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Report 10 of the 6 January 2011 meeting of the Communities, Equalities and People Committee, report arising from concerns about the Pilkington case, which explores the MPS’ response to ASB and Safeguarding Adults.

Warning: This is archived material and may be out of date. The Metropolitan Police Authority has been replaced by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC).

See the MOPC website for further information.

Safeguarding Adults and Anti-Social Behaviour (learning from Pilkington and Hardwick)

Report: 10
Date: 6 January 2011
By: Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides an overview concerning the MPS Territorial Policing (TP) response to the learning from Leicestershire Constabulary in relation to the tragic deaths of Fiona Pilkington and Francesca Hardwick in 2007.

A. Recommendation

That members

  1. note the report.

B. Supporting information

Introduction

1. This report details the main recommendations from the Chief Constable of Leicestershire’s report to the Leicestershire Police Authority (LPA) in 2009; and summarises the MPS position and response to the areas identified by Leicestershire.

2. This report outlines how the MPS responds to ‘Anti Social Behaviour’ and ‘Safeguarding Adults’ at risk, including volume of reported cases for ‘Vulnerable Adult Abuse’. It will also detail key developments in the identification of repeat victims; and policy developments and Equality Impact Assessments relating to ASB (Anti-Social Behavior) and Safeguarding Adults

Background

3. In October 2007, Fiona Ann Pilkington took her own life and that of her 18 year old daughter, Francesca Hardwick. A letter written by Miss Pilkington before her death identified the continued harassment and anti-social behaviour that she and her daughter had suffered as the cause of her actions.

4. Following the tragedy, an internal review was instigated by Leicestershire police. The review made the following observations:

  • The disability and vulnerability of the Pilkington’s had not been taken into account, and that there was a failure to link the reported incidents,
  • Opportunities to deal with the identified offenders earlier through liaison with key partners were missed by failing to share information

5. The failure of officers to recognise that the victimisation was related to disability resulted in the Force Hate Crime policy not being adhered to. This meant that standards of investigation and support were not sufficient and that incidents were treated as isolated occurances of anti social behaviour.

6. The Leicestershire review recommended a number of actions which are detailed in bold throughout this report, along with the MPS response:

Action 1 - To report back to the Management of Police Information Group regarding the issue of creating a “golden nominal” for the identification of vulnerable victims.

7. The Improving Policing Information (IPI) programme will deliver a search mechanism (e.Met-search) to identify all information held by the MPS about individuals for a policing purpose. The first release of e.Met-search will bring together information across the Crime Recording, Intelligence, Custody, Child Protection, Missing Persons, and Incidents systems; these will be complemented with images taken in Custody, with the results presented as a single view of the person, highlighting their risk indicators.

8. e.Met-search will also use probabilistic matching [the likelihood of a match rather than just exact matches of names and/or references] which greatly increases the chance of identifying risk factors for individuals where, for example, a name may be misspelt. Testing with live data has produced excellent matching results with the probabilistic element producing, in many cases, improvement in matching over conventional search methods. This facility will be available from 2011.

9. In relation to repeat victims who identified as being disabled, the Community Safety Unit (CSU) Central Service Delivery Team has created an ‘Early Warning System’ (EWS) that provides an intelligence framework to identify and manage harmful offenders, offence locations and repeat victims. All disabled victims of crime are identified through the EWS and repeat victims within the previous 12 months are highlighted. A report is submitted to the CSU Service Delivery Team who liaise with the borough CSU where the victim resides to ensure that an effective risk management plan is in place. These plans are monitored centrally via the TP crime Daily Management Meeting.

Action 2 - To ensure that Anti Social Behaviour (ASB) policy is fit for purpose and that processes are in place to effectively identify and deal with prolific ASB offenders in line with legislation.

10. Although investigators and response teams have a vital role to play in tackling ASB, the problem solving activity is primarily the responsibility of Safer Neighbourhood Teams. There are 632 wards in London, each serviced by an SNT of a minimum policing model which is 1 Sergeant, 2 Police Constables and 3 PCSOs. This means there are approximately 1990 police officers and 1900 PCSOs in London managing issues of anti social behaviour.

