MPS response to Contest 2

23/09
2 September 2009
MPA briefing paper 23/2009

Author: John Bunn QPM – SO2, MPS

This briefing paper has been prepared to inform members and staff. It is not a committee report and no decisions are required.

1. The purpose of this briefing paper is to update members on the MPS response to the Government’s Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST).

2. On 24 March 2009 CONTEST 2 was launched as a Counter Terrorism strategy working across government departments, including local authorities and police.

3. This paper considers the MPS response to CONTEST 2, and outlines the impact this will have on our delivery of the four strands of our Counter-Terrorism policy (Pursue, Prepare, Prevent and Protect) with an emphasis on Pursue. Response to CONTEST 2 is at a relatively early stage, but the MPS believes it has a robust structure in which to incorporate such changes as CONTEST 2 requires. This process is closely monitored and changes made as appropriate.

4. The current threat from international terrorism is assessed as Substantial, formally defined as “an attack is a strong possibility” and Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Great Britain is assessed as Moderate, defined as “an attack is possible but not likely.” The Irish-related threat level in London has not changed despite murders in Northern Ireland in March, which were followed by a robust response from the Police Service of Northern Ireland. While acknowledging the seriousness of the dissident republican challenge the Independent Monitoring Commission has assessed that the peace process in Northern Ireland is not unravelling. The MPS continually monitors the relevant threat levels.

5. The MPS Counter Terrorism & Domestic Extremism (CT&DE) strategy supported CONTEST 1 and continues to support CONTEST 2. Its delivery is overseen by two strategic boards, both chaired by ACSO.

6. Internally the Counter Terrorism Strategic Delivery Board oversees the MPS structure and resourcing to deliver our strategy. Each strand of CONTEST is represented at ACPO level, supported by other relevant business group members.

7. Externally the London CONTEST Board includes our statutory partners and facilitates effective engagement at a senior level. Through this Board organisations’ strategies can be aligned and partnership activities properly resourced and coordinated.

8. The MPS is alert to the dangers of silo working. To meet this challenge and ensure that delivery of all four strands is coordinated, the two strategic oversight boards and the performance board ensure that there is cohesion between all four strands by monitoring progress regularly.

9. Specialist Operations (SO) acknowledges the importance of strong communications and an effective performance management structure to deliver CONTEST 2 activities. SO continues to build capacity and capability in line with the four strands, this has been underpinned by the creation of a Counter-Terrorism Support Unit (CTSU), and a performance unit.

Performance

10. Given the nature of terrorism, it is recognised that it is difficult to monitor performance in the same way as other types of crime. Work is continuing to develop a comprehensive package of methods of assessing performance in this area. Performance against national targets will be monitored and inspected independently by the relevant bodies e.g. the MPA and HMIC, to ensure the MPS is delivering effective policing.

Protection of Human Rights

11. The MPS is committed to uphold high standards of equality and diversity and protection of human rights in its service delivery. The MPS supports CONTEST 2’s statement that the protection of human rights is a key principle underpinning our counterterrorism work at home and overseas.

12. The most significant challenges encountered are where partner countries have human rights records that are not compatible with UK standards. In these cases judicial and governmental oversight is required before the UK can share evidence for prosecutions overseas or to reduce the risk of potentially tainted evidence being presented in UK courts. This requires careful drafting of International Letters of Request (ILoR) and agreement for mutual legal assistance (MLA) to ensure compliance with acceptable UK standards. Professional working relationships with overseas interlocutors provide opportunities to work together to increase the chances of MLA success. Any such action will always be taken in conjunction with the Crown Prosecution Service in London; guidance is also usually sought from the Home Office.

Pursue

13. To prosecute a wider range of offences, and effectively consider other alternatives to prosecution, revised Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) governance structures are being implemented. Notably, in response to CONTEST 2 the MPS has made the significant move of aligning Prevent and Pursue under the CTC, to ensure coordination and consistency. These will help meet new challenges associated with earlier interdictions.

14. The MPS must place public safety as their first priority. This responsibility creates significant challenges in managing public expectation where intelligence, rather than existing evidence, drives a requirement for operational activity. There will continue to be operations where action must be taken at an early stage, ahead of any known evidential opportunity and therefore with the clear risk that no evidence may be discovered. The impact on public perception in respect of this activity will continue to be monitored and carefully considered.

15. Inter-operability (“seamless operation between units”) is a rapidly developing priority, particularly in the deployment of multiple surveillance and/or firearms units over a prolonged period and against multiple subjects. This strengthens coordination and partnership, and maximises detection and investigation capability and capacity.

