“Determining police pay in the police service" a review by Sir Clive Booth 

01/08
4 January 2008
MPA briefing paper

Author: Alan Johnson, MPA

This briefing paper has been prepared to inform members and staff. It is not a committee report and no decisions are required.

Background

1. The first report by Sir Clive Booth described and discussed the systems for pay determination in the public sector. Two main approaches were identified, namely collective bargaining covering 2.5 million employees and pay review bodies covering about two million employees.

2. Pay related expenditure accounts for 80% of the total revenue expenditure on UK policing of £14.5billion. Sir Clive argued that the determination of police pay is therefore a very important matter, not only for people in the police service themselves, but also for those responsible for the service and for the taxpayer.

3. The main bodies concerned in police pay and related matters are the Police Negotiating Board (PNB) and Police Advisory Boards (PABs). The Home Secretary is empowered to give directions to the PNB and is also represented on the Official Side. Recommendations of the PNB (and the Police Arbitration Tribunal) are subject to the approval of the Home Secretary. The Police Staff Council (PSC) system covers the majority of police staff, but not the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

Sir Clive’s evidence

4. Sir Clive suggested the ways in which the police service needs to modernise have been the subject of much discussion and some action. The pay machinery can take a relatively active or a relatively passive role in facilitating modernisation.

5. In other areas of employment outside the police service, Sir Clive felt it is often on the employee side that there are difficulties in bringing the views of the different staff representatives together. In the police service, however, it was the “official side” that appeared to have experienced more difficulty. This seemed to be because of the entirely legitimate differences in perspective of the three parties to the tripartite relationship. This was because the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) were strongly focused on delivering professional policing on the ground, its individual members facing widely differing local challenges.

6. The members of the Association of Police Authorities (APA) saw themselves accountable to their communities for the delivery of good policing, as well as wanting to be good employers. The Home Office represented the wider public interest and, as part of the Government, was responsible for ensuring that Government pay policy was observed. It also paid most of the bill for the police service.

7. Until 2005-06, the PNB machinery provided a long period of good industrial relations, but the situation deteriorated in PNB in 2006 and 2007 because the indexation of police pay was effectively removed as an automatic right. At the heart of the deterioration lay the difficulty of reconciling the historical approach of inflexible indexation with the need for modernisation, affordable settlements and consistency with Government pay policy. For the staff side, particularly the Police Federation, this coincided with an increase in Government intervention.

8. Sir Clive argued that the evidence to the Review indicated that because of pay indexation, there had been little significant discussion of these aspects. While both sides referred to the importance of recruitment, retention, motivation and morale, the emphasis of the staff side was on primarily on motivation and morale.

9. Sir Clive had gathered evidence from a wide range of sources, including a consultation amongst those most closely involved. Drawing on this work, and particularly the replies to the consultation, nine criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the pay machinery were proposed. It should:

1. Incorporate safeguards against exploitation because police officers are unable to strike.
2. Achieve good levels of recruitment, retention, motivation and morale in a high calibre workforce.
3. Maintain good industrial relations.
4. Enable developments that support modernisation and the effective use of the whole work force.
5. Deliver a medium to long-term strategy appropriate to a modern, dynamic, effective and efficient police service.
6. Adopt an inclusive approach that allows all interested parties to be able to contribute effectively to the pay determination process.
7. Achieve timely, affordable and, as far as possible, mutually acceptable outcomes within the context of the Government’s public sector pay policy.
8. Provide the right balance between a national framework and local flexibility.
9. Accommodate the devolved UK system of government.

10. In the special circumstances of the police service, i.e. to take account of police officers' inability to strike, could best be assured in three ways:

• demonstrating transparently, with evidence, that police officers are being treated fairly in terms of total reward against the background of the wider labour market;
• using the benchmarks of recruitment, retention, motivation and morale to show that fair pay is being achieved;
• involving independent people in the system, to ensure fair treatment.

11. He suggested the Armed Forces provide an example of safeguarding working successfully in the practice over a long period. This was because the Armed Forces’ personnel had no recognised union representation and for many years their pay has been set by a system which incorporated pay comparability and special consideration of the unusual, difficult and dangerous conditions of the military service. This had worked well.

Sir Clive’s findings

12. In the police service, pay was determined separately for police officers and police staff. Having considered the evidence, Sir Clive recommended that the pay of police officers and police staff should continue to be determined by separate mechanisms. However, unified machinery may become more attractive as workforce reform gathered pace.

13. For police officer pay, two options were considered: an improved system of collective bargaining based on the existing system, and a pay review body. These were assessed against the nine criteria and he felt it was clear from the assessment that the pay review body option would be the more effective option. Sir Clive therefore recommended that a pay review body for police officers should be created.

