Vetting in the MPS - progress report

Report: 10
Date: 7 July 2011
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This paper details the progress made by the MPS Vetting Unit in addressing the MPA Vetting Audit recommendations since the last report to the Communities, Equalities and People Committee meeting on 4 November 2010.

The body of this paper focuses on three specific topics that the Committee indicated warranted further scrutiny. This paper presents an analysis of vetting appeals, including equalities analysis, and how learning is being applied to improve the vetting operation. It provides the latest information available to police on the Government’s review of the Vetting and Barring Scheme and explains why the MPS’s use of Youth Supervision checks rose so sharply in 2009.

The Coalition Government has now announced provisions to revise its vetting and barring arrangements. Until all the appropriate legislation has been introduced and the new arrangements are established, the existing responsibilities of employers and the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA) will remain. The MPS does not anticipate that policing roles will be defined as regulated activity under the remodelled scheme, in line with the current position. The MPS is not a Registered Body and does not obtain Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates. However, to maintain public confidence those roles which mirror the criteria for such a Certificate will require an MPS Youth Supervision check.

A. Recommendation

That Members note this report.

B. Supporting information

Why the Metropolitan Police Service needs Security Vetting

1. The MPS is committed to the maintenance of the highest levels of honesty and integrity, and to the prevention and disruption of dishonest, unethical and unprofessional behaviour. Vetting exists to protect the Service from persons and organisations, both internal and external, who may seek to harm it or expose it to harm through their own vulnerabilities. It assists in providing a safe working environment for personnel, in protecting the people of London, in protecting our information, safeguarding national security and plays a fundamental part in achieving an ethical and honest police service free from corruption.

Progress report: Improving the vetting operation

2. Since November, when Vetting last reported to CEPC, significant progress has been made in addressing the recommendations made by the MPA Audit. Much of this progress has stemmed from the formation of the MPS Vetting Unit on 1 October 2010, when the Personnel Security Group merged with the National Security Vetting Unit.

3. This progress has been achieved at a time when staff numbers have been reduced in order to deliver savings to the organisation. The head count has been reduced by 1 Band C, 1 Band D and 5 Band E posts. In addition, as officers working in vetting have left, these posts (three in total) have been converted into Police Staff posts. The staffing profile and funding position for FY 2011/12 can be found at Appendix 1. (The work undertaken by the National Security Vetting Unit will continue to be funded by the CT Grant and so is listed separately to MPS funded activity.)

4. As a direct result of the merger, the following improvements have been achieved:

• A single vetting case management system is now in use
• A single performance framework is now in place for all types of vetting
• A single quality assurance process is in place, which will be further developed throughout FY11/12
• The duplication across two vetting units has been removed.
• Improved efficiency by ensuring police checks are completed in full before initiating Security Service checks.
• Appropriate use of police staff rather than officers
• Ensuring no unnecessary contractor vetting occurs, in partnership with recruiting directorates.

5. In addition to these improvements, the following projects are nearing completion:

• The revised draft vetting policy and standard operating procedure is now entering the final stages of consultation prior to being signed off.
• The introduction of more balanced levels of vetting
• Development of detailed decision-making guidance for vetting officers, to support reasonable proportionate and consistent decision making, which draws on recognised good practice in support of disclosure decisions as cited in R [L] v Commissioner, Supreme Court 2009.
• The Vetting Case Management system is being integrated on to the corporate IT platform, which will deliver increased productivity and full disaster recovery facilities. This will maximise the benefit of IT upgrades scheduled later this financial year and will deliver further efficiencies and an improved customer experience: a candidate will be able to submit typed forms electronically, which will also make the process more auditable and easier for security controllers to track applications.

6. Appendix 2 details progress to date on outstanding recommendations in the 2008/9 Audit Report.

Vetting performance

7. The MPS requires 80% of counter terrorism check (CTC) cases to be completed within 35 calendar days. In the last financial year 96% of CTC cases were completed within 35 calendar days with an average CTC check now taking 20 days.

8. The service level agreement (SLA) for management vetting (MV) is to complete 80% of cases within 42 calendar days. In the last financial year, 80% of MV cases were completed within 42 days with an average check taking 36 days.

9. The MPS Vetting Unit undertakes all checks required for processing all types of vetting apart from national security checks and professional standards integrity checks. There is a requirement to liaise with the British Security Services for a national security check and a further integrity check with the Directorate of Professional Standards Intelligence Bureau, as there is currently no direct access to their respective databases. Some cases can prove to be more complex resulting in the Security Services and/or DPS integrity checks taking longer to complete, delaying the resulting process and it is these cases that often exceed the SLA.