11. The MPS is also currently undergoing a full review of its approach to ASB. This is led by the ASB steering group chaired by Territorial Policing Commander (Crime and Customer Strategy). Whilst the areas of work are wide, key areas include:

  • Response to the 2010 HMIC inspection,
  • Responding to public concerns around ASB
  • Responding to the MPA audit of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders
  • Providing a co-ordinated response to ASB across the MPS
  • Development of consistent and cohesive relationships (both strategic and operational) with partners and to develop a response to the MPA review of anti-social behaviour orders.

12. All areas are being reviewed with particular reference to identifying how VOLT (Victim, Offender, Location, and Time) can help deal with Anti Social Behaviour. This includes:

  • Provision of training for all staff in relation to identification and definitions of repeat, vulnerability and ASB
  • Guidance to command and control staff
  • The MPS Directorate of Information is are currently reviewing its systems to identify both short term/long term solutions for a case management system that will allow easier identification of VOLT. This will form the backbone of a future recommendation to the TP Chief Officer Group (COG).
  • Guidance and minimum standards have been circulated to Borough management which encompass identification of VOLT. These include inclusion of this type of ASB data at daily/bi-weekly intelligence/tasking meetings as well as holding of specific ASB partnership meetings monthly to discuss, identify and task in relation to ASB.
  • The Performance Information Bureau provides monthly data to Boroughs on repeat callers based command and control data.
  • The Central (TPHQ) performance team currently dip sample command and control reports to ensure information (including repeat/vulnerability) is appropriately tasked to teams.
  • There is currently a central review of borough analysts to enhance identification of repeat/vulnerability in relation to ASB.

13. TP Safer Neighbourhoods staff attend the monthly ASB managers forum. This forum includes ASB (both MPS and Local Authority) managers and is used for discussion of ASB issues as well as exchange of good practice. They have also recently commenced a review of its ASB website to ensure that it highlights information of note including good practice ideas.

14. There is also an ongoing review of the MPS’ approach to ASB, and Territorial Policing Headquarters (Safer Neighbourhoods) has linked in with a number of forces including Norfolk and Leicestershire constabularies to help guide its approach to ASB management. The MPS has a representative who sits on the Pan-London ASB board as well as a Police Sergeant who is attached to the GLA and who has links with the Home Office to assist in guiding MPS policy towards ASB.

15. The MPS is currently working towards identifying a case management system that will facilitate identification of repeat victims, callers, offenders, locations and times. It is proposed that this system will:

  • Allow end-to-end management of ASB cases.
  • Facilitate identification of repeat victimisation/vulnerability with a view to early intervention and prevention of escalation.
  • Improve staff understanding of ASB therefore reduce the gap in how staff views ASB compare to crime.
  • A supervision facility to ensure that ASB cases are appropriately recorded managed and resulted/classified (for example to ensure that incidents of hate crime are not hidden under ASB labels).
  • In the near future the MPS will be adopting the national “risk assessment matrix” for assessing vulnerability of callers.
  • Document problem solving activity.

Action 3 - To ensure that processes are in place to identify potentially vulnerable ASB victims.

16. The MPS and its partners are developing an intelligence sharing process based on the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) trialed in Devon. The model for the partnership is a platform to provide an effective information sharing, referral, problem solving, risk management and early intervention capacity within London. The need for a multi agency system has been highlighted following numerous nationwide incidents and case reviews where co-operation was criticised.

17. The MPS has a number of policies in place to deal with persons at risk;

  • Hate Crime policy
  • Mental Health policy
  • Repeat victimisation policy
  • • Safeguarding adults at risk policy
  • Investigation of Rape and serious sexual assault policy
  • Victim Codes of Practice (VCOP)
  • Victim support policy

18. Vulnerable and intimidated victims are catered for under “the Victims code of practice” (VCOP). Here victims of crime are entitled to receive a minimum standard of service from the police and other criminal justice agencies. Police have a number of obligations in order to comply with the code, and these obligations must be complied with within either one or five days depending on the risk to the victim.

