and the nature of the briefing given. Delphinus 2 work also extends the briefing processes to other partners (outside the local authorities).

b) Briefings to local authority and other staff include feedback processes for the reporting of information and intelligence. Processes need to give individuals the confidence to report their suspicions as well as a system to follow and is a very important aspect of this work. The existence of such systems will be examined during the March/April TP Performance Unit Inspection.

c) Project Griffin has been reviewed by Commander Allen and a provisional decision has been made to expand across all MPS BOCUs. Consideration is being given to appropriate processes and support to enable a workable model to be introduced.

d) Local Authorities are being encouraged to embrace this work through the Chief Executives London Committee and its chair Mary Ney (Chief Executive of Greenwich). Jo Gordon at GOL has been updated regarding the Delphinus 2 work and will discuss CT issues with local authorities during development of Local Area Agreements (LAAs).

Recommendation 9. Consider what it can say when it comes to counter-terrorism, not what it cannot: a different approach is needed.

MPS Response:

a) The Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) has developed an extensive strategy for communications during counter terrorist operations, this takes account of this recommendation and will result in greater information being made available earlier (see Appendix 4). The aim is to provide a strategic and co-ordinated communication approach for handling high profile counter terrorism operations and investigations. The objectives of the strategy are to protect the integrity of the counter terrorism investigation and support its aims and objectives:

• To provide timely and accurate information to the public,
• To engage through the media with the community directly affected by the operation,
• To ensure that they are better informed about what has taken place,
• To maintain public confidence by explaining the methods and tactics deployed to carry out the operation and to respond and re-butt, where appropriate, speculation or inaccurate media coverage,
• To avoid the risk of prejudicing future judicial proceedings,
• To mitigate the negative impact of any police action,

b) The joint Crown Prosecution Service and Police press conference following the August 2006 arrests of those involved in an alleged plot against aviation is evidence of this change in communication strategy. The conference gave as much information as possible and detailed the distinct roles of each organisation.

c) The DPA have also developed a means of collating communication activity data. This includes details of campaigns, leaflets and websites to promote successful CT Court Cases. The first in a series of CT Bulletins ( the text is reproduced at Appendix 5) - within which information is provided about successful operations, community engagement and the development of the CT Strategy - has been developed. It has been disseminated to the MPA, Home Office, to every borough CT lead to share with their stakeholders, to Project Argus and Griffin and for inclusion on the police counter terrorism (Rainbow) website.

Recommendation 10. Explain counter-terrorist terminology, such as ‘intelligence’ and ‘disruption’, to the public

MPS Response:

a) The MPS recognises that these phrases can be confusing and may be poorly understood, and that this can profoundly affect community confidence. 'Intelligence' is information, which is passed to police from a wide variety of sources. This information has to be carefully assessed by police and the Security Service for its reliability and accuracy. Intelligence is not hard evidence and as such varies in quality and usefulness. The gathering and assessment of intelligence is by its very nature an imperfect science. Where public safety is at risk police have to err on the side of caution and will take action to 'disrupt' terrorist activity in order to minimise potential loss of life, injury or damage. Disruption is any action taken by police or the Security Services to prevent terrorists carrying out their intentions. This may take many forms including the arrest and charge of suspects for 'preparatory' or financial offences or for unrelated criminal activity members of the network may be engaged in.

b) The MPS will build further explanation into existing counter terrorism strategies and plans. The MPS will make every effort to explain what is meant in greater detail, especially taking into account the needs and views of minority communities. The DPA are planning a CT publicity campaign in March 2008 and we will use this as an opportunity to reinforce and explain the terminology so that it is understandable to the community.

b) The MPS reported to the MPA Coordination and Policing committee on the 10th January 2008 providing an update on how the five IPCC recommendations following Forest Gate are being progressed. Recommendation two details proposals to explain the process by which intelligence is evaluated and acted upon.

Recommendation 11. During and after counter-terrorist operations, move quickly to issue accurate, safe information to local residents and business people

Recommendation 12. In the event of a future attack, give clear and consistent messages to schools as to what to do with schoolchildren; provide clarity to employers as to whether to send their employees home; and appreciate the importance of the single 'top cop' giving clear information and advice to the nation on television

MPS Response:

These are part of the London Resilience and the MPS Emergency Procedures Department (CO3) 'Warning and Informing' strategy. The full details of which can be found on the Cabinet Office's UK Resilience and National Steering Committee website.

In addition a new standard operating procedure has been designed, which is intended to ensure that the Counter Terrorism Command works effectively with Borough colleagues, partners and communities during Counter Terrorism operations. An important element of it is the need to provide communities with timely information.

Recommendation 13. Challenge misinformation in the public domain about terrorism and counter-terrorism

MPS Response:

c) This is a key feature of the MPS’s Directorate of Public Affairs Counter Terrorism communication strategy that has been developed and is already in place to deal with future operations and incidents (a copy of which is attached at Appendix 4).

d) The MPS have implemented a new Media Monitoring Unit within the Directorate, which has been equipped with state of the art technology to help us capture and identify quickly, information about Terrorist operations/activity. A key part of the unit’s role in the future will be to identify who is saying what at the time of an incident, which will be used to inform an appropriate response.

e) MPS reporting to the MPA provides an accurate account of CT matters. An example is the Counter Terrorism Command report to the MPA Equal Opportunities and Diversity Board meeting on the 12th July 2007. This highlighted the number of person arrested for terrorism related offences, identifying that a large number are detained for less than 24 hours and 90% are detained for less than 7 days.

