Vetting within the MPS

Report: 11
Date: 5 November 2009
By: Assistant Commissioners Specialist Crime and Specialist Operations, on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides a briefing of vetting within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

The first part details options for the location of MPS vetting. There are currently two vetting units in the MPS, one within Specialist Operations which deals with Developed Vetting (DV) and Security Checks (SC); the other within Specialist Crime which conducts vetting enquiries on all recruits, new staff and contractors. The 2004 Service Improvement Review recommended that there should be one combined vetting unit in the MPS, suggesting that such a unit would be more professional, efficient and cost effective and would prevent duplication. The development of a single vetting unit has been delayed due to the uncertainty of the future national position. Furthermore, the current arrangements have worked better than any of the previous arrangements, in terms of performance. Management Board have therefore made the decision to maintain the status quo at the present time.

The second part of the report deals with the performance of vetting. Between the two units over 29,000 vetting checks were undertaken in the financial year 2008/09.

The final part of the report provides information on the Vetting and Barring Scheme (VBS). In July 2010 the VBS will become fully operational with a requirement for all people who have frequent and intensive contact with children or the vulnerable to be registered with the scheme. The Police Service are not currently exempted from this requirement and whilst the Home Secretary is considering an application from the Service to be exempted, work is in hand to identify the roles which we would be required to register under the scheme should exemption not be granted.

A. Recommendation

That members note the content of this report and, in particular, note the decision to retain the current arrangements for the location of the vetting functions.

B. Supporting information

Location of MPS Vetting

1. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) National Vetting Policy draws a clear distinction between Force Vetting, which deals with criminality and corruption, and National Security Vetting (NSV), which focuses upon the protection of the national infrastructure including national security and espionage. ACPO policy recommends that each force has a single vetting unit and that the unit sits within the Directorate of Professional Standards. However, it is for each Chief Officer to decide where their vetting unit sits. Currently all recruit vetting, contractor vetting, management vetting and subsequent renewals are administered by Personnel Security Group (PSG) whereas all officer/staff vetting at Security Clearance (SC) and Developed Vetting (DV) level (with the exception of ACPO ranks) are completed by SO15.

2. The anomaly of two separate vetting units was identified in the 2004 MPA sponsored Service Improvement Review (SIR). It maintained that a single vetting unit would be more professional, efficient and cost effective, would prevent duplication and allow for aligned policies in line with ACPO National Vetting Policy, Home Office Circular 54/2003, National Recruitment Standards and Cabinet Office Security Policy Framework. At that time it was proposed that the SO15 National Security Vetting Unit and PSG merge into a single unit under the management of SO15. /p>

3. The amalgamation of the two units has not taken place, primarily due to a decision as to the future of police involvement in National Security Vetting (NSV) remaining outstanding. Under the vetting transformation programme the Cabinet Office proposed that all NSV should be conducted by an external agency. ACPO currently contend that the cost implications of this to the Police Service are significantly higher than if certain parts of police vetting were retained within the service. This issue has not yet been resolved but the latest proposal that the MPS continues to conduct a part of the NSV process as it does at present, is being considered. That being the case it is appropriate for the issue of amalgamation of vetting units to be revisited.

4. Management Board have considered four options for locating a single vetting unit and a fifth option of retaining the present arrangements in two separate locations. These are shown below:-

Option 1 - Single Vetting Unit within Specialist Crime

5. PSG has been with SCD26 for over 2 years. Over the last 12 months the unit has been meeting its Service Level Agreements (SLA) targets for the first time in its history. This has been achieved through strong supervision, a review of processes and close partnership working with SO15, Human Resources and the Directorate of Professional Standards.

Benefits

• Both units are currently co-located
• Builds on current good performance
• Complies with SIR recommendation of a single vetting unit
• A link to the safeguarding decision making processes of the Disclosure Service in SCD26 under the same line management

Risks

• Relationship with Security Services partners would take time to develop. Requirement for a link with SO intelligence systems.

Option 2 - Single Vetting Unit within Specialist Operations

6. The National Security Vetting Unit based within SO has excellent working relationships with the Security Services and also has easy access to internal SO databases which are used for DV and SC vetting within the MPS and also as a service to other Special Branches nationally. If the NSVU were combined with PSG anywhere other than within SO this process would need to be retained either in SO or in the new unit.

Benefits

• Both units are currently co-located
• Complies with SIR recommendation of a single vetting unit
• Strong links to Security Services and Whitehall

Risks

• Potential increase in costs if remaining national functions are not moved from SO with the vetting unit

Option 3 - Single Vetting Unit within Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS)

7. ACPO national vetting policy recommends that a single vetting unit is located within DPS as the unit responsible for maintaining the discipline and integrity within the Service. Historically, this is where the unit sat until its move to SCD in April 2007.

Benefits

• Follows national ACPO vetting policy
• Complies with SIR recommendation of a single vetting unit
• Easy access to DPS intelligence and taint information in relation all vetting processes

Risks

• Previous vetting performance was poor in this command.
• Links with the Security Services would need to be developed.
• Requirement for a link with SO intelligence systems.