Command and Control Centre (CCC) response

19. The MPS has a 'repeat location' facility within its ‘Call handling System’ (CHS) which automatically searches caller, incident, attendance locations, phone numbers and VRM's to identify those which have come to police notice before, thereby identifying repeat victims as well as repeat locations. The system considers exact matches spatial matches and searches across different systems.

20. If an address is identified as a repeat location then Location Based Comments (LBCs) are entered onto the CAD system to advise officers dealing. Officers and control room staff can refer to previous reports.

21. Following the implementation of the National Incident Category List (NICL) in July 2010, descriptive categories were added to the MPS Command and Control operating systems, such as vulnerable and repeat caller and/or victim. These categories have both a definition and a dedicated Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

22. On the 13 October 2010, three special message formats were launched on the Command & Control systems. These provide an aide memoir, with script guidance and instructions where vulnerability and/or repeat victim status is identified.

Action 4 - To review the policy on race hate crime to ensure that disability issues are appropriately identified and to ensure compliance with the latest legislation.

23. The MPS Hate Crime Policy and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) were initially introduced in 2004 and an updated version is awaiting publication. Disability is featured within the policy as well as guidance in dealing with some of the issues contained within this report. The consultation process for the 2010 update and equality impact assessment (EIA) has involved members of the MPA Hate Crime Forum, including London Gypsy and Traveler Unit, UK Disabled Peoples Council, representatives from the MPS Disability Advisory Group, GALOP (London's lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community safety charity), The Monitoring Group, London Criminal Justice Board, Community Security Trust, London Councils, and Muslim Safety Forum.

24. A specially convened meeting was held within the MPA with members of the hate crime forum on the 20th January 2010, to give feedback on the SOP as part of the consultation process and EIA. As part of the consultation process, issues relating to open source intelligence and transgender matters were amended and incorporation of VOLT and violent offender orders added. Disability issues and guidance around dealing with victims with disability are contained within the document.

25. The MPS also has a ‘Safeguarding Adults at Risk’ policy and SOP, which was published in June 2009. The policy introduces an enhanced and prioritised procedure for the investigation of Safeguarding Adults at Risk cases to create a framework for all staff to provide an effective level of service.

26. As part of that consultation and EIA process a large number of organisations formed a ‘safeguarding adults at risk’ steering group. Some of the organisations involved included; Disability Independent Advisory Group (DIAG), Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI), Action on Elder Abuse, National Forum for people with Learning Disabilities, Guy’s and St Thomas NHS Hospital Acute Trust, Age Concern England, Albert Kennedy Trust, Black Gay Men’s Advisory Group, Broken Rainbow, Stonewall, Terence Higgins Trust and Victim Support.

Action 5 - To ensure that a mechanism is in place within area Community Safety Bureau (CSBs) to flag vulnerable victims on a daily/case-by-case basis.

27. Every borough within the MPS has a Community Safety Unit (CSU), which deals with domestic violence, all hate crime, safeguarding adults at risk and honour based violence. These incidents and offences are ‘flagged’ and screened in for investigation and/or support. CSUs are staffed by specially trained investigators. Borough CSUs are supported by the Community Safety Unit Service Delivery Team. In accordance with the existing safeguarding Adult at Risk Policy, CSUs focus on situational vulnerabilities as indicators of risk rather than the simple association of the person themselves being deemed ‘vulnerable’. As highlighted above in paragraphs 19-22, the MPS Command and Control Centre (CCC) also have a role to play in the identification of ‘vulnerable’ victims.

Performance

28. For the Financial Year 1 April 2008 - 31 March 2009, there were 708 offences of Vulnerable Adult Abuse. There were 47 offences of Disability targeted Hate Crime. For the Financial Year 1 April 2009 - 31 March 2010, there were 476 offences of Vulnerable Adult Abuse. There were 110 offences of Disability targeted Hate Crime. In the current Financial Year to date (1 April 2010 - 30 September 2010), there have been, 199 offences of vulnerable adult abuse. There have also been 66 offences of disability targeted hate crime.

