Metropolitan Police Service response to Stockwell

Report: 9
Date: 5 November 2009
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report highlights how the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is responding to the findings of the latest Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) review of the MPS response to Stockwell (published June 09), and outlines how the MPS is going to action the issues raised in that report.

The report seeks to reassure members that:

• The new ‘non-departmental’ approach mentioned in paragraph 1.2.7 of the HMIC report is working effectively in practice and that there are mechanisms in place to ensure effective resolution should problems arise, and that
• An effective governance structure and performance management framework is in place to support this

It also:

• Provides a detailed action plan including how responsibility has been allocated, the resources required to deliver it (and how these are being provided), key milestones and deliverables and progress being made to date
• Responds to the concerns of the Stockwell Scrutiny Panel raised within the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) report presented at SOP in July 2009
• Provides members with a summary of progress being made against the recommendations in the MPA Stockwell Scrutiny report (published May 2008)

A. Recommendation

That the Authority should actively monitor and scrutinise progress made by the MPS in achieving the deliverables in the agreed timescales.  

B. Supporting information

Concerns from HMIC inspection report (May 2009)

1. The third HMIC report of the MPS response to Stockwell focuses on command & control and the closely related issue of ‘inter-operability’ (i.e. how different units and personnel work together operationally) in Counter-Terrorism operations.

2. Whilst the report concluded that the MPS has continued to make progress, and that ‘highly significant achievements’ have been seen, it also concluded that the MPS could have worked more swiftly and achieved more. It identified a number of initiatives that were incomplete, but which had defined activities and timescales to bring them to fruition. These initiatives included the introduction of a common command ‘model’ for planned firearms operations, the formation of a smaller team, or ‘cadre’, of firearms commanders, and the formation of a new cadre of ACPO officers to deal with high-risk Counter-Terrorism operations.

3. Management Board approved the delivery plans for these initiatives in August 2009. Both the common command ‘model’ for planned firearms operations and the firearms command cadre will become operationally effective on 1 November 2009. This coincides with the publication of new Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Guidance on the Management, Command & Deployment of Armed Officers [hereafter referred to as ‘the new ACPO Firearms Manual’].

4. The MPS common command ‘model’ requires that both a Gold and Silver Commander be appointed in all planned operations where firearms are deployed. It also outlines that in more complex operations, where the firearms element is but one part of a much wider operation, the strategic and tactical firearms command functions may be separated from the wider Gold and Silver Command functions. The model additionally requires that the tactical firearms command role is not undertaken by the Senior Investigating Officer, or any person significantly involved in the investigation of the offences for which that firearms operation is being conducted.

5. Specifically in relation to the firearms command cadre, firearms commanders will be aligned to planned firearms operations based upon their level of training and experience of managing that type of operation, which will be assessed against a 4-tier grading system. In operations graded at levels 3 & 4 (those less complex and carrying less risk), the firearms commander will be supplied from a full-time cadre of 8 Strategic (Superintendent-level) and 8 Tactical (Inspector-level) Commanders. At least initially, strategic and tactical firearms commanders for operations graded at levels 1 & 2 (those more complex and carrying more risk) will be supplied from a cadre of accredited officers who perform the function as part of their overall roles. This arrangement is necessary to allow time for the best way for firearms command of crimes in action and incidents involving threats to life to be identified through a structured review. This review will be concluded by end February 2010 to inform a further report to Management Board by 26 March 2010.

6. 10 ACPO-rank officers have now been selected to command high-risk Counter-Terrorism operations. 6 of those selected are already accredited, having undertaken enhanced training and exercising. The remaining 4 will be accredited by 1 January 2010, when the cadre will be formally implemented.

7. The HMIC report identified a number of initiatives requiring additional focus to define key activities and milestones to bring them to fruition (detailed at paras. 13 – 19 of the HMIC report) including:

8. The Surveillance Command - This was formed on 6 April 2009 to provide consistency of training, procedure and professional practice, exposure and learning, and to create a platform for increased inter-operability with other departments and national units. It is currently the subject of a post-implementation review. Since September 2008, there has been a structured rotation of teams between CT and Crime operations to familiarise personnel in both types of operation. This practice will continue.