Recommendation 14. Enhance public confidence in counter-terrorist policing by being open and transparent about mistakes and by more proactively publicising successes.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS/DPA has a very proactive communication policy in place for dealing with counter terrorism operations, charges and subsequent court cases. One of the difficulties that we have faced and will continue to face is not being able to talk about successful court cases/prosecutions because of reporting restrictions, especially when one prosecution impacts on another. We have produced a court list that is openly disseminated to the media as a reference document and have developed specific websites for the media to promote successful court cases. DPA produce and disseminate a FAQ document on a regular basis, which includes details of successful CT cases. This goes to SNT teams through Operation Delphinus.

b) The MPS is actively working with Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU) as part of the Government’s CONTEST strategy. An important part of their work is to publicise successes and to challenge misinformation.

Recommendation 15. Strengthen information management systems so that senior officers have up-to-date, accurate information on terrorist and counter-terrorist incidents.

MPS Response:

a) The Knowledge Management Centre is ongoing. The aim of the KMC is at a time of crisis to become a single repository for organisational knowledge to ensure that Gold and the management team have access to timely and accurate information. This will ensure that the MPS provides accurate, auditable and consistent information. The MPA has asked for a further review by HMIC in the first quarter of 2008. There are further exercises planned, one of which will be reviewed by the HMIC. A copy of the HMIC report has previously been forwarded to the MPA.

b) The MPS will take action of any recommendations arising from the HMIC and the ongoing work led by ACPO regarding the national recommendations, which are currently being developed and implemented.

Recommendation 16. Enhance and publicise its anti-leak measures.

MPS Response:

a) The threat from leaks is an ongoing challenge. The MPS recognise how such leaks can undermine the confidence of the public and partners as well as undermining the security of operations. The anti-leak measures are regularly reinforced and publicised. Prevention and enforcement is based on an intelligence led approach. Wherever possible leaks are investigated thoroughly. The Authority will be aware of recent successful interventions such as an MPS employee who received a sentence of eight months imprisonment having pleaded guilty to unlawfully disclosing secret intelligence.

b) The joint strategies between DPS and DOI should lead to a drop in incidents of Information Leakage. The Information Code of Conduct was reviewed in August 2007 and is available on the AWARE homepage a summary of which appears on the AWARE home page. This code is supported by the Code of Conduct for the use of Information and Information Systems – Frequently Asked Questions. This is a DPS Control Strategy Priority for 2007-08 and recommendations from investigations highlight vulnerabilities in this increasingly complex area of business. An Information Misuse Matrix has been designed to assist the assessment of computer misuse issues as a conduct matter. Computer Misuse remains a core product in the Professional Standards Support Programme. This DPS initiative has taken the issue of computer misuse directly to Operational Commands. The presentations have been extremely well received. All 32 boroughs will have received some input by the end of 2007. The programme continues into 2008. The programme is supported by a brochure containing information about information leakage. DOI and DPS will host two seminars in February and March 2008. These events will share joint learning with officers and staff from across the MPS. DOI Publicity reinforces the need for care of information. Generally via Intranet news items, posters etc.

c) The MPS Information Quality Programme includes an Information and Access Management strand, which will seek to address the issues around monitoring and controlling IT usage and Information Management.

Recommendation 17. Communicate directly with Londoners, for example with Ringmaster, by Police Message Broadcast System or in person: do not rely upon the media.

MPS Response:

a) Warning and Informing is, under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA), a legal responsibility of all Category One Responders. Category One Responders include all emergency services, Local Authorities, Health Protection Agency, Environment Agency, NHS Trusts, Maritime and Coastguard Agency. The MPS is working together with all of the agencies to take this forward.

b) The London Resilience Team has generated a Warning and Informing Task and Finish Group to take this matter forward.

c) In relation to the media handling of this information, Warning and Informing is a wide area with many strands feeding into it. The Deputy Director DPA would chair the Gold Communications Group in times of major incident. There are several other multi-agency groups relating to the media and warning and informing including: London Communications Steering Group; London Resilience Communications Panel and the Media Emergency Forum. The MPS is involved in all of these groups with relevant partners.

d) In relation to Information Technology, several OCUs have systems in place to Warn and Inform residents and business communities via pager alerts, ringmaster and other private run IT systems. In the main these are in partnership with Local Authorities. Two of these systems, ‘Vocal’ and ‘Community Safe’, are tried and tested and up and running in London. Community Safe is being used in Westminster, Vocal is being used in the City of London. The London Resilience Team has begun a procurement process with these two companies to begin a 6 month pilot. These systems allow ‘recipients’ to receive information on incidents to be received by text, email, or phone. The system is very useful as the administrator (i.e. police/local authority) is able to group recipients depending on relevance of incident. An example of groupings is Licensed Premises, Businesses, Libraries. The procurement decision on Vocal or Community Safe will be made in January 2008. Once a procurement decision is made, it is intended to look to extend a system such as this across the MPS. We currently have disparate systems. In the meantime, the 24/7 Chief Inspector in charge of Central Communications Command has the ability to send a message to all Integrated Borough Operations offices with a request that it be forwarded via their current systems.

e) Similar to the systems used by Vocal and Community Safe, the telecommunications industry does have the ability to ‘cell blast’ both mobile and landline phones with pre-recorded messages. Currently, this is only permitted to those recipients who have signed up to receive such information (this being how the Vocal and Community Safe systems work). In an emergency, emergency powers can be given under the Civil Contingencies Act whereby a message could be sent to all phones in a given locality (post code/geographic area). Emergency powers can only be given by a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee chaired by a Minister.

f) The London Resilience Website: www.londonprepared.gov.uk

gives good advice and is part of the W & I strategy. Key partners of the London Resilience Partnership, including the MPS, have contributed to assist in re-launching this website and to advertise it across London.

Recommendation 18. Use community radio as an effective way to reach into the homes of black and minority ethnic Londoners and to reach relevant communities nationally and internationally.