Option 4 - Single Vetting unit within Human Resources (HR)

8. Vetting was commented by MPA staff as being an HR function and it is therefore right that consideration be given to locating a single vetting unit within that Directorate.

Benefits

• Close alignment with the recruitment function

Risks

• Need to develop relationships with security services
• Need to create links with DPS for Taint and other intelligence
• Not clear how this would fit with Transforming Human Resources (THR)
• Vetting would not be seen as independent

Option 5 - Retain both units as present, NSV within SO and PSG within SCD26

9. These are the current arrangements.

Benefits

• Retain existing ‘successful’ management function in SCD26
• Maintain links with Security Services and intelligence systems within SO
• Vetting seen as independent
• Co location retains close working links
• Link for PSG with disclosure decision making process
• Ability to make immediate progress on the MPA Audit recommendations

Risks

• Need to ensure that close links are made with DPS for taint and intelligence
• Need to develop a system of independent oversight, e.g. through DPS chair of vetting board
• Need to develop transparent performance management regime in both areas

Management Board have agreed Option 5

10. Since SCD took responsibility for vetting, the vetting performance against Service Level Agreements within PSG consistently improved, so that the current vetting performance is at the best it has been (please see table below). This has been attributed to strong management and good links to the decision making processes within the disclosure service. Vetting is also seen as independent to either the recruitment or discipline processes. Furthermore, the risks attached to this option can be overcome with ease. The delays to the decision on vetting transformation and the MPS role in any national solution make this a viable option. It will enable the MPS to maintain and improve on existing performance whilst the new national structures are being developed.

PSG Performance - % % CTC cases cleared within 35 days

* Figure for w/e 16 January 2007. Given to the MPA in a report by DCS Phil Flower

** Performance dipped to 62% following the resulting of a back log of cases over 35 days old.

Performance

11. MPS vetting in both PSG and NSVU complies with the national ACPO vetting policy. The policy was drafted by members of the Vetting Officers’ Advisory Group, with MPS involvement. The draft policy was circulated across the Service and MPA in August 2008 and responses were sent to ACPO in September 2008. The final version has yet to be published although it will be used as the foundation for the review of MPS vetting policy which has been commissioned by MPS Vetting Board and is due for completion in December 2009.

12. Current vetting performance with in the MPS is split within the two units. PSG have a requirement to complete 80% of CTC cases in 35 calendar days. This financial year PSG have achieved an average of 95% of cases completed within 35 calendar days with an average Counter Terrorism Check (CTC) check now taking 21 days.

13. The SLA for Management Vetting is to complete 80% of cases within 42 calendar days. Performance this year is at 78% with an average check taking 32 days.

14. The NSVU aims to complete SC applications within six weeks and DV applications within six months. Current performance shows that DV applications are taking approximately 107 days to complete from receipt of application to clearance. SC applications take approximately 42 days to complete.

The table below gives details of the total number of vetting requests in each unit since 2007.

Total Number of Vetting Files Processed

16. The NSVU and PSG undertake local checks on police intelligence systems for vetting purposes. There is a requirement to liaise with the British Security Services for a national security check and then a further integrity check with the DPS Intelligence Bureau (the main internal customer for MPS vetting) as there is currently no direct access to their database.

17. National Security Vetting is conducted under the directions given by HM Government in their ‘Security Policy Framework’, which are updated annually. There are currently over 5500 MPS employees shown as holding DV or SC clearance, which they retain (subject to ongoing aftercare) until leaving the post that requires the vetting. Significant increases in workloads across vetting are expected in the lead up to the 2012 Olympics.

18. In 2008 MPA Internal Audit reviewed the MPS vetting processes. The recommendations and an update is attached at Appendix 1.

19. Both the NSVU and PSG have a Quality Assurance system in place. The NSVU apply a Quality Assurance process to each application at various stages, to assess whether the vetting is required, whether the forms are correctly completed, and whether the NSVU pass/fail criteria have been correctly applied. PSG have recently appointed a Quality Assurance officer at band D who has responsibility for the QA system within that unit.

20. PSG are advised by individual units of the number of staff/officers to be vetted and to what level. MPS Vetting policy is that all staff and officers are vetted to CTC level as the basic vetting check. With regard to contractors, their vetting level will depend on their role. All staff and contractors are vetted prior to commencement of employment unless a SOP17 is issued. As of week ending 9 October 2009, PSG have 569 cases outstanding:

21. All staff members who have informed the NSVU that they require DV or SC are either cleared (or refused) or are undergoing the process. The NSVU aim to complete SC applications within six weeks and DV applications within six months. At any one time there are approximately 80 SC and 380 DV cases in progress.

22. On the 10th anniversary of vetting all officers and staff (via their HR Units) are issued with instructions to complete vetting forms for a vetting review. All officers and staff who are to undertake a new role under a different contract of employment are vetted to the appropriate level, i.e. police community support officers (PCSOs) applying to be officers, staff applying for the MSC and officers applying for the 30+ scheme or for staff posts.