14. The need for new pay machinery for police officers was underlined by the fact that the PNB had made no progress in pursuing two recommendations made in his first report. These concerned (a) paying attention to recruitment and retention, motivation and morale and other relevant factors and (b) agreeing a timetable with key milestones for discussions on new approaches to wider reward and recognition.

15. For the pay of police staff, two options were also considered: the existing system of collective bargaining, and a pay review body for police staff. These were assessed against the nine criteria. Although the judgement was finely balanced, the existing collective bargaining system was relatively effective and had scope for further development. Sir Clive therefore recommended that the existing PSC machinery should be retained for police staff for the time being.

16. For the pay of ACPO ranks, three options were considered: an improved system of collective bargaining based on the existing machinery, the pay review body for police officers proposed above, and transfer of responsibility to the Senior Salaries Review Body. Sir Clive recommended that that the proposed pay review body for police officers cover chief officers, but if that is not created, chief officers should become one of the groups covered by the Senior Salaries Review Body.

17. A number of factors influences his recommendation for pay review body for police officers, all of which he felt were important for an effective and efficient police service in the future.

18. First, the review body mechanism provided an “arm’s length” way of dealing with politically sensitive public sector groups. Pay review bodies were able to accommodate the “special” status of groups with no legal right to strike, such as the Armed Forces, or of groups such as the Judiciary and Senior Civil Servants, which traditionally accepted self imposed restraints on industrial action.

19. Second, the history of the pay review body system as a whole showed that it was associated with improved industrial relations in areas where previously they were poor. In the 36 years the pay review bodies have existed, none of the staff covered by the pay review system had resorted to significant industrial action over pay as a direct response to pay review body recommendations. Government decisions to stage review body recommendations had cause disquiet, but staging could equally be imposed on PNB and Police Arbitration Tribunal recommendations.

20. Third, a review body injected an independent contribution which could be seen as similar to arbitration, but this independent view was being offered continuously, not just when there was a breakdown, as was the case with arbitration. The review bodies’ independence was reinforced by their objective, strongly evidence based approach and use of independent research and visits to the operational front line.

21. An important feature of the independent contribution was the ability to deliver strong, sometimes unwelcome, messages to any of the parties, not least the Government.

22. Fourth, the existing pay negotiations tended to be strongly focused on the current annual pay round. This made it difficult for those involved to look ahead to the strategy for pay and conditions over a three to five year period. A review body could facilitate the collaboration of the parties in developing a strategy and can set its own recommendations within a longer-term framework. The ability of the pay machinery to take the long view and set in train work that will follow a multi year strategy, monitoring progress year by year, was very important for the police service.

23. Lastly, a review body could contribute to the social partnership between employers and employees. Whole not in the “driving seat” for reform, a review body could be helpful in generating change at a strategic level, keeping matters on the agenda and offering fresh perspectives.

24. Some key features of a pay review body for police officers were seen as follows:

• It should operate independently.
• It should be established as a statutory body so that its role and purpose are enshrined in law. This will underline its duty to provide safeguards and take account of the particular circumstances of police officers including their inability to strike.
• It should cover all Federated Ranks, Superintending Ranks and (subject to the recommendation below) Chief Officer Ranks.
• The Review Body should allow representations from all interested parties to be made jointly, collectively and individually as appropriate.
• It should be able to take abroad view of progress with police workforce developments and resulting pay reform.
• It should be able to commission independent research.
• The pay review body should have UK wide coverage with the flexibility to recommend different approached in constituent areas of the UK should the nature of policing or the requirements of the devolution demand it.

25. In recommending the move to a pay review body he considered carefully what other machinery might be require. Consultation on the terms of reference would help to establish its scope. This in turn would influence the requirement for and the nature of other machinery. There would still be a need for negotiating and advisory forum to capture those areas of the employment package not covered by the pay review body.

26. In his view, this should be a single body operating under a wide-ranging remit, as with the current PABEW. Separate continuing arrangement for Scotland and Northern Ireland would be required. No specific evidence was presented on requirements for other machinery except positive comments on the effectiveness of PAB arrangements. As with the pay review body, he suggested arrangements for any other machinery should be the subject of Government consultation with relevant parties.

Government response

27. The Government welcomed Sir Clive Booth’s report and accepted that a pay review body for police officers, including chief officers, should be created. It also agreed the pay of police officers and police staff should continue to be determined separately and that the Police Staff Council should be retained.

28. The Government noted that in due course unified officer and staff pay machinery may be considered, in particular as police workforce developments are progressed, but do not think that this is a practical proposition for the time being.

29. The Government agreed to consult, in the near future, on proposals for implementing the necessary changes to the police pay machinery.

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