MPS Response:

a) The Community Press Team, which is part of the Operational Services Press Office is now in place and is starting to engage more broadly with the minority media. A key part of future terrorism operations will be to look at how we can engage with and influence how the events are being portrayed in the community by utilising local and ethnic minority media.

b) The DPA is mindful of engaging with minority media that can influence public opinion within a given community. Many of the ethnic minority broadcasters and publications are very small operations and therefore DPA has had to implement and develop plans that cater for their needs and demands.

c) A good example of our innovative work is that Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team (CTSET) are now collaborating with a London Somali radio station. The radio station have been provided with funding for equipment and we are now looking to progress a regular slot for different Business Groups from the MPS regarding relevant topics for the community.

Recommendation 19. Emphasise that the Metropolitan Police Service takes hate crime – including persistent ‘low-level’ hate crime – seriously by investigating hate crimes, including incitement to hatred, as rigorously as possible, by further developing third party reporting schemes, and by publicising more heavily successes in hate crime investigations.

MPS response:

a) The MPS continues to invest significantly in human, financial and equipment resources in the form of Community Safety Units (CSU) in all of London's 32 Boroughs. All hate crimes are investigated by specially trained investigators. The MPS and MPA continue to work with strategic partners in London Boroughs to further develop and publicise third party reporting sites, self and assisted reporting facilities to offer victims and witnesses the choice to report serious and sensitive crimes in a safe and confidential environment.

b) Assistant Commissioner (AC) Hayman and AC House undertook to look at the links between “Honour Crime” and extremism. Research on those suspected of terrorist offences has not highlighted a recurring link with CSU suspects. The MPS does not consider that further research is warranted at this stage. The CTIOs have a role to educate BOCU staff on CT information and the intelligence requirement, which does incorporate the staff of BOCU CSUs.

c) The MPS has a third party reporting system through the “True Vision” packs. These are managed through DCF and cover LGBT and Faith/Race crime. The reports are sent to DCF and then to the relevant boroughs. DCF are producing guidance for Violent Crime Directorate (VCD) on third party reporting, which is intended to be published by the end of January. This will include good practice and provide assistance for Boroughs to link with Voluntary Organisations.

d) The MPS investigates all allegations of hate crime seriously, whether the victim or any other person perceives those matters to be 'low level'. It is the MPS position that any form of hate crime is serious and will be investigated as such. The current MPS performance relating to Race Crime sanctioned detections is 35.9% (bespoke target is 33%) and the Homophobic sanctioned detection rate is 34.9% (bespoke target is 33%).

e) This matter is now monitored through the MPA Race Hate Crime Forum, who look at individual BOCU performances.

Recommendation 20. Improve data collection by flagging religious hate crime by religion more accurately and consistently.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS has been working with internal and external stakeholders to develop its Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS) to capture better all forms of equalities data in order that the data may be used to inform strategic decisions, identify gaps in service delivery and improve services to victims and witnesses of crime. In addition we will also use this data to identify, arrest and prosecute perpetrators.

b) The CRIS flagging project is being led by TP Violent Crime Directorate. The project team has made a number of recommendations to DoI, which relate to changes to the system so that the MPS can better capture equalities data - including religious data. A formal estimate of the software upgrades is being obtained. Once the exact costs are known, papers will be presented to the relevant Chief Officers for approval. It is anticipated that the changes will be implemented in June 2008.

Recommendation 21. Demonstrate an appreciation of the level of fear amongst Londoners of both terrorist and counter-terrorist activity, and continue to seek to satisfy people that they are as safe as can be.

Recommendation 22. After high profile terrorist incidents or operations, give reassurance talks in schools and colleges, deploy high-visibility policing, but keep deployment of armed police to a minimum.

MPS Response:

a) O15, DPA and DCF are working together to take this recommendation forward. They are utilising MiPODs (inflatable diary rooms) to enable the public to deliver messages and also to seek feedback on concerns at public events. The Embedded London Youth worker (a dedicated youth worker contracted to CTSET) is looking at engagement with 400 youth clubs. His work includes ‘Challenging Racism and Extremism’ through workshops and training for youth workers and community leads. This is taking place in Nov/Dec and is to be evaluated in January 2008. The embedded youth worker is now engaged in delivering workshops and helping to train some youth to engage in this type of work. CTSET have a network that enables them to brief key contacts linked to communities to ensure that messages are conveyed appropriately.

b) A review is taking place of the CTSET bulletin and the messages contained therein to make sure it is focussed towards the needs of the public. A survey has been commissioned and is now live, interacting with youth to ensure that key messages are delivered in the medium they will listen to/watch. Two more MiPODs are being utilised during this survey to encourage uptake. One example is the potential pilot use of Tag Map – a google/facebook/youtube combination, which will allow the MPS to post messages and for responses to be received. The pilot is proposed for three areas of work – citizen focus, gangs/guns and youth in general.

c) An emergency communications plan has also been drawn up to ensure key messages are passed to youth in light of a critical incident, which will work in conjunction with CO3 contingencies.

Recommendation 23. Metropolitan Police Service: Redouble/increase efforts to explain to the public the role of Police Community Support Officers, including in regard to the counter-terrorist effort.

MPS Response:

a) With the roll-out of SNT, the general role of the PCSO is becoming understood by the public. PAS results for the first quarter of 07/08 reveal that 59% of Londoners think that PCSOs are good or excellent in the role that they perform. Only 4% had a negative view. There is now an internet site (www.met.police.uk/pcso/PCSO_ct.htm) that the public can visit. The site describes the crucial role that PCSOs play in CT, including powers, roles and responsibilities.

b) The PCSO team is visiting Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNT) supervisors across the MPS with a series of 'Supervisor Conferences'. As part of the conference the role of PCSOs in CT is re-emphasised and a power point presentation in this area for use at ward panel/youth group, etc meetings has been offered to the Safer Neighbourhood Teams.

c) The Safer Neighbourhoods unit has funded a MORI poll, which will take place between 4th January and 7th February 2008, with the results being available week commencing 11th February, where the following questions will be asked:

To what extent do you agree Police Community Support Officers should be involved in the following activities?

