Tamil Protest at Parliament Square - financing additional costs

Report: 8
Date: 18 June 2009
By: Director of Resources on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides information on the Tamil protest in Parliament Square and its impact on the Service’s budget and performance. The Committee is asked to consider the release of reserves to cover the additional costs being incurred.

A. Recommendation

That members

1. Note the action taken to manage the Tamil protest and to mitigate the impact on police performance.
2. Decide whether MPA reserves can be used, up to a total of £6.1m, to meet the direct cost of the actions being taken subject to consideration of the application of general underspends identified as part of the regular financial monitoring process.

B. Supporting information

Background

1. The Tamil protests that have taken place (and continue to do so but at a far lower level) within Parliament Square, spontaneously commenced on Monday 6 April, with approximately 3,000 people attending. They then occupied the roads of Bridge Street and Westminster Bridge and attempts to remove them from these locations resulted in a number of the protestors jumping into the Thames from Westminster Bridge. The protesters were eventually moved onto Parliament Square on the morning of Tuesday 7 April.

2. The difficulties of policing the Tamil demonstration in Parliament Square cannot be over-emphasised. Whilst being highly organised, they (appear to) have no identifiable organisers and can mobilise vast increases in their numbers in a very short time by the use of text messaging. They act in an unpredictable manner, in that they react to unconfirmed media reports and external factors (e.g. U.N. decisions). These impacted upon their mood and willingness to comply with reasonable Police requests. Whilst the MPS has received praise for its handling of these demonstrations, from some quarters (e.g. Liberty), the prolonged operational commitment required a sensitive balance in terms of the impact it was creating on the Palace of Westminster, London’s commuters, workers and tourists.

3. There were a number of keys dates within the protest period:

• Saturday 11 April – The British Tamil Forum held a march and rally, which the MPS estimated that an excess of 100,000 people took part in.
•  Monday 20 April – Parliament returned from the Easter recess and approximately 1,000 Tamil protesters sat in the road outside the Palaces of Westminster
•  Wednesday 22 April – PMQ’s and Budget Day, approximately 15,000 Tamil protesters attended Parliament Square to raise awareness of the conflict in Sri Lanka
•  Monday 27 April – two simultaneous protests occurred at the Sri Lankan & Indian High Commissions, which resulted in an incursion and Criminal Damage to the Indian High Commission
•  Tuesday 5 May – a protest outside the Chinese Embassy, which resulted in Criminal damage occurring to the Embassy
•  Monday 11 May – approximately 1,200 Tamil protesters over power police resources outside Parliament and again stage a sit down outside the Palaces of Westminster
•  Throughout this period it was not uncommon for the Tamil demonstration on Parliament Square to reach 2,000 to 3,000 protesters, especially in the evening and at weekends

4. Continually throughout this period the MPS tried to engage with representatives of the Tamil Community to establish what their protest intentions were. Many of the meetings arranged between police and the protestors, were cancelled by the protestors at short notice, leaving the MPS unsighted as to intended actions of the protesters. Following a number of successful meetings with various elements of the Tamil Community, it was assessed that when the conflict in Sri Lanka concluded that the strength of feeling within the Tamil Community would increase. There was an increase in the number of arrests of Tamil protesters for offences such as violent disorder, following what had generally been a peaceful protest broken up with some civil disobedience. As a result, it was assessed that there could be an escalation of direct action and confrontation with police following an announcement by the Sri Lanka Government that the LTTE leadership had been taken prisoner or had been killed. On the basis of previous incidents at diplomatic premises earlier in the demonstrations, there was a concern that there might be further incidents against diplomatic premises within London.

5. The MPS recognised the need to have an increased policing operation in place that could immediately deal with the spontaneous demonstrations that were expected following the conclusion of military activity within Sri Lanka. This operation needed sufficient resources to be able to deal instantaneously with the additional demonstrator numbers that might suddenly appear in Parliament Square or at foreign Embassies. As such, the MPS had to significantly increase the numbers of officers available to police the demonstrators from 7am on 13 May 2009. This date was chosen because of open source intelligence and Foreign and Commonwealth advice about activity in Sri Lanka. The resources were increased to the following:

• Daily Resource Demand: 41 PSUs (1:3:21) 41 Insp 129 PS 909 PC
• E/T
  18 PSUs 18 Insp 54 PS 378 PC
  Traffic 2 PS 18 PC
  Dogs 1 PS 6 PC
• L/T
  18 PSUs 18 Insp 54 PS 378 PC
  Traffic 2 PS 18 PC
  Dogs 1 PS 6 PC
• N/D
  5 PSUs 5 Insp 5 PS 105 PCs

6. After formal acknowledgment that the military action on the ground in Sri Lanka had concluded, there was an increase in protest activity, with protesters again occupying the roads outside the Palaces of Westminster. The anticipated numbers of protestors and the level of confrontation did not materialise and a review of resourcing levels conducted. This led to the demand for resources being reduced as of the 21 May 2009 to 24 PSU’s a day, 10 Early Turn, 10 Late Turn and 4 Night Duty. Additional reviews of tactical plans against threat assessments created further reductions. As of the 26 May 2009 to 14 PSUs a day, and from 27 May three PSUs a day. Operation Mirandy formally concluded as of 0700hrs on Tuesday 2 June, with the policing operation being return to Westminster OCU to manage as normal business.