Safeguarding Children and the vulnerable

23. Currently the MPS undertake a Youth Supervision Check on those staff working within designated roles. This check is the equivalent of the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) enhanced check. Pending a decision by the Home Secretary on an application to exempt the police service from the requirement to register with the Independent Safeguarding Authority the use of Youth Supervision checks has been reinstated within the MPS. The posts which require the check have been identified and in the first 6 months of this financial year we have seen a 100% increase in the total number of checks compared to the whole of 2008/9.

24. The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 was created in order to protect children and vulnerable adults, from unsuitable people, who intended to work in roles which fall under regulated activity. The Home Office, Vetting and Barring Scheme was subsequently created to manage the vetting process and through the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA), register and where appropriate, bar individuals from working with vulnerable groups.

25. The Police Service is not currently exempt from the requirements of the Act which means; that from November 2010 any police officers or police staff working within a role which is deemed as regulated activity within the Metropolitan Police Service will be required to register with the Independent Safeguarding Authority and be subject to continuous monitoring. The ACPO position on this matter has not yet been made and further to this, a case is currently being reviewed by the Home Secretary as to whether the police service will be excluded from the requirement to register with the scheme.

26. It is the MPS position that if exclusion is not granted, a review of posts within the service will be conducted to ascertain which posts fall within the guidance of regulated activity, intensive contact and frequent contact. Sir Roger Singleton (Chair of the Independent Safeguarding Authority) is currently in the process of reviewing the terms; intensive and frequent after the Education Secretary requested the ISA clarify these points. His findings and guidance are not expected until December this year. Once his findings are published, the police service will be better sighted on the scope of roles which will fall under the act. The MPS will also be required to refer relevant disciplinary information on their staff to the ISA if the information relates to children or vulnerable groups people and it is proportionate to do so. A process is currently being discussed under the vetting portfolio on how this will work.

27. If the Home Secretary excludes police from the requirement to register with the scheme, then a vetting process will be created in line with ACPO guidance which will vet police officers and staff to a greater extent than that of the ISA. Under section 50a of the police and crime bill currently being read in parliament, police will have access to the ISA’s barred list which will show all persons who are barred from working with children, adults or both. This will mean that police will be in possession of all the information used by the ISA in their decision making process and more material based on intelligence. The process the police will follow is likely to take the form of recruit vetting with the inclusion of the barred list, vetting for officers identified in roles that would fall under regulated activity and an ongoing monitoring element. The ongoing monitoring element is likely to be a system whereby officers in identified roles will be regularly vetted to ensure they are still suitable to work with the vulnerable. Consultation is still taking place across operational portfolios to produce guidance on this subject, but any work will involve a significant change in practice.

C. Race and equality impact

1. By its nature, vetting has the potential to have implications for Race and Equality. An example of this could be in the application of residency criteria and the inability to verify antecedents in some countries. Whilst these have an impact on overall vetting policy and are being considered as a part of the Equality Impact Assessment currently underway with the MPS Vetting Review, they do not impact on the content of this report.

D. Financial implications

1. PSG budget for financial year 2009/10 is for £3.5 million which includes external funding of £164,000. It also includes a baseline provision of £650,000 for CRB checks were there a necessity to complete them for all officers. PSG has a Staff Establishment of 70 (9 of which are employed in non MPS vetting roles) and a Target Strength of 1 PC. The National Security Vetting Unit has a Target Strength of 12 and a Staff Establishment of 14.6. The NSVU budget for 2009/10 is estimated at £1.2 million, which includes £600,000 for the cost of the outsourced DV interviews and is funded from the Counter Terrorism specific grant.

2. Both NSV and PSG units are currently co-located at NSY. Any amalgamation of the two units would still retain the functions of NSV and PSG and so the work undertaken by them would be delivered within their existing budgets and the budget would therefore be transferred to any new directorate. If the units are consolidated, a review of the MPS vetting strategy and structure will be carried out. This could deliver efficiency savings which will be considered as part of the service’s budget and business planning process.

E. Legal implications

There are no direct legal implications of this report. The MPS and the Home Office have mandatory vetting standards which are justified by the need to protect national security and the prevention and detection of crime. It is therefore imperative that these standards are adhered to consistently in order to avoid susceptibility to a legal challenge.

F. Background papers

• Appendix 1: Action Plan

G. Contact details

Report author: Commander Simon Pountain

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Abbreviations and acronyms

• ACPO - Association of Chief Police Officers
• CRB - Criminal Record Bureau
• CTC - Counter Terrorist Check
• DPS - Directorate of Professional Standards
• DV - Developed Vetting
• ISA - Independent Safeguarding Authority
• MB – Management Board
• MPS - Metropolitan Police Service
• MV - Management Vetting
• NSV - National Security Vetting
• NSVU - National Security Vetting Unit
• PCSO - Police Community Support Officer
• PNC - Police National Computer
• PSG - Personnel Security Group
• SC - Security Check
• SCD - Specialist Crime Directorate
• SCD26 - Specialist Crime Directorate (Personnel Security Group)
• SIR - Service Improvement Review
• SLA - Service Level Agreement
• SO - Specialist Operations
• SO15 - Counter Terrorism Command
• SOP - Standard Operational Procedures
• SVAP - Security Vetting Appeals Panel
• THR - Transforming Human Resources
• VBS - Vetting and Barring Scheme

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