9. The new CT control room - This facility has been in full operational use since 5 August 2009.

10. The operational delivery of a new secure photo-imagery system for transmitting images of suspects and other data - A new photo-imagery transmission system has been identified offering an enhanced level of security and additional functionality to that of the current system. Funding for capital costs has been secured and the Extreme Threat Programme Board gave final approval to move to implementation on 9 October 2009. It is envisaged that full operational usage will be achieved at least by end March 2010.

11. Clarity on the roles and responsibilities of control room staff - Progress towards maximising the inter-operability of the MPS covert (CT & Crime) and overt (Special Operations and Pan-London) control rooms will be tested in exercise on 2 December 2009. Areas requiring additional focus will be identified from this exercise with a view to ensuring delivery by end March 2010. To achieve compliance with guidance recently published by ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM), work is being undertaken by the ACPO (TAM) CT Interoperability Project Team (in conjunction with the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and with oversight of the National Co-ordinator - PREPARE) to create a national cadre for CT operations rooms through formalised training and accreditation. The first module of this two-module training package has already been piloted in the North-East and London Counter-Terrorist Units (CTUs). The final pilot will take place during November where-after the module will be reviewed, refined and rolled out to all CTUs and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) nationwide. Module 2 is under development.

12. On 29th September 2009, at the conclusion of a two day National workshop including an extreme threat exercise, a de-brief was held which was attended by the Commissioner, the ACPO President, Chief Constables from the lead CTU forces and twelve ACPO members representing the ACPO regions. Agreements in principle (subject to ratification at ACPO Cabinet and Chief Constables’ Council) were reached on:

• a Command and Control protocol designed by the ACPO (TAM) Interoperability Project Team, and
• that, as a starting point, audio recording should be activated in CT Police Operations Rooms in a manner that would satisfy the recommendation of the IPCC when Police take action to deal with a suicide threat.

13. At the end of October 2009, an Interoperability Project Board will convene. Membership includes the Extreme Threats Review Group, ACPO Stockwell Coordination Group, and the ACPO (TAM) CT Interoperability Project Team. The aim of this Board is to ensure that all decisions on the five strands of interoperability are made in a consistent manner.

14. The debrief of the events of July 2005 - This review, commissioned by Commander SO15 (CTC), was not intended to be a re-examination of the events of 21 July 2005, which have already been subject to intense scrutiny through judicial processes, rather to ensure that learning is captured from the wider events of July/August 2005. The review, which was complete by end July 2009, makes a number of recommendations, some of which have been agreed for implementation as part of the SO15 Command action plan, by Commander Sawyer. There are, however, no new major work streams arising outside of those already being addressed through the Extreme Threat Programme (explained at paragraph 15, below).

15. A structured approach to organisational learning: Overall responsibility for Organisational Learning (OL) lies with the Deputy Commissioner and a corporate OL model for implementation by all Business Groups has been developed. Initial compliance testing was carried out in February 2009. An update report was presented to SOP in June 2009 outlining how OL was being embedded into the MPS Performance Management Framework; a review of progress will be conducted in due course. A process to specifically capture, share and embed learning from crimes in actions and incidents involving threats to life (including CT operations) is under development, led by Commander Sawyer, and will be implemented by end March 2010.

16. Standard terms (a glossary) for use in operations involving firearms and surveillance: The MPS has worked jointly with the National Surveillance User Group (NSUG) to develop, through national consultation, a glossary and dictionary of common terminology for use in surveillance and firearms operations. It is expected that the document will be ratified by the NSUG in mid-November 2009 and taken to ACPO Cabinet for final agreement in January 2010. Following ‘sign-off’ by the NSUG, the MPS will begin to embed the glossary through training and exercising, with a view to achieving full operational usage by the time of its formal publication in the new ACPO Surveillance Manual, anticipated for delivery by end March 2010.