• Stopping and questioning people about crime
• Stopping and questioning people about terrorism
• Finding out about local problems
• Solving local problems

d) The results of this work will both prompt interest in the role of PCSO in CT as well as measuring the expectation of the public in how they feel PCSOs should be contributing to this area.

Recommendation 24. Strengthen links between Specialist Operations and Borough Operational Command units when it comes to counter-terrorism by:

• Sharing more information on terrorism and counter-terrorism with frontline, borough-based officers, especially Safer Neighbourhoods officers and Police Community Support Officers.
• Ensuring that designated counter-terrorism leads on borough senior management teams are fully trained and competent to play that role.
• Increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Delphinus (which provides structured guidance to borough police on counter-terrorism matters).
• Increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Rainbow
  (which provides tactical options for a uniformed counter terrorist
  response).

MPS Response:

a) There are a number of initiatives to strengthen the links between SO and Boroughs, including the strengthening of Operations Delphinus and Rainbow. Under the SO restructuring programme many former Special Branch officers are now deployed as CT Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) embedded across all the London Boroughs. The CTIOs have been integral to the development of Delphinus 2 and provide a high level of support by servicing the regular BOCU Security Review Meetings. At this meeting, CTIOs will share available intelligence reports with BOCUs to enable them to make considered judgements regarding the nature of the threat and its impact on the BOCU and its communities. From the Security Review Meeting, such intelligence as it is appropriate to share more widely will be disseminated to front line officers including SNTs and PCSOs through the briefing processes.

b) CTSET and SO have developed effective links that enable CTSET to provide assistance as advisors on pan borough issues, as well as acting as “Bronze Community” for coordinating cross borough operations. A recent example of this working practice was in December 2007 where DCF provided advice and assistance to the planning process with SO, TP and the Chief Executive of the local councils in Harrow, Brent and Ealing.

c) As mentioned above under recommendations 11 and 12, the new standard operating procedure has been designed. This is intended to ensure that the Counter Terrorism Command works effectively with Borough colleagues, partners and communities during Counter Terrorism operations.

d) All SMT members are included in the BOCU briefing process in Delphinus 2. A full training needs analysis has been commissioned. This will focus on training for SMTs and Counter Terrorist Response Vehicles (CTRV) crews, but also consider the needs for other BOCU staff. A draft is anticipated by mid-February 2008 with a view to a training requirement going to the Corporate Training Board in April 2008.

e) Supportive visits are conducted by Rainbow office staff, with every BOCU having been visited individually by the end of December. TP Performance Unit inspections are being carried out to ensure compliance. The first round commenced in November, second round to be conducted in March / April 2008. The inclusion of CT in each BOCU Strategic Assessment and Control Strategy will maintain focus on terrorism. Consideration is being given to performance targets for appropriate BOCU Superintendents.

f) Delphinus 2 has been well received by BOCUs and has been identified as good practice by the Home Office (OSCT) in respect of the PROTECT and PREVENT strands of CONTEST. Other work is progressing with Local Authority Chief Executives and through GoL to influence Local Authorities and CDRPs in order to recognise their role in assisting to address terrorism issues by working more closely with BOCUs.

g) The development of CT Focus Desk functions on every BOCU will highlight all CT activity, including Operation Rainbow. Knowledge of Rainbow and other key terrorism related operations will be included in the training needs analysis mentioned above.

Recommendation 25. Use local police, as opposed to central specialists, to perform public-facing roles in counter-terrorist operations wherever possible.

MPS Response:

a) CTSET have a role of “Bronze Community” in such operations and deploy a team to advise and support Gold Groups. Current SO operations have lead to CTSET attending Gold Groups and seeking words/DPA releases to allow BOCU Commanders to facilitate local engagement. This worked well throughout the Haymarket incident and local risk assessment and recent cases in Harrow, Brent and Ealing, with the local briefings being delivered by the BOCU Commanders to key individuals.

b) Within the CT Communications Strategy it is recognised that in the early stages of an incident we will always try to utilise a Borough commander to address any community concerns.

Recommendation 26. Empower local borough police to comment as Metropolitan Police Service spokespeople about counter-terrorist operations in their area.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS have developed and implemented an extensive Counter Terrorism Communications Strategy (see Appendix 4), which takes account of this recommendation. This will be used during all future CT operations. The Strategy has been developed to learn from the issues identified during the Forest Gate incident. Thirty officers, above the rank of Superintendent have now completed the training in relation to this media strategy within the MPS.

Recommendation 27. A Community Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist operation and an Equality Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist policy.

MPS Response:

a) A Community Impact Assessment is performed on every CT operation. An Equality Impact Assessment will be performed on every new counter terrorist policy.

b) There is now closer cooperation with the NCTT office to ensure that a wider and more holistic national picture is obtained. The CTC has increased the number of trained individuals to undertake EIAs. The SO15 Diversity Working Group is tasking this work to ensure that all policies and practices within the Command are subject to this review. Work is underway to map communities down to street level, which will assist in the planning of operations and to enable the formulation of specific CIAs.

c) CIAs and EIAs are being formulated during planning stages of operations. Recent examples include Operation Landshark (arrests in Ealing and Wembley) and Operation Fanwood, the repatriation of the three detainees from Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre.

d) EIAs have been formulated on all existing policies.

Recommendation 28. Explain to the Metropolitan Police Authority the Metropolitan Police Service’s proposal to brief and share intelligence with vetted community members prior to counter-terrorism operations. Include an update on progress made towards the realisation of this idea.