10. New SLAs are now in place for Security Cleared (SC) and Development Vetted (DV) vetting cases, which were introduced in March 2011. These new SLAs reflect the fact that MV clearance must be completed successfully before enhanced national security checks are commenced. However, the need to complete a MV clearance prior to the DV national security checks means that the new process takes slightly longer. This is ultimately a more efficient approach as it avoids two clearances being progressed in parallel. In addition this approach is compliant with Cabinet Office guidance and learning from national security vetting cases heard by the Security Vetting Appeals Panel.

11. The new SLAs are:

• SC: Completion of 80% of applications within 7 days of the MV completion date (or equivalent non police personnel vetting clearance).
• DV: Completion of 80% of cases within 130 days of receipt.

12. Up until March 2011, records show that DV applications were taking approximately 107 days to complete from receipt of application to clearance. Similarly, SC applications took approximately 42 days to complete and since September 2009 approximately 84% of SC cases were completed within 42 calendar days.

Quality assurance

13. The quality assurance processes used by the MPS Vetting Unit are continuing to develop. Since the amalgamation, the recording of quality assurance activity has been improved to allow for a greater range of analysis to be performed. For example, trend analysis on appeal decisions is becoming possible to allow individual, team and organisational learning to be identified. This is presented below.

14. In addition, SCD 26 is investing in a software upgrade which will permit more elements of the case management system to become readily searchable, including reasons for vetting refusal. This will ensure that more timely and accurate data can be analysed, rather than relying on time consuming, manual generation of records.

15. Section Managers dip sample vetting decisions weekly and it is the responsibility of Senior Vetting Officers to oversee data accuracy and that all the checks have been completed to a satisfactory standard before resulting a case, taking into account the recommendations made by the Vetting Officer. In addition a small team is also assigned to quality assure vetting decisions.

16. Work is currently being undertaken to implement a decision making framework to support staff in completion of vetting cases and the quality assurance process. We anticipate training and the implementation of this framework to coincide with the completion of the Vetting Policy Review.

17. The MPS Vetting Unit has been working in partnership with HR Analysis to reconcile vetting data with candidates’ equalities data held on MetHR and now has access to experienced data analysts who will periodically report findings to the Unit to inform policy monitoring and organisational learning.

18. An example of the analysis that can now be undertaken is around examining trends arising from vetting appeals. This is in addition to ensuring equalities analysis can be performed to examine the relative outcomes for different groups who have undergone vetting.

Analysis of Appeals Decisions

19. The public is entitled to expect that the Police Service recruits police officers with proven integrity, who are not vulnerable to pressure from criminals and others to disclose information. The potential for an individual to harm or cause embarrassment to the organisation is also considered.

20. Vetting is a snapshot in time and decisions are made, as guided by MPS policy and national guidelines, on a case by case basis, having given full consideration of the information found following the necessary searches conducted as part of the vetting process. All MPS police vetting decisions are guided by NPIA Circular 02/2011 in conjunction with ACPO National Vetting Policy (NVP) for the Police Community, whilst HMG’s National Security Policy Framework guides decision making on national security vetting.

21. It is important to highlight that there are some hard and fast rules which will automatically lead to a vetting refusal e.g. for specific serious cautions and convictions and other areas where the information must be assessed to decide whether the candidate should be refused or not.

22. Typically, 8% of all candidates fail vetting each year, and the main reasons for this are due to cautions and convictions (~40%), financial reasons (~19%) and adverse intelligence (~12%). Very few candidates fail national security vetting (less than 0.5%).

23. All candidates who fail vetting are entitled to challenge the vetting decision and request to have their case reviewed, even if they are not currently employed by the MPS.

24. A study of vetting appeals considered by the MPS was commissioned in November 2011 to identify learning and to inform the MPS review of vetting policy and the decision making guidance issued to Vetting Officers. A sample covering a time period of 18 months was manually created that categorised appeals lodged between 7 May 2009 and 30 November 2010. This sample includes candidates who applied for a range of roles and not just individuals who applied to become a police officer or special constable.

25. Between May 2009 and November 2010 the MPS Vetting Unit resulted 34,433 cases of which 1,913 (5.5%) were refused.

26. Of all unsuccessful candidates, 43.2% chose to challenge the vetting decision. In 279 cases out of 826 appeals the decision was reversed. This indicates that one in 7 of all vetting refusals are reversed on appeal and the failure rate, when adjusted accordingly, becomes 4.7%.