Effectiveness of the non-departmental approach, governance structure and performance management framework

17. Since July 2008 Commander Savill has drawn together a work programme under the Extreme Threats Group (ETG) to capture all recommendations from Stockwell made by the HMIC, the IPCC, the MPA and the Coroner for the Inquest into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes. The work programme encompasses 13 key projects and is underpinned by approximately 250 separate activities. Commander Savill chairs monthly meetings with the cross-Business Group Project Leads to monitor their progress against defined deliverables. A full-time dedicated Programme Support Office coordinates the different areas of work and has day-to-day oversight of progress.

18. As Deputy Senior Responsible Officer (SRO), working to the Deputy Commissioner, AC Yates chairs monthly meetings with senior-level lead users and representatives from relevant support service departments. At these meetings the strategic direction of projects is set and reviewed, and areas of conflict or difficulty are discussed and resolved.

19. AC Yates and Commander Savill report to the Deputy Commissioner on progress. Where appropriate, MPS Management Board is asked to take a corporate decision as to the strategic objectives of a project or how those objectives should be achieved.

20. This system of governance is proving effective in ensuring that progress is sustained, and that opportunities to meet the undertaking given by the Commissioner to Chief HMI Denis O’Connor upon receipt of their inspection report in May 2009 (to complete all Stockwell related work by end March 2010) are being maximised.

Action plan, areas of responsibility, milestones and deliverables

21. The ETG Programme Support Office maintains a programme-monitoring chart detailing all of the project plans and outlining which individual is responsible for delivery of each activity within each project and by when. It also outlines when each activity is actually delivered and is underpinned by a log of updates provided by each Project Lead to create an audit trail. A copy of this chart has been provided to Stockwell Scrutiny Panel Members and they have been briefed on its contents; feedback has been positive.

Concerns raised by MPA Stockwell Scrutiny Panel in their report to SOP July 2009

22. The MPA report to SOP on 9 July 2009 raised a number of concerns including:

• That the slow progress in some areas is attributable to the MPS failing to set a clear direction of travel and making it happen
• That there is a continuing lack of clarity about the MPS’ willingness to drive through some of the changes and recommendations highlighted by the Coroner, IPCC and Health & Safety trial in addition to the MPA Panel
• The extent to which the activity examined by HMIC lacks clear timelines for delivery
• That there has been lots of activity by individual departments but with no guarantee that the initiatives will be operationalised
• That the Programme Board is not chaired personally by the Deputy Commissioner
• That there should be continuity with all personnel involved in implementation in order to ensure that there is full ownership of the action plan and that progress is not further hampered because of changes in key posts until the plan has been implemented in its entirety
• That there should be regular Management Board discussions of progress so that all business groups are involved in the development of corporate models of delivery

23. It is hoped that the information outlined at paragraphs 17 – 21 (above) provides reassurance as to the commitment of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and wider MPS to drive through the necessary changes. The MPS concurs with the observation relating to the need for continuity with all personnel involved in implementation. It is with this in mind that AC Yates retained responsibility for the work programme as Deputy SRO following his change in responsibilities from AC SCD to ACSO. There are also a number of examples where, within specific projects, individual members of staff have maintained delivery responsibilities despite their transfer to other departments.

24. As outlined in paragraph 19 (above) AC Yates reports to the Deputy Commissioner between the monthly Programme Board meetings and all critical decisions have been, and will continue to be, tabled on formal Management Board papers.

25. The MPA report to SOP also outlined concerns in relation to a number of specific work areas including:

26. The absence of an Organisational Learning model and the non-mandatory participation of operational commanders in the debriefings – an update in this area is provided at paragraph 15 (above). The work underway in relation to crimes in action and incidents involving threats to life includes a review of debriefing processes.

27. The extent of the Specialist Crime Directorate’s engagement with the firearms command cadre proposals – an update in this area is provided at paragraph 5 (above). Professional differences that exist within the MPS in this area are based upon a concern to ensure that risk is reduced and not increased by a ‘one size fits all’ approach. The cadre implementation plan, approved by Management Board in August 2009, is designed to ensure that the most appropriate operating model is identified. The outcome of the review, which will be concluded by end January 2010 cannot be pre-empted, however, whatever decision is taken regarding the final structure and composition of the cadre, it will fully meet the requirements of the new ACPO firearms manual in respect of separation of command roles where there is potential for conflict and in ensuring that firearms commanders are both occupationally (i.e. trained) and operationally (i.e. experienced) competent to deliver the roles they are asked to perform.