MPS Response:

a) Extensive discussions have taken place with colleagues in ACPO (TAM), the Security Service and communities. After protracted discussions with colleagues in ACPO nationally it has become clear that any such work will be London-based and centred. The MPS is determined to find a way to share why and how operations are being carried out in a safe and lawful manner as soon as it is possible to do so. On a case by case basis we do already seek 'expert' advice on aspects of our operational planning. In addition we are increasingly involving community members in exercises and training, allowing them better to understand the challenges and dilemmas inherent in countering terrorism, and seeking their advice about how we best maintain confidence and keep the public safe.

Recommendation 29. Work with the Metropolitan Police Authority to establish a clear strategy and policy framework for police community engagement to counter terrorism.

Recommendation 30. Work with the Metropolitan Police Authority to develop a performance measurement framework for counter-terrorism community engagement.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS continues to engage with communities and is developing its approach with strategic partners to make London safer from terrorism. This includes working closely with the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and initiatives across 26 London boroughs in receipt of 'Preventing Violent Extremism Delivery Fund' money. Work is ongoing to develop a performance management framework for counter-terrorism community engagement. The Community Engagement Infrastructure project is looking at facilities such as mapping communities and a contacts database to help build on engagement and to allow Boroughs to make local community specific engagement plans at a ward level. This will include a review of current training processes to review engagement input. The project is due to deliver by March 08.

b) Performance indicators for community engagement are being developed at present in conjunction with the MPA. A briefing paper is being drafted for the Citizen Focus Performance Board to take this forward. The outline work has been presented to Cindy Butts for agreement in principle.

Recommendation 31. Provide evidence that the Metropolitan Police Service is engaging young people more in counter-terrorist efforts.
and
ecommendation 32. Provide evidence that the Metropolitan Police Service is engaging women more in counter-terrorist efforts, for example through women’s sector second-tier organisations and umbrella bodies as well as groups that deal directly with female service users.
Recommendation 33. Ensure a diversity amongst the Muslims with whom the police engage in counter-terrorist efforts, eg. women, non-Asians, Ahmadis, Ismailies etc.
Recommendation 34. Involve local councillors in police counter-terrorism work.
Recommendation 35. Support community activists in organising their own engagement events on counter-terrorism.
Recommendation 36. Replicate successful local models of community engagement.
Recommendation 37. Provide feedback to consultees on all consultation exercises.
Recommendation 38. Ensure that Local Safer Neighbourhoods teams build relationships with places of worship in their areas.

MPS Response:

In its initial response the MPS accepted all of these recommendations. There is a considerable amount of work ongoing and some examples of this are given below:

a) CTSET are continuing ongoing work with SO and TP within “Age Strand” and “Gender Strand”. DCF and the MCU are engaged with Local Authorities through GoL and London Councils. They are helped by DCL PVE funded initiatives. The MPS does undertake to feedback to consultees, the results of our work and progress. CTSET are working with the “Gender Strand” and MSF to look at the best methods for developing links with women’s groups. An outline plan will be available for the next update.

b) The MPS do send representatives to community meetings where terrorism as a topic is being discussed, when we are aware of these. The MPS now has a London Youth worker in place, who is reviewing how it engages with youth via youth clubs and identifying systems such as TagMap to help us engage more effectively with youth. DCF and TP are working together to ensure that the Youth Strategy reflects links to The London Debate.

c) Work has been conducted with the Somali Community across areas of London and several projects are being sponsored to allow engagement. Work is underway to hold a conference for African Youth in the New Year with an MPS input for CT issues and for the MPS to gain an awareness of issues impacting directly on this group. There are also proposals to work with the Association of Muslim Police and the British Association of Women Police to hold a seminar for women to develop views, communication and access.

d) The University of Central Lancashire work under Quadrant is also working with Bangladeshi, Pakistani, SriLankan/Tamil, Turkish/Kurdish and Somali communities. The project has recruited volunteer community representatives. This work has highlighted areas of concern for the community, including stop and search/account and recruitment. The representatives were invited to attend New Scotland Yard, where they received briefings on key issues by Human Resources, Specialist Operations and DPA. They were asked to brief their communities with this information. This should refine the areas of concern, which in turn will be used within MPS Business Group focus groups to assess and develop ways in which to take this forward. It is anticipated that the focus groups begin in February.

e) Consultation takes place during and throughout incidents. All minutes of the meetings are circulated and actions/issues are published in the Communities Together bulletins. An example is the recent Stockwell Community Consultative Forums who raised concerns around the Latin communities in relation to stop and search/account. This feedback from the community has been actioned with the Stop and Search Team regarding the use of appropriate language and a plan has been proposed which meets the community needs. This includes a communication plan to involve engagement in a number of areas if it is to be effective in achieving the above vision. This will include: ‘know your rights’ section on our website www.met.police.uk/stopandsearch available in different languages; ‘Know your rights’ posters which can be printed off the above website both internally and externally; Targeted media communication; and a ‘third party contact’ system to provide advice and guidance in relation to stop and search. The first three of these actions can be dealt with as a matter if priority with a timeline of three months. The latter will require a longer timeframe. Other steps include a comprehensive framework within the MPS to discuss stop and search issues. The Community Monitoring Network (CMN) ensures local dialogue with senior officers as each of the boroughs. The CMN links into the Metropolitan Police Authority to ensure scrutiny at a strategic level.

f) The five standard operating procedures for stop and search are due for review in the early part of 2008. Consultation with London’s communities including the Latin American community will be part of that review.

g) Every year an MPS Equality Impact Assessment for stop and search takes place. This measures the adverse and positive impact of policing proposals on communities through a structured and transparent process. In support, each of the thirty-two boroughs is required to complete an EIA.

h) The new Tension Monitoring process will be rolling out in January, which will allow Police and Local Authorities to monitor tension across all areas and share information to help minimise the impact. This will enable a pan London picture to emerge whilst enabling issues to be addressed locally.