7. Officers spent eight hours on ground assigned, and incurred a minimum of a 12 hour working day. There were also the costs of the Command Teams, Forward Intelligence Teams, Evidence Gathering Teams, Charge Centre staff (83 people in total), catering staff and catering costs, three carriers and associated costs for each PSU, SOR staff and many miscellaneous roles. The total estimated daily cost was £0.49m for periods of high demand on police resources.

8. As a result of the recent public order events there would appear to have been an impact on BOCU performance. Aid demand on BOCUs is currently up against last year’s figures, 145% for April and 61% for May. In order to reduce the impact of the abstractions, the majority of the Aid sourced from Boroughs during the high intensity period was covered by overtime working to create additionality. This resulted in officers getting warned to work rest days with less than five days notice, which resulted in them being paid at double time.

9. To ensure effective use of resources the majority of the reserves (whilst not actually engaged in policing the demonstrations) were tasked through a coordination process to four of the most challenged boroughs on a daily basis. However it is important to stress that the deployment options on these boroughs was extremely limited as the officers needed to be able to respond to any sudden change in circumstances within the demonstration and needed to be able attend the scene as quickly as possible to ensure that the demonstration remained under control.

Implications for borough policing and crime reduction

10. The level of Aid required necessitated the cancellation of the Operation Blunt 2 Taskforce together with the central command and control of London-wide incidents of serious youth violence/gang violence, between 13 May and 27 May 2009.

11. TSG asset previously allocated through Corporate Tasking to boroughs to undertake operations against violence and burglary was, with effect from 6 April 2009, redeployed to protest policing. These assets were previously deployed on a fortnightly basis against violent and acquisitive crime priorities on the most challenged boroughs against an assessment of risk and performance. The high level of demand meant an additional 616 officers per day were being provided from boroughs at times. This had an immediate and adverse impact on borough performance against violent and volume crime such as burglary and on the management of risk in relation to youth violence. There have been increases of 28.9% in most serious violence and 7.3% in burglary since 1 April 2009.

Conclusion

1. The issue of Tamil protests cannot be said to have run its course, although the protest within Parliament Square is in decline at this time, there will be further demonstrations and marches within the Capital, highlighting Tamil Issues for the foreseeable future.

2. This report seeks to secure £6.1m from the reserve MPA Funds which covers the additional costs to policing the Tamil Protests following an agreement between the Deputy Commissioner and the MPA to increase the policing operation following an assessed increase in risk from 13 May 2009 for the following 10 days.

C Legal implications

1. The Commissioner has a duty to balance the rights and safety of those
wishing to demonstrate, with the rights and safety of other members of the community going about their lawful business. He must also keep the peace. He has a broad discretion as to where he devotes his resources, subject to judicial review if he exercises his discretion unlawfully, inconsistently or in a manner regarded as legally perverse. The current enhanced scrutiny of policing of public order gives rise to an enhanced litigation risk if sufficient resources are not applied to the task.

C. Race and equality impact

1. Demonstrations were carried out, as they continue to be, primarily by Tamil Communities who initially demonstrated about the action of the Sri Lankan Government, which they believed led to the death and injury of innocent Sri Lankan citizens. The current focus is to raise the humanitarian plight of the Tamil refugees being held in camps within Sri Lanka and the fact that the Sri Lanka Government will not allow foreign aid into to these establishments.

2. Tamil communities across London supported the demonstration as was evidenced by shops being closed, displaying signs and explaining the way to demonstrate with regard to Sri Lankan citizens treatment.

3. The MPS were required to manage this legitimate concern; it is the policing role to facilitate their demonstrations but balanced with the need to ensure the process of Government is not prevented.

4. The MPS impartiality on this matter will impact on how minority communities perceive us acting fairly and will therefore tie into confidence they have in police to deal with their issues, on the other hand the deployment of such large resources over an extended period could impact on our ability to deliver mainstream and balanced policing in other areas. It has already reduced our ability to respond to serious youth violence with reduction in taskable assets.

5. In order to fully monitor and manage these various factors. CT-SET were tasked to analyse both open source and organisational intelligence to ascertain community tensions and provide Territorial Policing with options on how these could be managed. In addition, these impacted on our own staff, as officers were required to work long duties and as the demonstration continued over an extended period the impact on leave and time off.

D. Financial implications

1. The total cost of policing the Tamil Protest and associated events (Operation Mirandy) between 6 April and 1 June 2009 is currently estimated at £10.5m. This includes £4.4m of opportunity costs, i.e. officers assigned to these duties who could otherwise have been assigned to other policing duties or operations and £6.1m in additional direct costs in respect of overtime (£5.7m) and non-pay costs (£0.4 m). Work is continuing with TP to collect information on actual costs incurred in BOCUs.

2. The bulk of the overtime estimate relates to the period from 13 May, when there was a reassessment of the asset required to manage the protest.

3. Whilst direct costs are being met from the public order budget, the extent of the additional costs is such that they cannot be contained within the approved MPS budget. It is not possible at this stage of the year to identify other areas of underspend of a level to meet the estimated additional costs associated with this operation particularly given other pressures being contained within the approved MPS budget. The overall financial position will be reported to the Authority in the regular financial monitoring reports at which time consideration can be given to the application of any emerging underspends to meet these costs.

4. However, given these unusual circumstances the Service is requesting the use of general reserves, up to £6.1 m, to meet the additional direct costs of policing this protest subject to consideration of the application of general underspends identified as part of the regular financial monitoring process.

E. Background papers

• Budget Submission 2009-10

F. Contact details

Report author: David Hartshorn - Superintendent Operations CO11, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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