27. An analysis is presented below on vetting appeals from candidates who applied for the standard level of MPS Police Vetting. This group represents the majority of candidates who appeal; 230 out of 692 appellants were successful and there are too few cases for other types of vetting for meaningful analysis to be conducted by vetting type. (It should be remembered that there is different decision-making guidance for different types of vetting).

28. It is not possible to complete analysis on all six diversity strands and an analysis of the relative outcomes for faith, sexual orientation and disability is not possible. This is because there is too much missing information as these are the strands that candidates are least likely to declare.

29. However, analysis by age, gender and ethnicity was possible for this new dataset.

30. The following general observations can be made:

• The type of decision that was most likely to be overturned was when the initial decision was based on police information. (78 cases). This reflects the fact that this type of vetting decision is most likely to be challenged as the candidate may not have been supplied with a full decision rationale due to confidentiality matters, and is the area in which the vetting decision making framework is least prescriptive.
• The type of decision that was second most likely to be overturned was when the initial decision was based on an assessment of the candidate’s cautions and convictions record. (61 cases)
• The type of decision that was third most likely to be overturned was when the initial decision was based on an assessment of the candidate’s finances. (40 cases)
• The main grounds for overturning the initial vetting decision was that the Reviewer believed that the initial decision was a severe application of policy, and based on the available information discretion could be applied allowing for a more reasonable, balanced and proportionate decision to be made. (96 cases). These decisions tended to relate to areas of policy which require the decision maker to assess the weight of the information found as a result of the vetting process as opposed to applying a hard and fast rule. Typically, these decisions related to assessing aged cautions and convictions for relatively minor offences, police intelligence and candidate finances where depending on the individual circumstances the decision could potentially be either a refusal or a clearance.
• The second most common reason for overturning the initial decision was that the candidate was able to provide mitigating circumstances. (64 cases)
• 14 appeals were granted as candidates were able to demonstrate they had paid a Country Court Judgement [1] or a mistake in the official record had been corrected.

31. Equalities analysis revealed:

• There were broadly comparable levels of success for both male and female candidates who challenged the initial vetting decision, with 50% of female candidates lodging successful appeals in comparison with 46% of male candidates.
• There were comparable levels of success for candidates aged 32 years and over (51%). However, younger candidates tended to be less successful (43% - 45%), which could be explained by the fact that there is less opportunity for the passage of time to mitigate aspects of their personal history (e.g. cautions and convictions - the primary reason the majority of candidates fail vetting).
• Reliable analysis of relative success rate of candidates from BME and white groups was limited as ethnicity data was unavailable for the majority of appeals cases (440): Data on ethnicity was only available for 256, or 37% of candidates who appealed. The following statements must be interpreted with caution:
• Appeals made by BME appellants were nearly two times more likely to fail than white appellants. However, it should be remembered that there are 440 appeals where no diversity data was provided, over half of the sample, and this group were three times more likely to fail than white appellants 3:1. This means that the observation regarding the relative success of different groups has limitations and may not be reliable and could be significantly different if the ethnicity of the majority of candidates were known.
• There was no significant difference in the success rates of white (52%) and BME (49%) appellants when the initial decision was based on police information.
• The proportions of BME/white appellants whose appeals were successful as the Reviewer believed the initial decision to be perverse were broadly similar (57.1% BME, 53.6% White).
• The second most cited reason for the reversal related to 'mitigating circumstances', and the data revealed that the white appellants were around 1.4 times more successful in (or able to) presenting mitigating circumstances than the BME group (46.5% white, 33.3% BME).

32. Please see Appendix 3 for data.

Actions resulting from appeals analysis

33. The limited data set and the small numbers in each of the monitoring categories are factors that need to be taken into account when assessing the appeals data. Research to date suggests that the MPS should continue to monitor appeals and underlying trends in as much detail as possible. This will ensure that issues can be identified; their causes explored and focused action taken to address them as appropriate. As the sample becomes bigger the statistical validity of the analysis will improve. For these reasons, the action currently being taken to address the learning points arising from this research focuses on decision-making and the vetting process as a whole.

34. What the above analysis does suggest is that appeals are more likely to be lodged in cases where the initial decision maker has to assess a wide range of information where the policy guidance is less prescriptive.

35. Although the typical case circumstances that trigger some unsuccessful candidates to challenge a vetting decision in effect moderate the decision making process, it would be preferential to improve the guidance provided to Vetting Officers and internal quality assurance processes to avoid the need for cases to go to appeal if at all possible.