28. That the rotation of crime and CT surveillance teams may not continue – an update in this area is provided at paragraph 8 (above).

29. That the Deputy Commissioner should provide a clear statement in the key roles of command and how to ensure officers feel empowered to take appropriate action based on the circumstances they are dealing with on the ground – the new ACPO Firearms Manual provides clarity on the lines of responsibility for authorising/delivering a fatal shot where it is necessary to protect life. It also outlines an AFO’s duty to comply with an instruction given by a firearms commander to use force or firearms, unless that order is manifestly unlawful or beyond the tactical capability of the officers concerned. It encourages, where circumstances allow, the advance agreement of command protocols setting out the situations in which officers are empowered to take decisive action, including opening fire without recourse to a commander. Awareness training in relation to these principles, and in relation to the implementation of a common command model for firearms operations (as outlined at paragraph 4 above), is in the process of being delivered to relevant staff and they are being embedded into all relevant training courses.

30. That all the various MPS control rooms are now fit for purpose – as outlined at paragraph 9 (above), the new CT control room is now in full operational usage. It is hoped that recent visits by Members to see the room in operation have provided reassurance by demonstrating the significantly improved facilities and processes since July 2005. The Stockwell work programme encompasses a project to ensure that these rooms are used in all appropriate operations, and that, in the event a covert operation becomes overt or vice versa, the different operating environments are able to work together efficiently to support command and control.

31. In relation to Airwave capacity (particularly in the context of the Olympics), that the MPA Olympics sub-committee should receive a detailed report on the Airwave system that highlights all known concerns and seeks assurance that these concerns are being addressed and that any budgetary requirement will be made available – following receipt of the MPA report, the MPS prepared and submitted a report, as requested, to the MPA Olympic sub-committee. The London statement of requirement for the Olympics was approved by the Airwave Olympic Business Design Authority on 30 June 2009. The national Business Case, prepared by the MPS, was approved by MPS Management Board on 30 June 2009 and by Home Office Group Investment Board on 1 October 2009.

32. That Airwave ‘user error’ by officers could have serious consequences for officer and public safety and need to be rectified immediately - The incidence of user error during an exercise highlighted the complexity of the new and evolving covert airwave system. To be more effective in our management of this very sophisticated system, the MPS has already introduced the role of Covert Airwave Tactical Advisor to its surveillance operations; the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) have taken responsibility for formal development of this role on a national basis. Formal training for MPS staff involved in the administration of the covert airwave system will be delivered during November 2009. This will be followed by the design and delivery of enhanced training to end ‘users’.

33. That the MPS practice of officers writing up their notes together after an incident could leave officers open to criticism and should stop – the MPS is compliant with ACPO guidance in relation to post-shooting conferring. These guidelines were issued in October 2008 and have been successfully applied at a number of incidents where police officers have discharged their firearms since. Internal instructions to manage the separation of firearms officers writing notes concerning the use of force, drawn up in consultation with the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and MPS Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS), have worked well. On 8 September 2009 Management Board approved the extension of post-incident management procedures to officers involved in other (non-shooting) death & serious injury cases. A police notice on this issue is anticipated for publication during October 2009; Post-Incident Management awareness training for Chief Inspectors is already underway. Additionally, a police notice was published in August 2009 outlining that, in general, officers should complete their notes independently, but may confer where it is considered necessary, so long as they record the time and date conferring took place, the issues discussed and with whom, and the reasons for such discussion. It outlines, however, that officers must not confer on their own ‘state of mind’ at the time that force was used. This is applicable to all incidents, including those that do not result in death or serious injury.

Summary of progress against the 34 Stockwell Scrutiny recommendations

34. On 21 August 2009 a written summary of progress against the 34 Stockwell Scrutiny Report recommendations was provided to Panel Members. A copy of this summary is attached at Appendix 1.