i) SNTs have faith officers in post. CTSET and the Operation Rainbow office are looking at examples of faith premises security, similar to the work carried out between the MPS and Community Security Trust for synagogues. This will be delivered through SNTs and local Crime Prevention Officers. Information will be fed back to Operation Rainbow to use as a contact database. Discussions are taking place now and a report will be available for the next update.

j) An example of the excellent work being conducted is that of Katie Miller of the Southwark Partnership team. She has developed “Faith in the Neighbourhood”. She works four days a week on Southwark Borough and one day with DCF on the Faith Strand, in order to develop the pan-London roll out of this project. Katie recognised a gap in contact with faith communities. She identified faith venues and got to know the communities in her role as a PCSO. Katie has developed monthly newsletters, which are sent out by mailshot and email (a copy is attached at Appendix 6). In September 2007, Katie coordinated SNT and community interaction during Peace Week, during which she arranged a Faith Tour, visiting the various places of worship around the borough as a means of developing officers knowledge and community contacts. Within the newsletters, Katie encourages the community to engage with the MPS. Katie also produces a Prayer Points bulletin for circulation to the BOCU officers. The Peace Week activity saw an increase in SNT engagement with the communities and was received positively by all parties. A further bulletin is produced on a weekly basis for officers on the Borough about Festivals, explaining their reasons, traditions and timings which is increasing officers understandings of the communities that they police. Prior to Ramadam, Chaucer SNT held a Peace Breakfast as a means of raising awareness amongst members of various faiths. Katie is working with Lambeth Borough to advise and develop a local multi faith forum. Within Southwark Borough, Katie represents the MPS on the Southwark Council Community Involvement Development Unit. Through this work, which is supported by the local SMT, an everyday dialogue has developed between the MPS and faith groups, which assist when critical incident management is required.

Recommendation 39. Redouble efforts to recruit more Muslim police officers and officers from other minority ethnic and faith groups.

MPS Response:

Diversity is an issue of particular relevance and importance to the MPS. The continuing commitment to recruiting a diverse workforce, including Muslim officers and officers from other minority ethnic and faith groups, is driven primarily by the operational imperatives associated with policing such a diverse city. The MPS has been successful in increasing the recruitment of people of Muslim faith and people from other faith groups. One in ten of all BME recruits last year identified as being of Muslim faith. Of all police officer recruits, 4.5% self-identified as being of Muslim faith. This continues to be a very important part of the recruitment strategy for the Human Resources Directorate.

Current work includes:

a) The Met Careers Team (formerly the Positive Action Team) continues to work in partnership with staff associations, to help promote the Met as a viable career option and provide support to under represented groups. A new Met Careers Office (MetCO) has opened at Earls Court and will focus on recruiting for police staff roles. Recent generic events held at MetCO have proved highly successful in attracting high levels of applicants from under represented communities. To complement this, we have developed the Recruitment Bus. The bus is used to undertake recruitment activity in distinct communities. Since introduction in December 2005, over 2,500 people have registered their interest in careers in the Met - 68% of those come from a black or minority ethnic group.

b) The team continues to address many of the misconceptions and perceived barriers that prevent groups currently under-represented in the organisation from considering a career in the MPS. Extra support is also offered to those candidates who speak English as an additional language, as well as delivering advice to the public on career opportunities within the MPS through the Met Careers Office, the dedicated careers office. The Me+ Careers Team also works in partnership with Boroughs, with Staff Support Associations, and with Job Centre Plus who stretch the visibility of the MPS even further into the community allowing true engagement with Londoners on a face-to-face level.

c) Specific advertising campaigns have been developed including the ‘Can you be?’ campaign to address perceived barriers that might prevent groups currently under-represented in the Service from considering a career with us. These include ethnic groups, faith groups, and female applicants. Other campaigns and events have been designed to coincide with religious or cultural events such as Eid, Diwali and Chinese New Year.

d) A comprehensive careers website has been developed and provides information on all roles within the MPS. The website includes a section on 'supporting diversity' with links to Police Staff Associations and 'Can You Be?' literature.

e) The MPS has targeted a number of London universities where there is shown to be a high proportion of Black and minority ethnic (BME) students in a bid to recruit high quality candidates from BME groups.

f) The substantial achievements in attracting extensive numbers of diverse applicants to MPS roles are attributed to focused and dedicated advertising and marketing strategies and applicant support. Targeted Me+ Careers and marketing events have resulted in black and minority ethnic candidates constituting 37% of overall applications to the MPS (more specifically 16% were from Asian candidates and 15% were from Black candidates compared to 12% and 11% respective proportions of the London population) 12.3% were Muslim, 3.3% were Hindu and 1.9% were Sikh. See Appendix 7 for faith/religion figures.

g) During the last two financial years, record numbers of police community support officers and special constables have been recruited from London’s communities and the BME representation within both of these roles has been excellent (i.e. 24.3% PCSO and 31.8% specials). In terms of strength, BME account for 31% of both PCSO and Specials’ strength, significantly exceeding the 26% Economically Active Population (EAP).

h) The highly targeted advertising and specialised recruitment events have also created an application pool richly diverse with regard to highly sought after life skills and experience. For police officer recruitment, the admissions criteria questionnaire has enabled early identification of candidates’ additional skills and experiences. Those who pass the National Recruiting Standard (NRS) process were prioritised accordingly. This ensures that such skills were identified and utilised at the earliest opportunity. For instance, 13% of police officer recruits in the first three months of 2007 spoke a language other than English to bilingual or fluent levels. Such an emphasis on the importance of life skills such as fluency in a language other than English in everyday community policing and specialised roles is highlighted in events such as the 'Language Intromet' held on February 2007. At that event, 10% of attendees were bilingual and 32% were fluent in a language other than English.