36. Accordingly, the MPS Vetting Unit is currently developing a decision-making framework to supplement national policy guidance and existing MPS policy. This will include more detailed guidance around assessing candidate finances (and what constitutes unmanageable debt), assessing police information either relating to the candidate or a third party and areas where discretion may be applied in assessing historic cautions and convictions that are not so serious as to automatically mean a candidate should be refused. Good progress has been made in developing the decision-making framework, which will support reasonable proportionate and consistent decision-making. It is anticipated that this document will be ready shortly after the revised MPS Vetting Policy is published this summer and it will draws on the recognised good practice of the Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) [2] that was developed to support disclosure decisions as cited in R [L] v Commissioner Supreme Court 2009.

37. Information on the QAF and a copy of the QAF can be downloaded from www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/CRB/qaf-introduction

38. Seminars are currently being scheduled to provide vetting officers with regular feedback to allow matters detected via the quality assurance process to be addressed and to ensure that there is ongoing training support for the Unit’s staff.

39. Further improvements are being planned to support existing quality assurance practices and additional staff will be assigned to this function once capacity is released when Police National Database (PND) is launched. This is because the advent of PND will reduce the demand for searches to be conducted on behalf of Vetting Units, thus freeing up resource to support the quality assurance process.

Youth Supervision

40. The MPS undertake a youth supervision check on staff working within designated roles. This check is the equivalent of the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) enhanced check, is valid for 3 years and is not transferable to another organisation.

41. The existing designated posts are:

• Child protection
• School liaison
• Police cadets
• Youth offending teams
• Youth engagement officers

42. Details of the number of checks completed within the last 3 financial years are included in Table 1 below:

43. The sharp rise in the number of Youth Supervision checks undertaken during 2009/2010 primarily resulted from national guidance stipulating that ViSOR [3] users, a database rated CONFIDENTIAL in the Government Protective Marking Scheme, must hold an Enhanced Criminal Records Check. Therefore the MPS stipulated that its VISOR users must hold Youth Supervision vetting. The roll out of MPS Youth Strategy and increased levels of youth engagement work also account for some of the rise and explains why the number of Youth Supervision cases processed in 2010/11 did not fall back down to previous levels.

The proposed remodelling of the Vetting and Barring Scheme

44. The VBS had been created to help safeguard children and vulnerable adults, following the Bichard inquiry and was designed to check the records of those who wanted to work with vulnerable groups.

45. In its programme for government, the Coalition Government committed to reviewing the Vetting and Barring Scheme (VBS) “to scale it back to common sense levels”. Accordingly, in June 2010, ministers announced that the planned implementation of the VBS was to be halted, pending a thorough review.

46. The government has now announced provisions to revise its vetting and barring arrangements, to ensure fair and proportionate regulation of those who want to work with vulnerable groups.

47. On February 11 2011 the Coalition Government published the findings of its Review into the Vetting and Barring Scheme, which is published on-line at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime/vetting-barring-scheme

48. As part of the Protection of Freedoms Bill, the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, has unveiled a new scaled-back employment vetting scheme and a fundamental reform of criminal records checks as summarised below:

• to maintain a barring function
• to abolish registration and monitoring requirements
• to redefine the requirements of 'regulated activities'
• to abolish 'controlled activities'

49. Specifically, the key recommendations from the VBS Review include:

• the merging of the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) and Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA) to form a streamlined new body providing a proportionate barring and criminal records checking service;
• a large reduction of the number of positions requiring checks to just those working most closely and regularly with children and vulnerable adults;
• portability of criminal records checks between jobs to cut down on needless bureaucracy;
• an end to a requirement for those working or volunteering with vulnerable groups to register with the VBS; and
• stopping employers who knowingly request criminal records checks on individuals who are not entitled to them.

50. It should be noted that the new system will retain two offences: it will continue to be an offence for a barred person to work with vulnerable groups in regulated activity. It will also be an offence for an employer or voluntary organisation knowingly to employ a barred person in regulated activity.

51. The ISA is currently awaiting further details and will be working with the Home Office, the Department for Education, the Department of Health and the CRB to help implement the new arrangements.

52. The Coalition Government has confirmed that until all the appropriate legislation has been introduced and the new arrangements are established, the existing responsibilities of employers and the ISA will remain.
Implications of the revised VBS and the Protection of Freedoms Bill on the MPS.

53. The MPS does not anticipate that policing roles will be defined as regulated activity under the remodelled scheme, in line with the current position. Presently, the MPS does not seek Enhanced Criminal Records Check (ECRC) certificates as it is not a Registered Body and further, police information is a major part of the ECRC process.