29. Perceptions of ASB can sometimes be subjective which affects the manner/method of recording (e.g. local team spreadsheets, CADs (Dispatch report), CRIMINTS or even no need to record). At present it is almost impossible to identify exact levels of ASB within the MPS and this was highlighted by the recent HMIC inspection. There are a number of reasons for this including:

  • The number of methods for receiving ASB information, i.e. via CCC, reported on the street or via SNTs.
  • Accurate classification of initial calls.
  • Accurate recording and flagging of ASB on the MPS intelligence (Crimint+) systems.

C. Other organisational and community implications

Equality and Diversity Impact

1. This report predominately relates to disabled people and those that find themselves within the ‘safeguarding adults at risk’ arena. It discusses the Leicestershire and MPS response to their experiences, particularly in relation to experiencing Hate crime and ‘anti-social’ behaviour. It goes on to detail specific measures that are in place to deal with those who experience ASB or hate crime. An example of this would be the ‘early warning system’ for disabled victims of crime (para 9). However, anti - social behaviour can affect anyone, and this report summarises the main response by the MPS.

2. Full impact assessments were completed for both the Hate crime and Safeguarding Adults policies. There was extensive consultation for both policies (detailed within the report), the outcomes of which were positive with minor suggestions made and accepted (i.e. issues relating to open source intelligence and transgender matters were amended and incorporation of VOLT and violent offender orders added to the hate crime policy).

3. EIAs are undertaken on corporate and local policies and are a vital tool that helps to mitigate or identify where potential negative outcomes may arise and are monitored and revisited when changes are made within the MPS.

4. The MPS is mindful of any adverse impact or disproportionality that may occur as a result of the delivery of its services and fully embraces the need to engage with and consult with the communities and their representatives.

Consideration of MET Forward

Met Streets - Safer Neighbourhoods

5. This report and specifically the work of the Safer Neighbourhood teams (SNT), supports ‘Met Streets’ (Safer neighbourhoods). The SNT predominately deal with ‘Anti Social Behaviour’ (ASB) in all is forms and are at the forefront of its identification and prevention. The Use of SNT’s in the fight against ASB reduces criminality and escalation of offences, whilst increasing public confidence.

Met Specialist – Public Protection

6. The role of the specialist investigators within the community safety units (CSU’s) supports the work of ‘Met Specialist’ (Public Protection), as officers are trained and deal with on a daily basis, offences of domestic violence, hate crime, safeguarding adults at risk and so called ‘honour based violence’. CSU officers work in partnership with key strategic partners to reduce risk to victims of crime, reduce criminality and increase confidence in policing.

Financial Implications

7. There are no known financial implications relating to this report. Activities identified are being carried out within existing budgets. Any new developments would be subject to the Service’s approval processes

Legal Implications

8. As a public authority, the MPA is currently required to take action to tackle discrimination, to prevent harassment, and to promote equality of opportunity in all its functions in relation to race, disability and gender.

On 8 April 2010, the Equality Act 2010 received Royal Assent. The Act sets out a general duty requiring those subject to the duty to have regard to the need to:

  • eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation;
  • advance equality of opportunity between different groups; and
  • foster good relations between different groups.

9. Some provisions of the Equality Act come into force on 1 October 2010 but the government proposes to bring the general and specific equality duties into force through regulations in April 2011. Public bodies will have an extra year after the regulations have come into force before having to publish their equality objectives and whether they are being met.

Environmental Implications

10. There are no known environmental implications relating to this report

Risk Implications

11. There are risks if the recommendations of the Leicestershire Police Authority Report into the death of Fiona Pilkington and Francesca Hardwick are not followed.

D. Background papers

  • Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police Report to the Leicestershire Police Authority (LPA) on 13 October 2010.

E. Contact details

Report authors: Commander Steve Rodhouse (Crime and Customer Strategy, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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