As a result of these positive steps the MPS has made significant improvements:

• Of the Met’s total workforce 14.3% are now from a BME group.
• Over 8% of all police officers now come from a BME community.
• 20% of all new police officer recruits now going through Hendon Training School are from a BME group. We also anticipate that by the end of the financial year, of all new police recruits going through Hendon during FY 07/08, 19.4% will have come from a black or minority ethnic group. This is in contrast to 2001 when just 7% of new recruits came from this group.
• In the last financial year, 33% of all police officer applications received came from the black and minority ethnic communities
• Of the Met’s newest staff grouping, Police Community Support Officers, 30.7% come from a BME community.
• 19% of all police officers, police staff and PCSOs recruited during the last 12 months came from a BME community.
• During the last two financial years, record numbers of police community support officers and special constables have been recruited, and the BME representation within both of these roles has been excellent (i.e. 24.9% PCSO and 32.6% specials). In terms of strength, BME account for 31% of both PCSO and Specials’ strength, significantly exceeding the 26% Economically Active Population (EAP)
• Of those successfully completing the selection process in 2006/07, just under one in three (29%) were from black and minority ethnic communities, about two fifths (38%) were female, one in five (19%) were aged 40 or over, one in ten (11%) were from minority faiths and 17% were graduates.
• HR Recruitment is on target to deliver and end of year strength of 31,593 police officers. If this is achieved, 19.9% of police officer recruits will be BME and 39.9% will be female. This will be the highest ever achieved. See Appendix 7 for BME officer figures and percentages.

Recommendation 40. Continue to seek to recruit more Londoners as police officers.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS Human Resources current strategy is to recruit more Londoners as police officers. The Met is committed to recruiting Londoners and attends and supports only London based community events in order to answer questions and provide advice about a career in the police service. Furthermore, the MPS holds specialist recruitment events on a regular basis across London and the MPS Recruitment Bus visits areas all over London. The MPS is especially interested in applicants with certain 'life skills' such as languages and/or knowledge of communities represented in London.

b) All the MPS marketing and advertising activity for new recruits is conducted in London and aimed at Londoners. The Recruitment Directorate and Directorate for Citizen Focus and Diversity have introduced award winning, innovative initiatives to gain access to minority communities within London. The recruitment results have been significant; for instance, two thirds of the 346 expressions of interest gained at the ‘Faith Intromet’ came from black and minority ethnic communities. The latest ‘Language Intromet’ event, based on an award winning campaign, resulted in 303 out of 498 (61%) expressions of interest from people from BME backgrounds.

Recommendation 41. Diversify the workforce in Specialist Operations and particularly in the Counter-Terrorist Command.

MPS Response:

a) Efforts continue to be made to improve the diversity of the workforce in Specialist Operations, including the Counter Terrorism Command. This has been a considerable challenge and progress could be described as steady but slow. The EODB has recently been updated on this work as has the MPS Diversity Board. We are working closely with the National Association of Muslim Police (NAMP) and other support staff associations. The CTC has taken part in National Counter Terrorism Careers fairs. SO have a Careers Consultancy Unit for whom increasing diversity is a very high priority.

Recommendation 42. Expand and enhance the diversity training, which police officers and Police Community Support Officers receive to ensure it is relevant to new and emerging challenges.

MPS Response:

a) The MPS has integrated the Race and Diversity learning resources into both programmes, and are currently working with both the IPLDP and PCSO initial training departments to develop their staff, to support community involvement process and support the inclusion of specific Race and Diversity objectives throughout the entire programmes as appropriate. The diversity training for PCSOs was reviewed in February 2007 and has been enhanced as a consequence forming a strong theme throughout the six weeks training. The training is pass/fail and diversity is one of the areas assessed. Diversity training is no longer a standalone module within recruit training, and has now been incorporated by specialists as a 'golden thread' in every element of foundation training. This allows trainees to see 'diversity in action' - applying what they have learnt to the skills they will require as part of their daily role as a police officer. This is further enhanced through the Initial Police Learning Development Programme (IPLDP), which is the future of recruit training, and is almost completely rolled out across the Met. This allows recruits to train in the community they will one day work in - enhancing their understanding of the many facets of that local community on an ongoing basis, over 31 weeks.

b) The responses to this recommendation will be monitored within EODB in future.

Recommendation 43. Draft and disseminate guidance for all Metropolitan Police Service staff on appropriate terminology concerning terrorism and counter-terrorism.

MPS Response:

The NCTT has published a document on appropriate terminology, which will be circulated across the MPS via OCU Commanders. This will be done by end of month, and re-issued in the event of an incident or attack. NCTT and MPS are linked in with RICU and this ensures that there is a consistency of messages from all levels across the MPS and Government.

The diversity handbook is now published online, which enables it to be kept up to date.

Recommendation 44. Put more information into the public domain about what to do in the event of terrorist attack.

MPS Response:

a) This is a responsibility shared by the MPS and many agencies including the Government and London Resilience. In January 2006 the MPS created a dedicated emergency preparedness operational command unit, CO3. This unit draws together the MPS response to emergency procedure, business continuity and partnership liaison with the London Resilience Team who work together to inform the public.

b) CO3 continues to prepare contingency plans for all eventualities including terrorism. BOCUs regularly exercise with local authorities and businesses for a terrorist event. We work closely with London Resilience. In relation to CBRN the government have circulated leaflets to every householder as to how they should react in the event of a catastrophic terrorist incident. The MPS continue to play an important role in this but do need the consistency and continuity of central and local government support to keep this message in the forefront of people’s minds – DPA being the conduit by which the MPS gets information to the public.

c) Her Majesty’s Government spent a considerable amount of money developing and delivering a booklet to every home in the UK called “Preparing for Emergencies” which also included information about what to do in the event of a terrorist attack. However, the public recall when analysed was extremely limited. Research has shown that the public will act on what they are being told at the time. In the event of a major incident (including terrorism), DPA will appoint designated leads to work with the various commands who will identify the issues that are impacting on their own area of work and tailor messages accordingly. This system has been used to great effect especially during 7/7. Since 7/7, the DPA have developed their website with hyperlinks to all manner of other organisations who can assist and provide further guidance. This is held on a page behind the homepage, which will be activated in the event of a major incident with up to date and useful information specific to that event.