54. The only element the police vetting regime and the MPS Youth Supervision check is currently unable to cover is a check of the "Barred Lists" (previously POCA, POVA, and List 99) but as the vast majority of people on those lists are there as a result of either committing an "Auto-bar” offence or from intelligence held by the police the impact of this is considered to be low risk. It is therefore clear that the police vetting checks would uncover the vast majority of barred individuals anyway. This argument was accepted by the then Home Secretary, Alan Johnson, in granting the police service an exemption from the requirement to register its staff engaging “regulated activity” with the Independent Safeguarding Authority.

55. The MPS takes its responsibilities to safeguard children and vulnerable groups most seriously and is taking steps to ensure the new Youth Supervision Standard Operating Procedures take the principles of this new scheme into account as far as possible at this point in time. The MPS believes that its plans for maintaining its Youth Supervision regime are likely to exceed requirements set out for organisations to ensure compliance with new legislative requirements of the remodelled scheme.

56. The suggested posts that the MPS would apply Youth Supervision to are:

• Child protection
• School liaison
• Permanent custody officers
• Permanent custody staff
• Police cadets
• Youth offending teams
• Youth engagement officers
• Custody Nurses
• ViSOR

57. Staff in these roles will be subject to a complete recheck every 3 years and an annual check against the PNC and PND, and barred lists if access is granted. Where appropriate, the MPS will refer incidents to the ISA. The three-year renewals cycle is likely to be within the timescale allotted for other organisations to comply with new legislation.

58. It is important to state that all relevant information is considered as part of the barring process. This goes wider than court convictions and cautions, better reflecting reports of behaviour – by the police, an employer or a professional body – which may cause concern but which have not resulted in a criminal record.

C. Other organisational and community implications

Equality and Diversity Impact

1. It is vital that vetting decisions are made in a fair, proportionate and consistent manner.

2. Analysis of the appeals data and other improvements to data collection and equalities monitoring arrangements will help achieve and demonstrate this principal in practice.

3. A review of vetting policy is currently underway for which there has been consultation with the staff associations in addition to MPS and MPA equalities advisors. The project team held a vetting workshop with SAMURAI to discuss any issues or concerns they had with the vetting process.

4. A draft Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) has been prepared and has been submitted to Members for information. The EIA process highlighted the lack of available information to assist detailed analysis of the vetting process and experiences of different groups. As stated above, steps have already been taken to improve data availability and quality, as demonstrated by the appeals analysis that has been presented in this report. Monitoring mechanisms will be put into place to assess adverse or otherwise impact across the equalities data. It is also clear that a communications strategy is required to help raise awareness of the vetting process, which would assist greatly in alleviating community concerns and misconceptions about the vetting process.

5. The draft EIA will be circulated to key stakeholders and advisors for final comment before it is approved. It is anticipated that it will be published alongside the revised policy in summer 2011.

Consideration of Met Forward

6. The MPS vetting operation supports several aspects of MET Forward. Whether it be helping to ensure integrity, so that officers and staff can focus on keeping London safe through the work of Met Streets, or performing national security checks to enable officers to work on counter-terrorism in MET Specialist, vetting is a vital function that ensures all MET people exceed the integrity standard the public rightly expect of officers. In addition, the current drive to improve efficiency and quality of service is in keeping with the theme of MET Standards.

Financial Implications

7. The allocated budget for the vetting unit is as shown in the table below:

Legal Implications

8. The legal implications have been set out in the body of the report.

9. Directorate of Legal Services (DLS) has been fully engaged throughout the Vetting Policy Review and is currently reviewing the revised draft MPS Vetting Policy and supporting standard operating procedures (SOPs), which will include Youth Supervision.

10 Legal advice should continue to be obtained from DLS in respect of the proposal to amend the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and to ensure the proposal to increase vetting checks of designated staff have no wider employment law related implications.

Environmental Implications

11. There are no environmental implications associated with the work presented in this report.

Risk (including Health and Safety) Implications

12. Vetting assists in providing a safe working environment for MPS personnel, in protecting the people of London, in protecting our information, safeguarding national security and plays a fundamental part in achieving an ethical and honest police service free from corruption. Ongoing work to ensure all employees and contractors hold a valid vetting clearance helps to mitigate the risk of individuals causing harm to the MPS.

D. Background papers

• MPS Report to MPA Communities, Equalities and People Committee on 4 November 2010 - Vetting within the MPS

E. Contact details

Report authors: Ruth Child - Head, Vetting Unit, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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