35. Progress was subsequently discussed at a final meeting with Panel Members on 8 September 2009 as a result of which it was agreed that the MPS would provide further information or reassurance, through SOP, in relation to the following issues:

36. Rec. 1 (maximising opportunities for learning through post-incident debriefs) – that a report outlining the types of incidents where full operational debriefs would be conducted and how many of these had been conducted in the first year should be provided. This piece of work will be initiated and an update will be provided in the next Stockwell progress report to SOP.

37. Rec. 2 (delivery of the revised ACPO Firearms Manual) – that a summary of the key changes should be provided. The new ACPO Firearms Manual was published in July 2009 and becomes effective on 1 November 2009. It is intended to be available as a public document and provides clarity and guidance in relation to a number of issues, incorporating lessons learned and good practice, including:

• The legal position in relation to self-defence and the accountability of AFOs and commanders
• Armed support to covert operations (now grouped it into three defined operational response types - Armed Surveillance, Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance and Operations to Counter Threats to Life)
• The accreditation of firearms commanders
• Command structure & responsibilities (including the operational strategy, command location, command protocols, transfer of command, and separation of the tactical firearms command function from those significantly involved in the associated investigation)
• The use of the conflict management model
• Briefing & Debriefing
• Community Impact Assessments
• Post-incident note-writing - based upon the interim ACPO Guidance issued in October 2008

38. Rec. 20 (audio and video-recording post-incident note-writing) – that the MPA should be included in discussions following receipt of the findings from the research being undertaken by Portsmouth University, and before any final decisions are made.

39. Rec. 29 (IPCC, MPS and ACPO agreement in the development of a protocol for use of the Salmon process) – that the views of the IPCC and ACPO on the position of the MPS taken with legal advice (that the Salmon process is not relevant to police misconduct proceedings and should not be applied) should be sought and any issues resolved: Consultation has taken place and it is commonly agreed that there can be no formal protocol on this subject. It is for the IPCC to decide, on a case-by-case basis, what they should and should not publish and how the publication process should be conducted. Any protocol agreement between the IPCC and police forces relating to the non-sharing of report extracts with named persons in advance of publication would be unenforceable either through law or misconduct procedures.

40. It was also agreed at the 8 September meeting that the MPA would initiate the following actions:

41. Rec. 12 (protocols for access to TfL CCTV) – an update from the Mayor’s office as to what, if any, intervention the Mayor has had in relation to this issue.

42. Rec. 15 (development and implementation of a community engagement strategy to better inform Londoner’s about the MPS policing model) – commission a report to the MPA on this issue, specifically in relation to the MPS firearms response.

43. At the conclusion of the 8 September meeting, the work areas relating to interoperability between MPS control rooms, asset tracking and the firearms command cadre were agreed as those presenting the greatest challenges for the MPS over the coming months. The MPS welcomes the proposal by Panel Members to invite HMIC back to conduct a further review of MPS progress towards the end of March 2010.

C. Race and equality impact

There are no race and equality impact issues directly relevant to this report. There may be issues relevant to specific projects as they near the stage of doctrine formulation. Issues will be identified and managed by the relevant Project Leads with oversight of the Programme Board as necessary.

D. Financial implications

The Extreme Threat Programme Office is funded until end March 2010. Most projects within the work programme are managed by a part-time Project Team; a small number have staff seconded to a full-time Project Team, however these staff continue to be funded by their respective business groups. Financial implications will arise in relation to specific projects as they move to procurement or implementation stage. These will be identified and managed by the relevant Project Leads with oversight of the Programme Board as necessary and subject to normal approval processes.

E. Legal implications

None given.

F. Background papers

• Appendix 1: MPA Stockwell Scrutiny Recommendations Update - 18 August 2009

• HMIC Report- ‘Stockwell - MPS Progress January 2008 to April 2009’

• MPS report to SOP July 2009

• MPA Stockwell Scrutiny Panel report to SOP July 2009

G. Contact details

Report author: Detective Superintendent Reg Hooke, SCD5

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Send an e-mail linking to this page

Feedback