Recommendation 45 Improve business preparedness for terrorist attack by:

• Publicising the ‘London Prepared’ website to businesses.
• Safer Neighbourhoods teams issuing small businesses with counter-terrorism guidance.
• Convening local business fora to draw up integrated private sector
  contingency plans.

MPS Response:

a) There are now 13 Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) for the Metropolitan Police area who deliver Project Argus, a National Counter Terrorism Security Office initiative, which gives presentations to businesses to help identify means they can take to prevent, handle and recover from a terrorist attack, particularly in crowded places. Safer Neighbourhood Teams identify and invite suitable businesses for Argus presentations. Businesses can also access a virtual exercise system via the Internet to ensure their preparedness for such an attack.

b) The London Resilience website www.londonprepared.gov.uk  has been relaunched and provides excellent information for both individuals and organisations.

c) London First, a business focussed umbrella group is working with the London Resilience team and the MPS to publicise this site.

Recommendation 46. Explore how criminal gangs use discontent at counter-terrorism activity to recruit new members.

MPS Response:

a) This proposed research will form part of the MPS wider work about gangs and the reasons people join them.

b) A meeting was held between MPS business groups, SOCA and the Security Service to scope the work requirements in relation to this recommendation. From this meeting, the Specialist Crime Directorate, in partnership with the Counter Terrorism Command, are examining crossovers between serious and organised crime operations and potential terrorist activity. The objective will be to increase our understanding of how criminals are interacting with and influenced by, those involved in terrorist activity and ideals. This research will be undertaken during the 1st Quarter of 2008. In addition, it is proposed that a Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer (CTIO) will be deployed to the Specialist Crime Directorate to facilitate the link with borough CTIOs.

c) The MPS (SO15) is developing links with the Probation Service in order to improve support and supervision of those convicted of terrorist offences, once they are released from prison and also to help to identify people who may be at risk of being drawn into violent extremism either in prison or through other criminal activity. This work is at an early stage, but together with our work with Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS), will form an important part of our PREVENT work in the future.

8. The recommendations will continue to be developed in collaboration with the MPA over the coming months. A further report will be provided in six months time.

9. In relation to Recommendations 1, 2, 9, 13, 14, 25, 26, 27 and 42 the MPS proposes to report further only on an 'exception' basis as the work required appears to be substantially complete.

Acronyms and abbreviations:

ACPO(TAM)

Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters)

AWARE

MPS IT system

BME

Black and Minority Ethnic

BOCU

Borough Operational Command Unit

BSIA

 British Security Industry Association

Category 1 responders

Agencies by law required to respond to major disasters

Channel

Community based project to counter extremism

CBRN

Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear

CCA

Civil Contingencies Act

CDRP

Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership

CIA

Community Impact Assessment

CMN

Community Monitoring Network

CONTEST

Government long term strategy for countering international terrorism

CPNI

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

CRIS

Crime Reporting System used by the MPS

CST

Community Security Trust (Jewish Community Security)

CSU

Community Safety Unit

CTC (SO15)

Counter Terrorism Command

CTIO

Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer

CTRV

Counter Terrorism Response Vehicles

CTSA

Counter Terrorism Security Advisor

CTSET

Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team

DCF

Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate

DCLG

Department of Communities and Local Government

Delphinus

Introduction of Counter Terrorism to all Borough Operational Command Units (BOCUs) in a structured format, and to provoke guidance as to the activities that should be undertaken.

DOI

Directorate of Information

DPA

Directorate of Public Affairs

DPS

 Directorate of Professional Standards

EIA

Equality Impact Assessment

EODB

Equal Opportunities Diversity Board

GLA

Greater London Authority

GoL

Government Office for London

HMIC

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies

HMPS

Her Majesty’s Prison Service

IPCC

Independent Police Complaints Commission

IPLDP

Initial Police Learning Development Programme

LAA

Local Area Agreements

LGBT

 Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender

NaCTSO

National Counter Terrorism Security Office

NAMP

National Association of Muslim Police

NCTT

National Community Tension Team

NPIA

National Police Improvement Agency

NRS

National Recruiting Standards

OSCT

Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (Home Office)

PCSO

Police Community Support Officer

PLDP

Police Learning Development Programme

PREVENT

Strand of CONTEST to prevent violent extremism

PROTECT

Strand of CONTEST to reduce the vulnerability of the UK and UK interests overseas to terrorist attack

Project Argus

Series of exercises with local authorities and businesses re Terrorism incidents

Project Griffin

Engagement with businesses regarding Counter Terrorism issues

PMS

Protective Marking Scheme

PVE

Preventing Violent Extremism

Quadrant

MPS operation to tackle criminality affecting South East Asian communities

Rainbow

Series of tactical options deployed against Counter Terrorism

RICU

Research Information and Communications Unit

RUSI

Royal United Services Institute

SIA

Security Industry Authority

SOP

Standard Operating Procedures

VCD

Violent Crime Directorate

C. Race and equality impact

Terrorism affects all Londoners and those to whom we provide a policing service. It has the potential to affect community cohesion severely. Counter terrorism operations have the potential to impact on some localities, faith groups and ethnic communities more than others. The equality and diversity implications of the London Debate report have been extensively considered by the Authority previously. These recommendations are designed to ensure that the potential for unfair and disproportionate impact is minimised and that operations are carried out sensitively and communicated effectively so that trust and confidence in the police and in counter terrorist efforts generally is increased.

D. Financial implications

There are no additional financial implications identified at this stage.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Cressida Dick, MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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