Beijing Olympic torch relay 6 April 2008

05/08
21 April 2008
MPA briefing paper

Author: Commander Broadhurst, Public Order Branch, MPS

This briefing paper has been prepared to inform members and staff. It is not a committee report and no decisions are required.

Summary

At the March meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority the Commissioner agreed to provide members with the cost of policing the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay event. This briefing note provides the cost, but additionally covers other subject areas that may be of interest to members.

Background

1. The Beijing Olympic Torch arrived in London in the evening of 5 April 2008 and the Torch relay took place across a 31-mile route, travelling through ten London Boroughs on Sunday 6 April.

2. The MPS clearly stated in advance of this event that we would facilitate lawful protest, which we achieved. On occasions people attempted to breach the safety, security and safe passage of the Torchbearer and convoy, the Metropolitan Police took appropriate and proportionate action.

3. There were clear lines for decision-making, which were used during the course of the event. Fast time decisions were made by our officers on the ground regarding immediate threats to the safety and security of the Torchbearer. As the event owners BOCOG, (Beijing Organising Committee Olympic Games) and the GLA made decisions about the route and mode of transport used.

Strategy

4. Working in partnership with the event organisers, Greater London Authority, Beijing Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG), the Chinese Authorities and other partners and agencies, the Metropolitan Police set out the following strategy, which was successfully achieved:

• Provide a safe environment for participants, the public and our staff;
• Ensure the security of the Olympic Torch;
• Facilitate the timely progression of the Torch around the route;
• Minimise the opportunity to commit crime and take all reasonable steps to bring offenders to justice if crime is committed;
• Facilitate lawful protest;
• Prevent public disorder and maintain the peace;
• Endeavour to minimise disruption to the life of the local community, residents and business;
• Endeavour to minimise disruption to vehicular traffic;
• Recognise the current threat level from terrorism to London and the UK and apply appropriate measures commensurate to that threat.

Responsibilities

5. The Metropolitan Police worked with the GLA, BOCOG, LOCOG, and other partners.

• The GLA were responsible for the overall event both in terms of what took place and the management of those who attended to watch the event.
• The GLA and the respective ten London Borough Local Authorities had responsibility for the staging of various events along the route and providing crowd management of those that participated or watched these events.
• The policing operation included the Metropolitan, British Transport and City of London police forces.
• The MPS provided advice and took responsibility for key elements of the operation; in particular the security of the convoy, the torchbearer and the flame and the progress of the torch along the route providing a safe environment for the participants and spectators.
• As the event owners BOCOG and the GLA made decisions about the route (with MPS assistance), the different modes of transport used and the community events along the route

Torch Attendants

6. The Flame Security Team is part of the BOCOG package, which comes with the Torch. They were subjected to normal passport and immigration procedures on arrival and had no executive powers while they were here and were not armed. Though like all of us, under common law they are entitled to protect themselves and their property if threatened.

7. The identification of flame attendants is in the legal agreement between the GLA and BOCOG in the form of a contract signed late in 2007. This document states:

• Local law enforcement personnel provide a number of essential services, which assist in ensuring the safety, security and timely movement of the Relay. Community agrees to:
• Provide adequate resources on the day of the Relay to implement the traffic management plan and provide for the safe and uninhibited passage of the Relay convoy, in cooperation with the BOCOG security and safety team, before, during and after the Relay activities.
• Liaise with the BOCOG Relay security and safety team on any known or perceived security threats to the Relay.

8. The MPS briefed the Chinese Embassy staff on what the flame attendants were expected to do and the associated contingencies. This included what to do if the Torch was attacked; in simple terms the role of the attendants was to turn and face the Torch runner to provide a physical barrier with their bodies, and if necessary escort the Torchbearer back to a safe location indicated by a Police Officer. They were instructed to leave dealing with any protestors entirely to police officers and take no action in respect of protestors.

9. Athens and Sidney both conducted major world tours to celebrate their Olympic games and in both instances flame attendants accompanied the Olympic Torch. In legal terms, the IOC requires the host nation to take responsibility for the actual flame. The physical Torch is the property of BOCOG who then gift it to the respective runner after the event has finished.

Policing Plan

10. The planning for this event began over a year ago, and that planning always assumed that the event would be subject to demonstration along the length of its route. Recent incidents seen around the world before and during the Torch's journey in the run up to the 6 April only served to reiterate this belief.

11. MPA Member Richard Sumray was regularly appraised about the event. Minister for Olympics, Tessa Jowell, was also kept informed and the Commissioner personally briefed her on 4 April.

12. The policing plan adhered to the specific security requirements identified in the “BOTR Community Planning Guide” and the contract between BOCOG and the GLA in the document dated 12 October 2007 entitled the “Agreement - Olympic Torch Relay Services.”

13. Throughout the course of the planning, constant changes were made to the route, causing great concern to the GLA and the MPS. Gold, Silver and the CO11 Planning Team were clear in stating that these changes were creating vulnerabilities and each change had to be surveyed by a Security Co-ordinator and sector tactical plans adjusted. As late as six weeks before the event, legs through Downing Street and the Olympic Park were added and two weeks before the event, the leg on the DLR and journey to Paris were altered. The Olympic Park legs were eventually removed from the route resulting in significant changes to the policing of the event. Chief Superintendent Thomas, MPS Public Order Branch, independently reviewed the policing plan on 3 April 2008 and found that it remained fit for purpose.