16. The CTC ensures forensic and scientific matters are properly addressed. It examines attacks in the UK and where appropriate, overseas. This data helps prevent terrorism, identify individuals/groups intent on committing acts of terrorism, and informs protective work.

17. To improve international coordination and partnership between Pursue stakeholders, the International Liaison Section uses its global Counter Terrorism & Extremism Liaison Officers network and has regional responsibilities covering many countries. This network supports CONTEST 2 by providing assistance and capability to many countries in a range of CT skills and techniques.

Prevent

18. In response to CONTEST 2 the MPS has moved to align Prevent and Pursue under the CTC, to ensure coordination and consistency. In addition the MPS rolled out its Prevent implementation plan and guidance on in March to support boroughs. The plans are consistent with CONTEST 2 and the delivery plans from the CONTEST Board. Prevent work is a developing area of intelligence-led non-prosecution interventions.

19. To improve Intelligence, the MPS is developing Counter Terrorism Local Profiles to assist our understanding of communities and individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists. It will also be a key resource in our joint work with local partners where appropriate.

20. Counter Terrorism grant money has been secured to build capacity and capability around the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer (CTIO) network on boroughs and Prevent Engagement Officers (PEOs) are being recruited and deployed. Three geographically-based chief inspectors and their teams will oversee PEOs to support boroughs.

21. The recruitment of a number of “Channel” coordinators will oversee partnership referrals to help identify individuals considered vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists and will support boroughs that do not have capacity or capability to manage referrals locally.

Protect

22. Following a review of the use of s44 TACT powers around vulnerable sites and sectors, revised tactical practice is to be rolled out across the MPS from July 2009. The review was approved by the MPA, most recently in May 2009, and the MPA strategic drivers have formed the direction of the project.

23. A Security Review Committee continues to coordinate protection intelligence and information, and the SO Protect strand, to develop the tasking and information from other policing partners in London.

24. A protection command around the expert skills of Security Co-ordinators (SecCos), Specialist Search Teams (POLSA) and Counter Terrorist Security Advisors (CTSAs) has been created. This provides the capacity to support the organisation at various different levels, from event planning and coordination to tactical advice.

25. The building of CT capacity and capability for the Olympics is an MPS partnership responsibility within the multi-agency Olympic Security Directorate. This team provides a framework in which all agencies work and is a single point of contact for stakeholders.

Prepare

26. Multi-agency partnership working has been established locally, regionally and nationally. In the MPS a number of strategic partnership boards and committees, chaired by ACPO officers, oversee the delivery of Prepare and are subject to regular reviews. Recently some terms of reference were refreshed to reflect the evolving changes in our Counter Terrorism & Domestic Extremism strategy.

27. Joint exercising with partners continues to build confidence in our counter terrorism capability, including threats from terrorists aspiring to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. ‘Prepare’ is integrated with the other three CONTEST strands as part of London resilience.

Race and equality impact

28. A full Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) has been completed for the Prevent programme and has been submitted on 2nd July 2009 to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit. No specific issues have been identified by the Prevent EIA at this moment but activities are and will be monitored through the Prevent Delivery Unit. A specific EIA is also in place with regard to Section 44 TACT use, and there have been no issues of note.

29. Aside from the above there are no equality/diversity implications arising from this report.

Financial implications

30. There are no additional financial implications arising as a result of this report.

31. The costs of ongoing CT activity in the MPS, and projects listed in this report, are currently covered by the MPS CT Specific Grant and the Dedicated Security Posts (DSP) Grant. National projects such as Inter-operability are being funded across the CT Network by the ACPO (TAM) administered CT Specific Grant. The current tranche of CT specific grant funding is secure until the end of the existing comprehensive spending review period (2010/11).

32. Both the MPS and ACPO (TAM) are currently at the very early stages of developing their joint response to the next CSR spending round over the period 2011/12 to 2013/14. Given the current economic conditions and the security requirements of the Olympic Games is anticipated that this CSR bidding round will be especially challenging for MPS and National Counter-Terrorism funding.

Legal implications

33. There are no direct legal implications arising from this paper.

34. The MPS as a Police Force is a key agency, required to deliver on all aspects of the CONTEST 2 strategy. The police powers of counter-terrorism legislation are contained in the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Regarding terrorism legislation the MPS continues to strive towards striking a balance between providing effective tools to investigate and prevent terrorism while ensuring that civil liberties are not unnecessarily infringed.

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