14. During the planning process and throughout the event the MPS enjoyed a strong working relationship with all the organisations involved, including the GLA, BOCOG and the Chinese Embassy.

Protestor Action

15. The MPS clearly stated in advance of this event that lawful protest would be facilitated but where people attempted to breach the safety, security and safe passage of the torchbearer and convoy, we would take appropriate and proportionate action.

16. As a result of a number of identified ‘protestor threats’ to the torch event, a plan and series of tactics were designed to identify, assess and counter each of these threats. There were eight areas along or close to the route where protest groups including Free Tibet, Burma Campaign UK, Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders and a Darfur Group had indicated that they wished to stage demonstrations.

17. Five organisations including Reporters Without Borders, Free Tibet Campaign, Burma Campaign UK, Tibetan Society of the UK and Amnesty International approached the MPS in order to notify us of their planned demonstrations. A Bronze Demonstration role was added to the Command Team and at least 4,000 demonstrators took part in protest, some of whom leap-frogged the relay.

18. There have been many examples where individuals have shown their support for a particular group using lawful protest, wearing T-shirts and holding flags. The strategy was not to interfere with their rights or stop any peaceful protests, and Anti-Terrorism legislation was not used to stifle protest. This strategy was made clear in briefings to operational officers.

19. Whilst people who wished to show their support for the event contacted the MPS, they do not come under any legislation. However, it was made clear to them that they would have to keep a reasonable distance from any demonstration and not in anyway act to prevent or hinder others rights to lawful demonstration.

Policing Response

20. The Torch travelled a 31-mile route throughout London, and in the course of the day the MPS used in the region of two thousand officers. Commander Broadhurst, Gold, was in overall command; Superintendent Miles was Silver.

21. A team of 14 officers from the MPS, BTP and City of London Police lead by a Chief Inspector were specially trained in advance of the event in how to use cycle and foot tactics to protect the torch. They wore high visibility jackets and cycle helmets because they had planned to cycle the route, but they had to adapt quickly to going on foot due to the frequency of attacks on the Torch.

22. There were 33 TSG Officers in the convoy ready to deploy to deal with incursions. In any event, all Officers employed on Torch security had to be deployed, due to the intensity of the demonstrators and the attempts on the torch, for most of the route from a very early stage.

The Operation

23. The policing plan catered for potential disruption and this was seen from very early on after the Torch left Wembley stadium. This behaviour included some determined individuals making concerted efforts to reach the Torch and the Torchbearer. A fire extinguisher was used in a crowded place, and objects thrown at police officers and the Torchbearers. Based on this, MPS officers had to make an immediate assessment when faced with people attempting to jump into the way of the Torch or making a grab for the Torchbearers. Not knowing the levels of possible violence or determination that they would face, officers had to act swiftly and robustly and a number of arrests were made.

24. There was no increase in planned officer numbers either pre-event or as the day continued. The MPS kept a highly visible presence around the Torch as it was targeted by protestors on many stretches along the length of its journey.

25. The MPS fully understand that people feel passionately about issues and attempted to work with groups to ensure their points could be made lawfully.

26. There were clear lines for decision-making, which were used during the course of the event. Fast time decisions were made by officers on the ground regarding immediate threats to the safety and security of the Torchbearer. As the event owners, BOCOG and the GLA made decisions about the route and mode of transport used. All parties abided by those decisions; it was a team effort.

Arrests

27. 37 arrests were made, broken down as follows:

• 29 x Breach of the Peace
• 1 x Handling Stolen Goods
• 7 x Public Order Act

28. Of these, three have been bailed pending further enquires and the remainder were either cautioned, received a fixed penalty notice, or released with no further action.

Complaints/Expressions of Thanks

29. To date the MPS Directorate of Professional Standards has received 34 complaints relating to the event, of which only 4 are classified as complaints against police under section 12 Police Reform Act 2002.

30. The MPS received 7 letters of thanks for policing the event.

Costs

31. The estimated total cost of the policing operation is £746k which will come from MPS funds as this was a community event rather than a commercial one and are broken down as follows:

• £502k of the estimate is in relation to opportunity costs. These costs cannot be regarded as an additional cost to the MPS; rather, the officers assigned to these duties would otherwise have been assigned to other policing duties or operations.
• £244k is the estimated additional costs of which £109k is overtime, £135k is non-pay costs. Non-pay costs include air support, radio package support, catering, the erection of barriers and road signs for public safety/road closures and the purchasing of specialist equipment.
• The operation involved 1,963 police officer shifts and 99 police staff shifts.

Beijing Paralympic Torch Relay

32. The MPS is aware of a proposal to hold a Beijing Paralympic Torch Relay in London on 31 August. No policing plan has yet been set.

Media reports – 2012 Olympic Security Story

33. Following a report in the media we wish to make it clear that MPS Commissioner Sir Ian Blair has neither recommended nor approved a plan to hand over any part of London's Olympic security to other countries.

34. Approval for foreign police officers to carry firearms in the UK is a ministerial one through the Home Office and at this time no decision has been reached on these matters.

35. As part of the proper planning process to assess the armed capability requirement in 2012 the Commissioner raised the issue last June with the Metropolitan Police Authority and made it clear that the overriding principle was that the Met 'did not want armed foreign police'. He stressed the need for proper scoping to ensure there will be sufficient armed capacity nationally to cater for the number of protected persons who will be in the UK and pointed out that some routinely armed foreign police officers might not even wish to be here unarmed.

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